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ABSTRACT 
 
Inspired by Derridean deconstruction, contemporary translation studies hold that 
translation is a process of transformation that is characterized by indeterminacy. 
However, little attention has been given to the political aspects of that transformation. 
By exploring this aspect, this thesis argues that translation is a transformation within 
sovereignty from a divine to a more secular model that is guided by justice. By 
offering a comparative reading of Derrida’s and the medieval Turkish/Persian 
philosopher’s, al-Farabi’s, works on sovereignty and translation, it holds that the 
switch in the paradigms of sovereignty from a Derridean kingly cape to an al-Farabian 
imam implies a change in the dynamics of translating sovereignty that is aesthetic in 
nature. 
The research starts by exploring the political and theological implications implicit 
in the translation of sovereignty as expounded in Derrida’s ‘Des Tours de Babel’. 
Adopting Derrida’s image of the kingly cape turned into a wedding gown, it argues 
that the translation of sovereignty is an aesthetic shift from a divine-kingly model to a 
more secular one. The thesis, then, explores traces of this shift within al-Farabi’s 
model of the Virtuous City where the weeds, dissenting citizens, contest the imam’s 
logocentric sovereignty in an affective and imaginative medium. Both models will be 
shown to highlight a reverse structure within the ceremonial aspect of power, which 
Agamben denotes as ‘acclamation’ or ‘glory’. Acclamation’s reverse role in the 
translation of sovereignty, the thesis argues, best figures in the political cartoons on 
the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. These cartoons illustrate how contestation becomes a 
creative event of redefining sovereignty that is negotiated in terms of language and 
image. The Egyptian protestors demonstrate how language escapes the fatalism of its 
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role in mediating meaning to acquire the role of poetic mediation in linguistic play. In 
poetic mediation, the thesis argues, sovereignty is translated within a collectively-
shared imaginative construct that a creative form of justice guides. 
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INTRODUCTION 
So let it be clear to you that the idea of the Philosopher, 
Supreme Ruler, Prince, Legislator, and Imam is but a 
single idea. 
Al-Farabi1 
The language of translation envelops its content like a 
royal robe with ample folds. 
Walter Benjamin2 
No doubt the cape and the folds protect the king against 
the cold or natural aggressions; but first above all, it is, 
like his scepter, the eminent visibility of the law. 
Jacques Derrida3 
 
In ‘Des Tours de Babel’, Jacques Derrida borrows Walter Benjamin’s metaphor of 
translation as a royal cape to show how translation remains ‘separate’ from the body 
of the original text. Derrida’s focus on this state of separateness and difference, rather 
than equivalence, constitutes the main theme of research in contemporary translation 
studies. However, little attention has been given to the political implications of that 
shift where difference is marked by such terms as power, law and royalty. The 
fundamental role that power relations play in differentiating translation (cape) from 
the original (body) finds these power relations subjected to reassessment under the 
influence of the new different translation produced. This prospect of translational 
difference as a mechanism of power and law-making is what this thesis aims to 
investigate. 
                                                            
1 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, in Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato 
and Aristotle, trans. by Mahdi, Muhsin (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 
47 (#58). 
2 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task of the Translator’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Marcus 
Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), vol. I, p. 258. 
3 Jacques Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, in Acts of Religion, ed. by Gil Anidjar, trans. 
by Joseph F. Graham (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 125–6. 
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This mechanism of power, the thesis will argue, is a process of transformation or 
difference-making that is influenced by context. The effects of context will be shown 
through comparing Derrida’s deconstructive representation of western kinghood as 
cape with the eastern, Islamic notion of the king as imam. The earliest philosophical 
fashioning of the latter is attributed to the ninth century Turkish philosopher, Abu 
Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Farabi (hereafter, al-Farabi). Al-Farabi is 
considered to be the father of Islamic political philosophy who is well-known for his 
attempt to marry the Platonic concept of kinghood with that of the prophet as Islamic 
imam, a legislator and supreme ruler.4 
The thesis’s comparative reading of translation as a transformation from kinghood 
into a western ‘cape’ and eastern ‘imam’ aims to highlight the fundamental role that 
aesthetics plays in the creation of power. Translation, here, becomes a concern with 
artistic representation and semiotic creation of metaphors that aid in the establishment 
or contestation of power. To elucidate this point and show its relevance to 
contemporary thought, I will investigate the aesthetic media employed by the 
revolutionaries of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution to contest power. The study of the 
challenge to power in these media, such as that of political cartoons, will show how 
political contestation becomes a translation of the semiotic into the aesthetic. The 
semiotics used by the representatives of the Egyptian regime to establish power 
through emphasizing the signified dimension of every sign faces the unanimous voice 
of the people in their famous chant, ‘[T]he people want to topple the regime’, a voice 
that evoked an aesthetic sense of emotional and affective unity. The aesthetic 
response of emotional unity, in turn, freezes the sign in its state as sign. The sign of 
                                                            
4 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present: Philosophy 
in the Land of Prophecy (Albany, NY: State University of NewYork Press, 2006), p. 
138. 
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socially-constructed power, the Egyptian regime, becomes an image open to an 
aesthetic response, a chant in response to a poetic verse by the Tunisian poet al- 
Shabbi in his Life’s Will (1933) that reads ‘If, one day, the people want to live, / then 
fate will answer their call’.5 In this sense, the semiotic field of the sign is translated 
into the aesthetic dimension of the sign as image and poetic chanting, a chanting that 
opens up the field of meaning through the imagination. The aesthetic and emotional 
aspect of that contestation will be shown to have ‘brought a world into being’, a world 
of reviving an age-old and dead theological debate on free will versus predestination. 6 
The aesthetic revival of a world marked by this debate, the thesis argues, questions the 
notion of the political and paves a way for a politics beyond revolution and beyond 
contestation. 
However, before proceeding to sketch the argument for my work, I would like to 
reassert that this thesis’s focus is not on translation in its ordinary, mundane linguistic 
sense concerned with a source and target text. This thesis instead borrows from the 
field of ‘cultural translation’ that Anthony Pym in Exploring Translation Theories 
claims is concerned with ‘translation without translations’ where the concern is not 
with ‘finite linguistic products’ as texts, but much broader ‘cultural processes’.7 This 
‘concept of translation as a process more than as a product’, Pym claims, ‘enters as a 
model of how the voice can cross a border and continue, transformed’.8 The voice that 
crosses the borders of the east/west divide and continues transformed is taken by this 
                                                            
5 Elliott Colla, ‘The People Want’, Middle East Report- The Art and Culture of the 
Arab Revolts, 42 (2012) <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer263/people-want> [accessed 
3 November 2014]. 
6 Nicholas Davey, ‘Hermeneutical Aesthetics and an Ontogeny of the Visual’, in The 
Handbook of Visual Culture , ed. by Ian Heywood and Barry Sandywell (London, 
UK: Berg, 2012), p. 144. 
7 Anthony Pym, Exploring Translation Theories (London &New York: Routledge, 
2010), p. 148. 
8 Pym, Exploring Translation Theories, p. 109. 
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thesis to be that of the people contesting political power, a contestation that assumes 
religious and theological connotations. On the one hand, western political theology, as 
in the work of Giorgio Agamben and Charles Taylor, narrates this in terms of the 
interrelationship and the move from the religious to the secular. On the other, what 
looks like a similar move that grapples with issues of religion/secularism in the 
eastern context of the Egyptian Revolution will be shown to continue the voice of 
contestation but equally transform and question the political relationship between 
religion and secularism. Al-Farabi’s works, which are believed by Massimo 
Campanini (in ‘Al-Farabi and the Foundation of Political Theology in Islam’) to be 
key forerunners of Islamic political theology, will inform my comparative reading in 
this respect.9          
  As the theological, political, and aesthetic turn out to constitute the main cultural 
levels of transformation in translation, a series of critical questions regarding the 
relationship between these different levels emerges. What does it mean to speak of 
politics as an act of translation? How can a translation of the semiotic into the 
aesthetic redefine politics, a field whose sole concern so far has been on mechanisms 
of power and governance? What is the relationship between the ‘western’ formulation 
of politics and the ‘eastern’ one and what are the factors influencing the 
transformation along these frontiers? How could this redefinition of translation as 
transformation inform the political-theological debate today? And why does political 
theology need to deal with the politics of translation in the first place? 
 
                                                            
9 Massimo Campanini, ‘Alfarabi and the Foundation of Political Theology in Islam’, 
in Islam, The State, And Political Authority: Medieval Issues and Modern Concerns, 
ed. by Asma Afsaruddin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 39. 
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The Argument: Translating Politics and Politicizing Translation   
In an attempt to answer the afore-mentioned questions, my argument will start by 
investigating the intersection of politics and translation through Derrida’s ‘Des Tours 
De Babel’ in which he gives his deconstructive reading of Benjamin’s ‘The Task of 
the Translator’. My chapter adopts Derrida’s metaphor of the ‘kingly cape’ of 
translation to show how the contestation of political power is a deconstruction that 
turns from the cosmic notion of the king as law or power represented by his cape to 
that of the ‘wedding gown’ that represents an excess dimension to politics, one aiming 
for justice.10 Emphasis is put on the different levels of that transition that range from 
the divine to the secular in the game of power politics and from the material to the 
spiritual through image, sound, sign and symbol, in semiotic representative terms. 
This political-semiotic contestation of the kingly discourse of power is revisited in 
Chapter Two through the lens of al-Farabi’s notion of contention employed by the 
‘weeds’ of the Virtuous City, the citizens of the Virtuous City who refuse to adhere to 
the laws set by the law-giver, against its king.11 That contention defines the medium 
of translation whereby rhetoric, a means employed by a king figure to establish 
logocentric power, is faced by activating a Derridean ‘différance’ in the weeds’ 
linguistic translation in terms of ‘text’.12 This ‘active production of meaning’ 
resonates with what Pym finds to be the basis for a view of translation as a process 
                                                            
10 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 126. 
11 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, The Political Regime, in Medieval Political Philosophy: A 
Sourcebook, ed. by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, trans. by Fauzi N. Najjar (New 
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 53. 
12 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatari Chakravorty Spivak 
(London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 65. 
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not a product, where ‘all language use may be seen as a translation’.13 Pym’s 
argument that translation is a process of transformation builds on Jakobson’s claim, in 
his article titled, ‘On Linguistic Aspects of Translation’ (1959), that ‘the meaning of 
any linguistic sign is its translation into some further, alternative sign’ that the latter 
relies on to formulate his theory on translation.14 The weeds, thus, translate in 
response to logocentric logic. By doing that, they define their identity in terms of 
resistance to power. Within the local context of the Virtuous City, translation results 
from the work of the imagination and desire that manifests in the weeds’ contention of 
and play on the images and symbols that the imam employs. The king as imam 
employs symbols and mimetic similitudes to theoretical truths in order to convince the 
weeds of the divine nature of these truths by which the Virtuous City operates. He 
thus appeals to both logic and the imagination to maintain his rule as a sovereign. 
However, the weeds invest in the imaginative faculty, through activating the 
multiplication of images, in order to initiate the translation of the imam’s model of 
sovereignty. Their translation of sovereignty assumes a creative aspect related to the 
imaginary and affective construction of other city models. So, the imagination and the 
affects become the tools for the translation of sovereignty through ‘playing’ on signs. 
These contesting weeds entertain the possibility of forming other cities to distinguish 
themselves from the model of the Virtuous City. They thus display the creative aspect 
in the aesthetic play of signs. The creative originality of the method that the weeds 
follow in their political contestation, in turn, assumes an aesthetic dimension that the 
following chapter investigates.  
                                                            
13 Pym, Exploring Translation Theories, pp. 148–150. 
14 Roman Jakobson, ‘On Linguistic Aspects of Translation’, in The Translation 
Studies Reader, ed. by Lawrence Venuti (London & New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 
114. 
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The weeds’ attempt to transgress power and law to reach justice in their 
deconstructive reading of the kingly rhetoric displays originality through the aesthetic 
medium. This creativity is reread in Chapter Three within the context of the Arab 
Spring, specifically the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, to show how aesthetics is the 
proper field to reflect translation as a creative form of political contestation. The 
aesthetic translation of sovereignty, I hold, best figures in satirical political cartoons. 
My interest in satire and political cartoons as a model to depict the aesthetic 
contestation within politics has two main reasons. For one, I take cartoons to be the 
model of play on words and images, the play on signs, which is employed for political 
ends through contesting established political power. Cartoons also illustrate the 
political mechanism of ‘revers[ing] the traditionally accepted content of the symbol’, 
which cartoonists employ to attack the system.15 By reversing the symbol of power, 
the cartoons reflect an aesthetic mechanism inherent to the weeds’ deconstruction of 
sovereignty. The aesthetic translation of sovereignty, I hold, needs the medium of 
image and language within the cartoon to reflect the dynamics of deconstruction. 
By re-reading al-Farabi’s model of political contestation as an aesthetic reversal, I 
hold that the weeds initiate what Critchley in The Ethics of Deconstruction calls a 
Derridean double reading of ‘interpretation’ and ‘judgment’.16 This double reading, 
for Critchley, sets the ‘ellipsis into play’.17 By ellipsis, I mean concepts that resist 
translation or the ‘blind spots […] within the dominant interpretation’.18 In aesthetic 
reversal, the weeds address justice through a double act of elliptical play on image 
and language that the political cartoons reflect.  
                                                            
15 Charles Press, The Political Cartoon (London: Fairleigh University Press, 1981), p. 
227. 
16 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992), p. 
23. 
17 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 23. 
18 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 23. 
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This aesthetic reversal that the cartoons depict will be shown to play a significant 
role in the address to power that takes the form of what Agamben calls ‘glory’, or the 
‘ceremonial aspect of power’.19 This ceremonial aspect of power reformulates the 
weeds’ address to justice. In the cartoons, glory is aesthetically reversed; praise for 
the sovereign figure of power in the figure of a king is shown to be maintained even 
when popular sovereignty is liquefied by the introduction of social media.20 The 
people end up acclaiming the means, as in Facebook and Twitter, in an act of ‘reverse 
acclamation’. In reverse acclamation, the modern weeds de-glorify sovereignty, thus 
displaying power to be a ‘void’ or an ‘empty throne’, a throne that can never be 
filled.21 The empty throne within translation, the chapter will argue, holds the promise 
of justice through the creative aesthetic and linguistic retake on power that it allows.  
The creativity of the weeds’ aesthetic translation of sovereignty will, then, be 
shown to be best reflected within the poetic medium.22 The poetic voice, I argue, 
invests in language as a ‘pure means’; language entertains the possibility of meaning 
without concern with achieving it.23 This is what Agamben calls the ‘inoperativ[ity]’ 
of language which is best exemplified in the language of the poem.24 That voice of 
inoperativity will be shown to qualify the weeds’ address to justice as a yet-to-come 
state. 
                                                            
19 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, trans. by Lorenzo Chiesa and 
Mateo Mandarini (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 168. 
20 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 257. 
21 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 243. 
22 I use the term ‘creative’, here, to qualify the weeds’ translation of sovereignty. The 
modern revolutionaries of the 2011 Egyptian revolution invest in the poetic use of 
language to challenge the regime. They thus assume a revolutionary role that is very 
similar to the medieval weeds. Moreover, their translation of sovereignty assumes a 
creative poetic aspect that questions the role of language as a medium of voicing 
political revolt, an argument that I further expand later on in this chapter. 
23 Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, trans. by Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 
2007), p. 88. 
24 Agamben, Profanations, p. 86. 
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I will investigate the uniqueness of the poetic voice through the concept of the 
poetics of translation in both its western and eastern al-Farabian guises. The poetic, 
here, is taken to refer to translation as the ‘voice [that] can cross a border and 
continue, transformed’.25 In its western form, the poetic assumes Agamben’s sense of 
the ‘inoperativ[ity]’ of language.26 In that state of inoperative language, the poem, I 
argue, becomes a ‘form, where all relation to what is other and finite—to what is 
true—has been suspended’, as Yves Bonnefoy in ‘Translating Poetry’ claims.27 By 
breaking off any relation with truth, the poem becomes a ‘spiritual statement’ that 
gains its value from being a reflection of ‘shared existence’.28 The inoperative 
language that manifests in the poetic moments of shared existence, in turn, loses 
interest in truth and turns to the realm of the imagination. 
The poem, I argue, becomes an expression of a common imaginary construct that 
the weeds share and that is closely linked to justice. This common imaginary 
construct approximates Charles Taylor’s definition of the ‘social imaginary’ as the 
‘common understanding which makes possible common practices’.29 So, the poetics 
of translation within the 2011 Egyptian Revolution is concerned with social common 
practices that reinforce a contestation against power. It does so by reflecting a 
common understanding of justice. The critical issue is the commonality, the shared 
existence, which reflects the understandings through the practices. This is what I hold 
to take place in the people’s chanting of the poetic verse, ‘The people want to topple 
the regime’, that coupled with the common marching in Egypt and other Arab Spring 
                                                            
25 Pym, Exploring Translation Theories, p. 109. 
26 Agamben, Profanations, p. 86. 
27 Yves Bonnefoy, ‘Translating Poetry’, in Theories of Translation: An Anthology of 
Essays from Dryden to Derrida, ed. by Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 187–8. 
28 Bonnefoy, ‘Translating Poetryʼ, p. 187. 
29 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (London, England: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
pp. 171–2. 
Page 18 
 
countries. The common chanting and marching and the common reinforcement of that 
particular verse of poetry, displays a common understanding related to justice. The 
chant asks for toppling the regime but does not formulate a creed or a mission 
statement for the future state of justice as the French revolution, for example, did. 
This political state of justice or messianic hope in a better future is of no precise 
features. The people do not know what lies beyond toppling the regime, except that it 
should be a better state, a state where justice could be attained. 
The messianic hope, in turn, redefines the perimeters of eastern political theology 
within an imaginative poetic medium. The protestors reinforce the commonality of the 
experience through action, marching for justice as a cause and chanting ‘The people 
want the fall of the regime’. In their common action, they subject al-Shabbi’s poetic 
construction of the relationship between the human will and fate to redefinition. 
Historically speaking, the poem written in 1933 invested in the appeal to the people’s 
will to resist French colonial rule, a rule that was justified as a deterministic form of 
fate that should not be resisted.30 The relationship between political power, fate and 
will that the poem constructs, I argue, is a revival and a revisionist reading of an age-
old Islamic theological creed of Qadarism. Also considered a ‘heresy’, Qadarism 
claimed the primacy of free will over predestination as a political ideology. In their 
common chant, the people echo this qadarite creed by aligning their common will 
with fate as evident in the second verse of the poem that reads as ‘If people want life/ 
then fate (qadar) will answer their call’. Historically, Qadarites adopted a similar 
assertion that ‘power was worthless as long as one did not prove worthy of it’, an 
                                                            
30 Khadija El Alaoui, ‘Chanting Tahreer and Compassion: People as Poetry’, Tensions 
Journal, Fall/Winter 2011, pp. 13–4 
<http://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/pdfs/khadijaelalaouiarticle.pdf> [accessed 
27 December 2014]. 
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assertion which was linked to the ‘heresy of free will’.31 This heresy was employed to 
protest the Ummayads’ claim that ‘their governmental power had been a gift of God, 
a rizq, predetermined and irreversible’.32 By reviving this politically-charged 
theological creed in a poetic medium, the protestors seem to redefine the perimeters of 
that creed to suit the modern context of the revolution.  
In the modern retake on this creed, I argue, the protestors shed light on a unique 
linguistic dimension to this doctrine whose early traces could be found in al-Farabi’s 
writings. An affiliate of Qadarism, al-Farabi defines future possibility (in his 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione)  in terms of the qadarite creed on 
choice and free will, a belief that some deny under the effect of ‘legislation and 
indoctrination’.33 He displays his affinities with this creed through language, 
specifically through the play he performs on the word, qaddara. Usually reserved for 
talk regarding religious fate, qaddara is employed by al-Farabi to refer to men making 
decisions, as Zimmerman remarks.34 Linguistic play becomes an al-Farabian model of 
what I call, linguistic qadarism, a ‘transformed’ variant of Agamben’s inoperativity. 
In the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the qadarite chant heralds in a unique modern 
revision of an al-Farabian linguistic qadarism through the political terms that the 
protestors struggle with in order to define the political scene during the revolution. 
Political terms, such as dawla madaniyya or ‘civil state’, are employed by the 
protestors despite the ambiguity and, sometimes, contradictory meanings they 
                                                            
31 Josef van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, trans. by Jane Marie Todd 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 135. 
32 Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, p. 135. 
33Abu Nasr Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, trans. by F.W. Zimmermann (London: Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. 76–7. 
34Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, pp. cxvii–cxviii. 
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evoke.35 By investing in linguistic creation and revision, the protestors illustrate their 
version of linguistic qadarism. In linguistic qadarism, language is no longer 
informative or communicative. Words escape the fatalism or jabariyya of already 
established meanings in order for language to return to a stage of inception which 
allows for all possibilities and forms of creative use. 
However, it must be mentioned here that al-Farabi does not seem to apply this 
qadarite vision, which I claim to inspire modern protestors, in his political doctrines. 
Actually, his political philosophy reads more like a Jabarite or pre-destinarian cosmic 
creed on a God-ordained king who is a prophet and a philosopher and who uses 
rhetoric to establish ruler-ship. Al-Farabi does allow for contestation within his model 
of the Virtuous City, but this contestation might lead to war where the other is to be 
controlled or exterminated. However, another ‘promising’ consequence of 
contestation is exclusion from the Virtuous City model where the excluded entertain 
the possibility of constructing other city models. This construction of alternate city 
models, which starts with contestation within the Virtuous City, shows that the virtue 
that al-Farabi is speaking about is a political virtue of common choice. If the 
construction of a functioning city is a state of excellence, that state of excellence is 
given to the weeds of the Virtuous City so that they can construct a model of their 
own, regardless of their personal moral values. When political choice corresponds to 
common moral values, whether virtuous ones or not, the people assume a political 
identity that warrants a city model of choice, a city that may not survive the after-life, 
but nevertheless a functioning city.  
                                                            
35 Mohammed Ajam, ‘The Fashion of Political Terms in Egypt: A Continuous 
Display’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 2012 
<http://classic.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=684979&issueno=12273#.V
HmoCDGsVcz> [accessed 12 November 2014]. 
Page 21 
 
So, contestation, within the 2011 Egyptian revolution, construes a political 
identity through the aesthetics of the common voice that invests in linguistic 
qadarism. The people thus play the role of weeds within the revolution only to be able 
to assume another role related to linguistic creation. The characteristics of the role that 
would allow and justify the weeds’ resort to linguistic qadarism could be found in al-
Farabi’s description of any nation’s early development of language. In its early stages, 
a nation needs a category of citizens, called the ‘oral transmitters of poems’, who will 
be responsible for developing the nation’s expressions and utterances.36 These oral 
transmitters of poems are described by al-Farabi as a nation’s first wise men who 
fashion a language for a nation by reflecting and correcting a nation’s defective 
utterances as well as contriving ‘uncommon expressions’ to refer to unprecedented 
coincidences.37 As oral transmitters, the modern weeds are concerned not with 
constructing a city model of choice as much as with carrying the function of 
linguistically building a nation from scratch. Their project, which borders on these 
two roles, seeks to redefine power through poetic commonality. 
Their version of translation that borrows from Pym’s view of cultural translation, 
as I previously mentioned, now borrows from the field of translation sociology. The 
modern weeds illustrate how translation is related to the ‘formation of power 
relations’, and thus to redefining power as a whole. 38 This latter strand of translation 
is best defined in Callon and Latour’s ‘Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors 
Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So’ (1981). Callon 
                                                            
36 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, ed. by Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar el-
Mashreq, 1969) in Leneshmidt Translations Resource Library 
<http://www.leneshmidt-
translations.com/alfarabi_book_of_letters_english/index.htm..> [accessed 4 June 
2014] (§130). 
37 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, §130. 
38 Pym, Exploring Translation Theories, p. 156. 
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and Latour cite Hobbes’s social contract as a ‘specific instance’ of translation.39 
Although Hobbes’s social contract is concerned with giving power to the 
representative, Callon and Latour rewrite that contract as an act of social translation 
where an ‘actor or force’ becomes the ‘spirit and spokesman’ who translates the other 
actors into ‘a single will’.40 Within the context of the Egyptian revolution, the modern 
weeds as oral transmitters of poems carry out this social translation in a unique poetic 
form. Their concern is not with the ‘who’ that represents but with the voice of 
aspiration or will, the poetic medium of representation. The common chanting of the 
same poetic verse assumes the role of representing the people. As social power or 
public sovereignty is given over to the aesthetic medium, the latter comes to indicate 
what Callon and Latour call a ‘society’s very beginning’.41 In sociological terms, 
poetic representation initiates the process of building a society. In al-Farabian terms, 
poetic chanting by oral transmitters linguistically rewrites a nation from scratch. In 
this poetic rewriting, power does not refer to the authority of the sovereign; instead, 
power is what Agamben calls a void or empty throne that is translated via linguistic 
qadarism with its implicit sense of affective or emotional commonality.   
Conclusion 
In totality, then, this thesis’s focus on the role of aesthetics in the translation of 
sovereignty represents an invitation to reconsider the definition of politics. Politics 
apparently needs aesthetics if justice is to be imagined as a possibility. While 
semiotics reinforces the political sense of law, aesthetics, no longer an adornment 
                                                            
39 Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, ‘Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors 
Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So’, in Advances in 
Social Theory and Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-
Sociologists, ed. by K Knorr-Cetina and A V Cicourel (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1981), p. 279. 
40 Callon and Latour, ʻUnscrewing the Big Leviathanʼ, p. 279. 
41 Callon and Latour, ʻUnscrewing the Big Leviathanʼ, p. 279. 
Page 23 
 
within politics, translates justice in the transformation of terms and significance. Law 
may employ language and semiotics to establish power and control, but justice as an 
imagined state can only translate itself through the language of the imagination which 
inoperative language reflects. In that aesthetic translation, questions of religion and 
political theology prove to be hugely relevant. 
This deconstructive reading of translation that my thesis adopts could not have 
been formulated without the great aid of Benjamin’s, Derrida’s, Critchley’s and 
Taylor’s works on this topic. I am equally indebted to Agamben’s writings for 
providing the political theological framework for my argument. My thesis simply 
builds up on this rich tradition to offer a comparative reading within the Eastern 
context that is guided by al-Farabi’s rich philosophical and political works. This 
comparative reading of the politics of translation, it will be argued, can no longer be 
formulated in strictly political terms, such as resistance, subordination, or even 
revolution.42 Translation, instead, is taken to highlight the aesthetic element 
fundamental to each of these political processes and to the more complicated, yet 
relevant, political concern with the religious and secular forms of sovereignty. 
Translation, here, indicates the aesthetic contestation that takes place within the 
political; political debates on the religious and the secular turn out to fundamentally 
be a domain of the aesthetic. So, my focus in this comparative reading is not so much 
on highlighting similarities or even differences in theological and political arguments 
                                                            
42 The concern with the politics of translation originates from postcolonial studies and 
its interest in translation as central to ‘the revolutionary moment’. For example, Maria 
Tymoczko (in ‘Translation, Resistance, Activism: An Overview’, in Translation, 
Resistance, Activism, ed. by Maria Tymoczko (Amherst and Boston: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2010), p.1) argues that colonizers used translation as a tool to 
subordinate groups. In turn, these colonized groups employed ‘translational 
resistance’ in order to resist their colonizers. Translation is thus taken to be a 
fundamental feature of political contestation.    
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on secularization in different contexts as on establishing the relevance that political 
theology and the politics of translation bear to eastern political debate, a debate that is 
still in search for a way to transcend the state of revolution. To establish that 
relevance, my comparative reading will be structured by the following set of basic 
questions that need to be addressed anew if a politics beyond the revolution is to be 
formulated: 
- What role does a deconstructive approach to translation play in redefining the notion 
of sovereignty within the context of the Arab Spring? What is sovereignty and what is 
power? Does politics have a uniform definition across different contexts and if this is 
not the case, how can we understand power? What does aesthetics have that can 
contribute to this redefinition of politics, sovereignty and power? And if this 
redefinition, as argued, is relevant to context, when and where does it become 
pertinent to political debate? 
-  How does a reading of translation as an artistic contestation within politics inform 
our understanding of power and justice? What new symbolic connotations would such 
concepts as violence, law, and justice acquire in this context?   
- How does theology relate to the politics of translation? How can old Islamic 
theological debates, on free will vs. predestination, or qadarite vs jabarite ideology, 
inform our understanding of what is happening today in the ‘eastern’ political field? 
And perhaps, most importantly, why do we need to return to these age-old debates in 
the first place?43 
                                                            
43 Although the plausibility of employing medieval Islamic theology to throw light on 
contemporary debates in Egyptian society is debatable, this approach, I will show, 
helps throw light on the shifting dynamics within sovereignty. This constitutes the 
Egyptian revolution’s most important contribution to the field of politics. 
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-And, finally, if such terms as the secular and the religious could be reinterpreted in 
aesthetic terms, how would that reinterpretation affect intercultural understanding of 
the mechanisms of establishing power and imagining justice? 
These questions, though very basic, will be the subject to which this thesis 
addresses itself. My intention is not to ambitiously formulate a comprehensive answer 
that would resolve and explain political conflict; instead, my aim is to modestly 
address strife in terms of a politics of translation that would emphasize the overlooked 
aesthetic aspects of that conflict. Perhaps establishing such a translation continuum 
within the political that transcends cultural divides in semiotic, religious, and aesthetic 
terms would enable us to better understand the undercurrents of what might seem like 
a ‘clash’ in cultural dialogue on political matters.44 Such a hopeful research scope 
cannot but recognize that it will be constantly discomforted with the skepticism that 
such a take on the politics of translation could ever really help in overcoming political 
conflict. However, for the sake of this research project, I would certainly opt to 
maintain this hope in order to explore the possibilities and potentialities that a 
translation of such an outlook can have.    
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
44 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993), 
22–49 (p. 22). 
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CHAPTER 1  
  
TRANSLATING POLITICS 
 
The language of translation envelops its content like a 
royal robe with ample folds.  
Benjamin1 
More or less strictly, the cape weds the body of the 
king, but as for what comes to pass under the cape, it 
is difficult to separate the king from the royal couple. 
This is the one, this couple of spouses (the body of the 
king and his gown, the tenor and the tongue, the king 
and the queen) that lays down the law and guarantees 
every contract from this first contract. This is why I 
thought of a wedding gown.  
Derrida2 
Introduction  
 
In ‘The Task of the Translator’ (in Angelus Novus, 1920-1926), Walter Benjamin 
likens the language of translation to an ‘overpowering and alien’ royal cape that 
envelops the content of the original text. It is a significant – and until now almost 
entirely neglected – fact that Benjamin’s famous metaphor for translation is drawn 
from the political arena: the body of the sovereign. One of the very few commentators 
to remark upon this metaphor and its political implications is Jacques Derrida in his 
essay ‘Des Tours de Babel’ (1980). However, Derrida extends and transforms the 
metaphor by turning the cape into a wedding gown enveloping a royal couple. 
Derrida’s wedding gown highlights the contractual nature, the wedding, of the joint 
between the original and the translation, what he calls a royal couple. By employing 
                                                            
1 Benjamin, vol. I , p. 258. 
2 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 126. 
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the same image, Benjamin and Derrida highlight the state of the royal or kingly in the 
relationship between this original and its translation. 
It is this intriguing moment in the relationship between translation and politics – 
where translation ‘itself’ seems to be originally political and politics a kind of 
translation – that this opening chapter will explore. This association of the cape-gown 
in the Benjamin-Derrida model of translation invokes a whole series of questions that 
this chapter will address in order to structure its argument. What are the political and 
religious implications of portraying translation as a royal cape? What does the 
political and religious add to the semiotic nature of translation concerned with signs 
and words? Why does Derrida choose to rewrite that cape as a wedding gown, and 
does this move hold any other political and religious implications for translation?       
To answer these questions, this chapter will start by investigating the political 
implications in the cape image. The key text that will frame my discussion of the 
political aspects of royalty will be Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies (1957). 
Kantorowicz explains the conception of kinghood in the Middle Ages in terms of its 
political and religious or theological aspects where the King assumes two bodies, one 
being the organic one that he uses to establish political power while the other is the 
religious one where royal rule survives the physical death of the body. The latter is 
what French political thought, especially the work of Pierre Gregoire, associates with 
‘regalia’, the royal accessories of robe, scepter and crown, that display the ‘visibility 
of God’.3 Kantorowicz claims that the accessorial guise of royalty is a later illustration 
of what started as ‘Christ-centered kingship’, perhaps best exemplified in the work of 
                                                            
3 Ernest H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political 
Theology (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 422–3. 
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the Norman Anonymous.4 The Norman pamphleteer argues that there is a ‘personae 
mixtae (spiritual and secular) and persona geminatae (human by nature and divine by 
grace)’ in the figure of every king.5 The association of the spiritual with the secular on 
the one hand, and the human with the divine on the other, are united in this figure of 
the king. The king assumes secular-political and spiritually religious natures. The 
religious and political natures are also combined with an emphasis on the nature of the 
king as a human being whom only grace, ‘consecration’, can make divine.6 The king, 
in this way, becomes a figure of many politically religious layers, the spiritual, 
secular, human and divine, which I will read as embodied in Benjamin’s sense of the 
cape’s ample folds. 
The chapter’s investigation of the multiplicity of the politically religious folds of 
the kingly cape will be carried out in parallel with an exploration of the aesthetic and 
semiotic aspects of the cape of translation. The foundational semiotic element to start 
with is Benjamin’s notion of the word, the smallest unit of translation, which assumes 
the image of an ‘arcade’.7 The word’s aesthetic dimension in the image will be shown 
to switch to that of sound as translation comes to stand for an ‘echo’ of the original.8 
Influenced by the works of the German romantics, such as Novalis, Benjamin uses 
aesthetic vocabulary to communicate his understanding of translation, thus, rendering 
translation an aesthetic field defined by the image and sound. Benjamin’s socialist-
romantic work is, in turn, read by Derrida in post-structuralist semiotic terms 
concerned with signs, expressions and symbols. Derrida’s concern is with a ‘symbolic 
complementarity’ that connects the language of the original to that of the translation 
                                                            
4 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, p. 42. 
5 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, p. 59. 
6 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, p. 49. 
7 Benjamin, vol. I,  260. 
8 Benjamin, vol. I, 258. 
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and marks the ‘being-language of the language’.9 Translation is a concern with 
symbolic complementation, a reaching across between languages in symbolic terms, a 
state that characterizes language for what it is. This Derridean reading of translation 
supplies the semiotic reformulation of the cape’s folds that Benjamin presents in 
romantically aesthetic terms.  
However, Derrida’s contribution to Benjamin’s aesthetic notion of translation is 
not a strictly semiotic one as he also adds a religious, Jewish, influence. Derrida’s 
religious input is perhaps best summarized in his claim that translation is a ‘Babelian 
event’, the well-known religious event marked by the deconstruction of pure language 
into multiple languages.10 Under this influence of the religious, the semiotic-aesthetic 
cape folds will be shown to rework the politically theological notion of the cape as 
one embodying the king’s two bodies to one of a royal couple enveloped with a 
wedding gown. Derrida’s ‘translation’ becomes a religious event where the ‘self-
relation of the sacred body’ is described as ‘translat[ing] itself of itself’.11 Being a 
royal cape, translation becomes the process through which the sacred body ‘translates 
itself of itself’ to become a wedding gown.  
Finally, this move from the politically religious notion of the cape to the 
contractual notion of the wedding gown in the translation of the sacred body, I will 
argue, also marks a move from the religious to the secular as Charles Taylor has 
explained it in The Secular Age (2007). For Taylor, the conception of kinghood in the 
Middle Ages, which was highlighted by Kantorowicz, was a cosmic understanding 
that kinghood or royalty is an embodiment of a Chain of Being as a ‘metaphysical 
                                                            
9 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 131. 
10 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 131. 
11 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 133. 
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order’ or ‘law’ that organizes society.12 This, however, gave way to secularism, first 
initiated by the theory of the contract that makes law and justice subject to negotiation 
among parties carrying out this contract. This continuum between the divine and 
secular in political and religious terms that Taylor and Kantorowicz advocate in their 
versions of political theology is what I will show to figure in the translation of the 
cape into a wedding gown. So, in this chapter, my argument will be that translation as 
a cape-gown, indeed, holds political and theological implications that negotiate the 
divine and secular in a complex relationship between semiotics, the field of signs and 
symbols, and the aesthetics of sound and image. 
1.1 The Fold of Image-Word as Law 
 
I begin my discussion by comparing the aesthetic and political implications 
inherent in Benjamin’s smallest unit of translation, the word, and Derrida’s 
reformulation of that into a concern with a ‘choice’ of words, what he calls the ‘form 
of linguistic expression’.13 In this comparison, I focus on the aesthetic dimension of 
the ‘arcade’ metaphor to which the word is compared.14 The aesthetic, I argue, plays a 
significant role in the politics of translation that is developed by both Benjamin and 
Derrida in their respective works. 
For Benjamin, a ‘real translation’ is concerned with the literalness of words, a 
literalness that is compared to an arcade.15 A real translation must be ‘transparent’, 
and this can only be achieved through the ‘literal rendering of the syntax which 
                                                            
12 Taylor, The Secular Age, p. 192. 
13 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 127. 
14 Benjamin, vol. I, p. 260. 
15 Benjamin’s concern with literalness is not a concern with fidelity to the original 
text. Instead, translating words, for Benjamin, is concerned with form, not meaning. 
Through the literal rendering of syntax, words become the tool of transparency. 
Words allow for a transparent illustration of linguistic complementation, which 
characterizes the expressionless word or pure language. 
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proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator’.16 This 
literalness of the word that distinguishes a transparent, real translation is further 
likened to an arcade. In one definition, an arcade is an ‘arched covered passageway or 
avenue’.17 Literalness, here, assumes an aesthetic dimension of the circular arch and 
linear passageway. This aesthetic dimension of the circular and straight is also present 
in another of Benjamin’s ‘translation’ images: the tangent touching a circle.18 For 
Benjamin, the tangent of translation ‘touch[es]’ a circle, signifying the original work 
that is being translated, at ‘the infinitely small point of the sense’.19 This small point 
of the sense acquires the same aesthetic dimensions as those of the arcade, because it 
is the point that joins a straight tangent to a circular figure, thus reinforcing the dual 
aspect of its constitution or build-up. The straight tangent of translation, or the 
passageway, is taken to be in contact with the circle at one point of the sense that the 
word has in its literalness. This point, then, retakes the form of the arcade by 
borrowing characteristics from both the ‘circular’ original and the ‘linear’ translation. 
The word, or point, is significant for the image-quality that is evoked by the reference 
to circularity and linearity; these are reflective of more complicated linguistic and 
political processes. The word, here, becomes an arcade constructed by the fidelity to 
the original, circularity, and the freedom of translation, linearity. In this composite 
construction, the word constructs an arcade of literalness, an arcade that allows for 
pure language to shine through.   
 
                                                            
16 Benjamin, vol. I, p. 260. 
17 Merriam-Webster.com, 2012 <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/arcade> [accessed 4 January 2012], s.v. arcade. 
18 Benjamin, vol. I, p. 261. 
19 Benjamin, vol. I, p. 261. 
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Benjamin’s focus on the word as the element of the translator is reformulated by 
Derrida into a ‘choice of words’ displayed in the ‘form of linguistic expression’.20 The 
German romantic influence evident in Benjamin’s aesthetic construction of the 
circular-linear word finds a poststructuralist reverberation in Derrida’s form of 
linguistic expression. The form of expression acquires characteristics of the arcade, 
the chosen words, through which it displays itself. This acquisition is displayed in the 
character of originality that distinguishes a translation. For Derrida, expression marks 
the margin of originality in the contribution of the translator, where the original form 
acquires the aesthetic, circular-linear, aspect of the literal words with which it aspires 
to write. It seems that translators strive to write in words as arcades of literalness. 
Originality marks their aesthetic attempt to construct the arcade in their expressions.  
As an aesthetic construction, these arcade words display originality in their 
political implications that problematize the relationship between aesthetics and 
politics within a translation. The choice of words, for Derrida, plays a significant role 
in the ‘foundation of law’.21 By law, Derrida means the authority given to the original 
that demands that it be translated. He holds that this ‘law first establishes itself’ as a 
‘demand in the strong sense, a requirement that delegates, mandates, prescribes, 
assigns’.22 The law of demand builds on an inherent distinction between an original 
work and its translation. To explain this law, Derrida refers to a ‘system of 
oppositions’, the ‘polarity expression/expressed, signifier/signified, form/substance’, 
which defines classical Western metaphysics.23 This system of opposition, then, 
infiltrates into the distinction original/translation that allows for the 
‘acknowledgement of some originality in the translation’ through the choice of 
                                                            
20 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 127. 
21 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 127. 
22 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 116. 
23 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 127. 
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words.24 The choice of words becomes a manifestation of the oppositions within 
classical metaphysics that justifies and gives authority to the law. The margin of 
originality, established by the choice of words, builds on that system of oppositions in 
order to found the law.  
 This law, which is enacted by the form of expression, is then influenced by the 
aesthetic dimension of the circular and linear arcade. Both Benjamin and Derrida 
highlight the fact that any law-making, coming up with a new law, also involves a 
sense of law-preservation, preserving the non-relenting need for law. Derrida argues 
in the ‘Force of Law’ (1990) that ‘the foundation or positing of law’ must ‘envelop’ 
the ‘preservation of law and cannot break with it’.25 The new law could be a reaction 
to the insufficiencies of an old law and thus a modification that shows that there is 
always a need, a demand, for law in general. Law-making and law-preservation, I 
argue, are the political reformulation of the aesthetics of circularity and linearity. In 
aesthetic-semiotic terms, the original demands a new form of expression in a constant, 
linear, state of law making, within translation. However, that state of law-making that 
translation depicts also inscribes a circularity of law-preservation within the original. 
By embedding one aspect of the law in another, Derrida draws attention to the 
aesthetic aspect of circularity and linearity that plays into the formulation of the law 
as a demand for translation. 
This state of embedding within the law, in turn, holds a major political implication 
for the semiotic-aesthetic combination of circularity and linearity: violence. The 
aesthetic-semiotic dimension of translation is not only an expression of the political 
but a carrying out of its inherent violence. In ‘Force of Law’, Derrida claims that this 
                                                            
24 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 127. 
25 Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, in Acts of Religion, ed. by Gil Anidjar (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 272. 
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fusion of one violence in the other is ‘fundamental violence’ that ‘calls for the 
repetition of itself and founds what ought to be preserved, preservable, promised to 
heritage and to tradition, to partaking’.26 This is what he defines as ‘iterability’ or a 
violence that ‘inscribes the possibility of repetition at the heart of the originary’.27 In 
terms of translation, traces of this sense of iterability that ‘inscribes preservation in the 
essential structure of foundation’ could be found in the law of demand that an original 
piece of work makes and that the form of expression shows. 28 On the semiotic level, 
every word, in aesthetic terms, linearly substitutes another word while circularly 
preserving enough sense from the original. In preservation, the semiotic-aesthetic 
assumes a political guise of iterability, a repetition, which is violent in nature. 
Translation, then, displays its political character in the tension between the linear act 
of originality and the circular act of preservation, a tension characterized as political 
iterability. 
To sum up, translations employ the semiotic-aesthetic dimension of the arcade of 
literalness of the word for word through political iterablity to preserve enough sense 
from the original while replacing it with a new form of expression. In turn, this form 
of expression in any translation enacts a violent embedding of law-preservation, the 
circularity of the original, in law-making, the linearity of translation. The integration 
of circularity and linearity is what I call the dimension of the ‘image-word’, the 
arcade, in any piece of translation. This aesthetic integration lays manifest the violent 
iterability within the law and thus the general aesthetic basis of the political, a basis 
that I will proceed to further build on and explore. 
 
                                                            
26 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 272. 
27 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 272. 
28 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 278. 
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1.2 The Fold of the Sound-Name as Law-Justice 
 
We have seen in the previous section how the arcade of literalness in the word 
enacts a law of demand through violent iterability. In literality, a translation 
aesthetically preserves enough of the sense from the original while allowing variation 
to make new laws in each new word within translation. However, the image-word as 
law in the Benjamin-Derrida model is not the only concern of translation. Benjamin 
gives the example of Hölderlin’s translations to make the point that the sense in the 
original work is ‘touched by language’ as an ‘aeolian harp’ is touched by the ‘wind’.29 
Here, the dimension of the image acquires a new dimension, that of the sound. The 
result of this new aesthetic modification figures in Benjamin’s description of the 
‘reverberation’, or the echo-like quality that contributes to the harmony of the 
languages among the original and its many translations.30 Through the echo, 
translation becomes a concern with sound in its aim to harmonize the ways of 
meaning, of making sense, between the original and its translation. Sense that was 
enacted in the arcade of the literal word, as the previous section has shown, acquires a 
new aesthetic guise of the sound. The sound, I argue, assumes political significance 
closely linked with its aesthetic aspect.   
This reference to sound is especially evident in another article that Benjamin 
wrote under the title ‘Antitheses Concerning Word and Name’. In this article, 
Benjamin associates sound with the name or the ‘Adamite spirit of language’.31 He 
claims that the ‘name is the translation of the mute into sound and of the nameless 
                                                            
29 Benjamin, vol. I, p. 262. 
30 Benjamin, vol. I, p. 258. 
31 Walter Benjamin, ‘Antithesis Concerning Word and Name’, in Walter Benjamin 
Selected Writings, 4 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1996), vol. II, p. 718. 
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into the name’.32 The name aesthetically marks the sound phase that translates the 
muteness of nature, described as the ‘residue’ of the ‘creative word of God’.33 The 
name, in this sense, acquires a quasi-religious role as it gives sound to the residue of 
the word of God through the human word. The quasi-religious residue is further 
qualified as that of ‘magic’.34 Standing for the ‘communication of matter in its magic 
community’, the sound-name complements the creative word of God.35 The sound-
name becomes a manifestation of the inherent communication of matter. This 
communication of matter which is translated within the name, in turn, relates back to 
the word where the former is said to dwell in the latter. Benjamin argues that the 
name ‘no longer lives in [the human word] intact’.36 Despite the quotation’s 
highlighting of the non-intact status of the name in the word, the main point is that the 
name takes residence in the human word. It follows that the sound characteristic of 
the name takes residence in the image word within translation.  
The dimension of the sound in the name that resides in the form of the word-
arcade is rewritten in Derrida’s terms as an ‘accord of tongues’ that a translation 
allows.37 The sound of language in the name imbues the arcade of the word with a 
harmonious symphony of the languages in translation. Benjamin’s sound assumes a 
symphonious sense of accord in Derrida’s reformulation. This harmony among 
languages, in turn, is said to ‘let the pure language, and the being language of the 
language, resonate, announcing it rather than presenting it’.38 Hence, the accord of 
languages is possible through the sound, the announcing in the name, which allows 
                                                            
32 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 717. 
33 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 717. 
34 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 717. 
35 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 717. 
36 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 717. 
37 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 131. 
38 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 131. 
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for pure language, or the being-language of language to resonate and announce itself. 
Pure language favors the medium of the sound to that of the image to announce itself 
through a harmony among languages in translation.  
This semiotic-aesthetic aspect of translation, in turn, becomes affected by the 
political and law-related aspects of the word-image. Taken to indicate law in violent 
iterability, the image-word invests in the sound-name to announce pure language or 
the being-language of language. The motif of harmony that reconciles languages 
within translation plays into the political field through justice. The extra political 
dimension that reworks the significance of Benjamin’s pure language in Derridean 
terms is found in the following quotation: ‘law claims to exercise itself in the name of 
justice’ and ‘justice demands for itself that it be established in the name of a law’.39 
Name becomes the intermediary status between justice and law where justice 
indicates the extra political dimension that orients the annunciation of pure 
language.40 Law claims that it announces justice, just as justice demands that it be 
announced in the law. This continuity between law and justice, I claim, is what the 
sound-name allows, through the announcement of pure language. The harmonious 
concern of all languages, it seems, is to establish a political link between justice and 
law through translation.   
 The political nature of translation, then, is affected by the link between the image-
word and the sound-name, which is marked by a shift from violent law-making to 
establishing continuity between law and justice through linguistic harmony. In 
political terms, that continuity is established by Derrida through the notion of the 
demand within the law. That demand, being an inherent aspect of law, also becomes 
                                                            
39 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 251. 
40 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 132. 
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that of justice that asks that it be translated in law via the name that announces 
linguistic harmony. However, despite this continuity, translation presents what seems 
like a juxtaposition of violence (political) with accord (linguistic) in the semiotic-
aesthetic terms of word-image and sound-name. The stage upon which this 
juxtaposition occurs is the linguistic sign to which I will turn my attention in the 
following section.  
1.3 The Fold of the Sign as Holy Intentions  
 
So far, I have argued that translation uses the arcade of the word to enact a law as 
violent demand. This demand, in turn, is expressed by the name, the dimension of the 
sound that links law to justice. By having the sound express the law in the written 
word, a translation thus announces pure language, the demands of justice in the 
accord of languages. As violence and accord meet in conflict, the focus shifts to a new 
semiotic level of aesthetic dimensions, that of the sign. 
The political friction within translation is enacted in the semiotic guise of the ‘sign 
character of the word’ that is said to damage the ‘character of the name’.41 For 
Benjamin, the foundation of the name that announces pure language is in the 
communication of matter. This communication is claimed to ‘take place through 
similarity’ or mimesis.42 Mimesis, or similarity, here, is taken to indicate the aesthetic 
reworking of image and sound discussed before. This aesthetic level is enacted 
through the guise of a semiotic element that allows for the ‘determinate empirical 
(albeit nonsensuous) similarity’, the mimesis, to ‘appear fleetingly in’ the ‘sign 
character of the word’.43 The sign is the semiotic level of the word that allows for 
similarity to appear. This similarity is further explained by Benjamin to be a ‘fleeting 
                                                            
41 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 718. 
42 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 717. 
43 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 718. 
Page 39 
 
appearance of a similarity in sound [that] corresponds to the fleeting appearance of a 
similarity in the object’.44 The word, here, assumes the guise of a sign whose concern 
is with the sound, the name, and the object connected in a fleeting appearance of 
similarity. However, Benjamin adds that the ‘character of the name is damaged by 
that of the sign’.45 Sign damages the name-sound as it hijacks the name from its 
‘immanent magic’ and makes it a tool of communication of matter, the sound of 
objects.46  
Here, the influence of the German romantics, especially Novalis, on Benjamin’s 
thought appears clearly as the sign, in its appearance of similarity, replaces the 
aesthetic concern with image and song or sound. In ‘Faith and Love or The King and 
Queen’(1798), Novalis claims that ‘the sign is neither a beautiful image nor a song’.47 
While Novalis here is referring to the sign as ‘the visible form of a mystical idea’ as 
Stoljar, the translator and editor of Novalis: Philosophical Writings claims, his 
quotation highlights the fact that representations of mystical ideas, signs, do not stand 
for the image, the word, nor sound, the song that is established through the name.48 
This is why Benjamin felt the need to reformulate the sign to involve the fleeting 
appearance of similarity as an entity distinct from the name as sound and the word as 
image, even if it characterizes the latter.   
As the aesthetic aspect of translation becomes that of a fleeting similarity that 
replaces the image-sound through the semiotic element of the sign, it extends its 
effects to the pure language that announces itself in the name. In this process, it 
                                                            
44 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 718. 
45 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 718. 
46 Benjamin, vol. II, p. 717. 
47 Novalis, ‘Faith and Love or The King and Queen’, in Novalis Philosophical 
Writings, ed. & trans. by Margaret Mahony Staljar (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1997), p. 87 (#15). 
48 Novalis, ‘Faith and Love or The King and Queen’, p. 176 (#8). 
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acquires a linguistically religious significance. Pure language, for Benjamin, is the 
target of linguistic harmony that Derrida rewrites as the ‘holy growth of languages’.49 
This being language of language is expressed through ‘modes of intention’, ways of 
meaning, which differentiate each language from another but also join them in 
‘linguistic supplementarity’.50 Languages supplement one another and their 
supplementation is what characterizes the being of language. However, instead of 
announcing a pure language as something ‘transcendent’ to language, they announce a 
‘messianic end’.51 Translations work through linguistic supplementation defined by 
the experience of a ‘remote’ sense of distance from the sacred text as a state of pure 
‘transferability’ or ‘to-be translated’.52 The messianic end, for Derrida, is not a 
definite historical or religious end as much as a source of tension in the relationship 
between languages in translation. This tension is created as languages supplement 
each other with a hopeless aim of reaching the state of the sacred text where ‘meaning 
and literality are no longer discernible’.53 In translation, languages supplement one 
another, and it is this sense of distance from a messianic end that maintains their 
constant state of the ‘to-be-translated’. So, the linguistically religious sense of the 
messianic end promised by intentions that supplement one another is established by 
the semiotic-aesthetic dimensions of similarity within the sign.  
In turn, the sign employs its linguistic-religious character to redefine the politics 
of law-justice discussed earlier. As sound becomes a song of harmony that displays 
the fleeting similarity between languages, the demand that law and justice make for 
each other is affected by that song. Law and justice demand in intentions 
                                                            
49 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 131. 
50 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 131. 
51 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, pp. 131–2. 
52 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 132. 
53 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 132. 
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supplementing one another, in mimesis, to form ‘justice as law’.54 Law imitates 
justice through the violent iterability that circularly preserves yet linearly founds the 
law of demand. The political, in this sense, again displays its inherently aesthetic-
semiotic nature through the linguistic aspect of translation.  
So, translation starts with the image-word that employs the inherent sound-name 
to announce a mutual state of demand between law and justice. However, its 
announcement is disrupted by the sign character of the word that inscribes similarity 
into the field of the political. The sign also renders translation a linguistic concern 
with modes of intention with a quasi-religious pronouncement, the messianic end. The 
mimetic sign thus links linguistic religiosity with the aesthetic nature of the political.  
However, this link that the sign establishes is characterized by the sign’s fleetingness. 
The transitory state of the sign, here, entails the likelihood that it is a stage preceding 
another, an issue that the following section will explore. 
1.4 The Sovereign King as Symbol 
 
So far, we have seen how the religious and linguistic guises that translation 
assumes in Benjamin’s and Derrida’s works reformulate the aesthetic-semiotic 
concern with image-word as law and the sound-name as law-justice. The 
reformulation defines the political as a sense of demand that links the word and name, 
or the law and justice, through similarity in the sign translated in modes of intentions 
supplementing one another and aiming for a messianic end. However, this sense of 
similarity is described as fleeting. This implies that the sign is a transitory stage, after 
which similarity through intentions disintegrates, leaving room for a ‘sign by means 
of which no similarity can appear’.55 In ‘Antithesis Concerning Word and Name’, 
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Benjamin defines this new semiotic state as that of the symbol. Because of its 
fleetingness, the sign undergoes a change in its aesthetic function from that of 
similarity to that of a post-similarity or a no-similarity state, the symbol. 
 Reference to the symbol in connection with translation can be found in 
Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’ where he claims that the ‘tremendous and 
only capacity of translation’ lies in turning the ‘symbolizing into the symbolized’.56 
By symbol, Benjamin alludes to ‘something which cannot be communicated’ or the 
‘very nucleus of pure language’ that is symbolized in the growth of languages.57 
However, this symbolized, pure language, for Benjamin, is ‘weighted down with a 
heavy, alien meaning’ through ‘linguistic creations’. This is why a translation’s aim 
becomes that of relieving pure language of the linguistic weight by turning the 
symbolizing, the linguistic creation, into a symbolized. The aim of such an act is to 
‘regain’ its state as pure language, an ‘expressionless and creative Word’.58 As an 
expressionless, creative Word, pure language is not concerned with expressing 
meaning; it assumes the state of the sacred literal language. It seems that the linguistic 
with religious resonances in the sign becomes a concern with the linguistic as a 
religious act itself. Derrida’s ‘promise’ and Benjamin’s ‘God’s remembrance’, the 
God word or logos, is played out in language supplementation and the ‘hallowed 
growth of languages’.59 The sign of distance from the state of pure language is what 
allows for the growth of the symbolizing languages as a religious act or manifestation 
of the creative Word, the expressionless. This creative Word is best exemplified, 
according to Benjamin, by a translation’s language characterized by the ‘looseness 
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with which meaning attaches’ to it.60 God’s Word that was a residue in the word-
image now assumes the guise of the symbolizing turned symbolized and rewritten as 
the creative and expressionless Word in translation.61  
As the symbolizing becomes a symbolized and the language of intention 
supplementation enacts the God Word linguistically as creative Word, the political 
dimensions of the word-law and name as law-justice joined by demand are reworked.  
Within the framework of intention supplementation, the demand that united word to 
name is qualified as a ‘desire for translation’ that manifests in the religious story of 
Babel.62 In this story, desire is claimed to be ‘not thinkable without this 
correspondence with a thought of God’ that would allow for Benjamin’s sense of the 
‘correspondence between the languages engaged in translation’.63 The desire ‘to be 
translated’ embodies the demand of two sides, that of the tribe, or any original work, 
and that of the ‘deconstructor of the tower’ or God who ‘gave his name’.64 Both the 
thought of God and the original work are thus indebted to the language of translation 
that voices their demands. On the political plane, this state of ‘double indebtedness’ 
translates into the ‘double bind [which] is in the law’.65 The law, which is enacted by 
                                                            
60 Benjamin, vol. I, p. 262. 
61 Paul De Man (‘“Conclusions” on Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator”’, 
Yale French Studies, 69 (1985), 25-46) argues that although readings of Benjamin 
usually portray him as reintegrating the messianic in history, Benjamin is actually 
exalting linguistic suffering and the separation of the ‘sacred from the poetic’ (p.34). 
So, the pure language is only apparent in the mode of trope as metaphors and 
metonyms. He focuses on Benjamin’s image of the fragments forming the vessel to 
argue that it highlights the fragmentary nature of the vessel ‘we have no knowledge 
of’ (p. 32). The fragments are said to ‘follow’ each other and not ‘match’ each other 
as Zohn’s translation of the text claims. De Man asserts that these fragments are 
metonyms, not metaphors, and are not working towards a ‘tropological totalization’ or 
the pure language (p.32).  
62 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 116. 
63 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, pp. 116–7. 
64 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 118. 
65 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 118. 
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God or the ‘proper name’, demands translation yet forbids it.66 The law, Derrida 
states, cannot ‘command without demanding to be read, deciphered, translated’.67 
This state of the double bind carries on unto the demand that the law-word makes for 
justice.68 The double demand of the law for justice is thus characterized as a double 
bind or a contradiction.69 Just as justice demands to be translated into the law yet 
escapes and exceeds it, both the original work and the thought of God demand 
translation yet forbid it. This double bind in the demand for justice, I argue, shows up 
in the guise of the ‘trait’ of the ‘to-be translated from one language to the other’.70  
The demand or desire can only be made through a language of traits. By the language 
of traits, I mean the language that displays the demand of the thought of God and the 
demand of the tribe as forever ‘to be translated’. The creative, expressionless Word of 
pure language becomes a language of traits. The law-word is a language of ‘traits’ as 
                                                            
66 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 119. 
67 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 118. 
68 Burghard Baltrusch, (in ‘Translation as Aesthetic Resistance: Paratranslating 
Walter Benjamin’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social 
Philosophy, 6 (2010), 113-29) employs the expression ‘double bind’ to explain how 
translation, on the one hand, produces the fragment of a language that has arisen as a 
fragment from a previous translation, and on the other hand, ‘shapes up’ to a ‘mode of 
intention’ with this fragment, bearing in mind a pure and unreachable 
language’(p.123-4). Baltrusch uses the image of the fragments of the vessel to claim 
that a translation ‘does not allow any symbolization of origin and calls for resistance 
to its totalitarian connotations’ (p. 123). In other words, the pure language acts as a 
force that invokes resistance against the totalitarian sense of the original. Moreover, 
the translation works on constructing cultural ‘modes of intention’ while being 
themselves fragments of previous works while a motif of resistance is underplay, that 
of resistance. This is what Baltrusch claims is the ‘third space of translation’, a term 
he borrows from Homi K. Bhabha (p.124). Baltrusch also refers to Benjamin’s vessel 
image as ‘a kind of synecdoche, that is, that the pieces remain fragments even when 
they were considered to form part of a supposed totality, as allegorical parts of a 
greater language, but excluding the essentialist or foundationalist idea of a whole’ (p. 
123).  
69 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 274. 
70 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, pp. 118–9. 
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midpoint between the living subject or original and the proper name, that of God.71 
This language of traits adopts justice as a motif that guides this double demand. 
As the concern comes to be with traits at the intersection between God and man, 
our attention is drawn to the symbol of this double bind that cannot be communicated. 
This symbol of the double bind, I argue, is embodied by the sovereign king whose 
‘body is only promised, announced and dissimulated by the translation’.72 The notion 
of the sovereign as symbol is a German romantic influence that figures in both 
Benjamin and Derrida’s works on translation.73 For Novalis, a symbol stands for a 
‘mystical sovereign’ that is denoted with a ‘more estimable and more appropriate’ and 
‘gracious, excellent person’ of the king.74 The romantic roots of kinghood shift the 
whole domain of translation from that of the human and divine as God to that of the 
king standing for a mystical sovereign. In translation, language shifts domains into 
articulating desire through symbols of traits of a pure sovereign, an intersection 
between God and man. In this sense, the political concerned with law and justice now 
shifts focus to the figure of a sovereign reflecting the traits of God and man through 
                                                            
71 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 118. 
72 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 125. 
73 The modern notion of the sovereign as symbol within German romanticism derives 
from yet the earlier modern literary period of the German baroque. Symbol is 
employed, here, to indicate the modern problematization of sovereignty that starts off 
with the German baroque. This fact is clearly outlined by Samuel Weber (in his 
‘Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt’, Diacritics, 22 
(1992), 5-18). Weber refers to Walter Benjamin (in The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama [Trauerspiel] (1925)) who illustrates how the German baroque is concerned 
with the ‘lack of sovereignty’, not as a theme but as a ‘methodological and theoretical 
problem’ (p.6). In the German baroque, the ‘undoing of the sovereign’ takes place 
when the sovereign is faced with a ‘situation in which a decision is as imperative as it 
is impossible’ (p.14). In this state of indecision, the sovereign becomes a tyrant who is 
forced to gather the power to make a decision but ends up becoming a martyr when he 
is faced with the ‘incapacity to arrive at an effective decision’ (p.15). In this sense, a 
sovereign is the symbol of the problematic role of the decision-maker who is 
incapable of making a decision. This incapability qualifies the sense of ‘lack’ that 
sovereignty starts to embody in later periods, and especially in the romantic period. 
74 Novalis, ‘Faith and Love or The King and Queen’, p. 87 (#15).  
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language. However, despite this change in political aspect, translation retains its 
fundamentally aesthetic nature, as the next section will show. 
1.5 The King, Cape and Contract 
 
Having established the politics of law-justice and sovereignty as inherent aspects 
of translation, we now turn to the reverse process whereby the political itself becomes 
inherently affected by this process of translation. Sovereignty is forever ‘to be 
translated’ into a language of traits. Translation’s language enacts its ‘symbolizing 
into symbolized’ function which it borrows from sovereignty upon it. The figure of 
the sovereign that reflects translation’s linguistic mechanism, I have previously 
shown, is that of the king as depicted by Novalis. However, in the process of the 
symbolizing turned symbolized that is outlined by Benjamin, translation turns the 
king or sovereign into a concern with the royal cape, or robe, that envelops this body. 
For Benjamin, ‘the language of translation envelops its content like a royal robe with 
ample folds’.75 The reference to royalty echoes Novalis’s king. However, the 
emphasis here is on the cape, the metaphorical guise of the king’s body as symbolic of 
sovereignty.  
Benjamin’s image of the kingly cape is later borrowed by Derrida to argue that the 
king’s body is a promise that orients translation and refashions the status of the 
original as a natural unity of fruit and skin. Starting with the original, Derrida repeats 
Benjamin’s claim that what unites the tenor, the content, to the language expressing it 
is the ‘essential core’ that is ‘not translatable’.76 Derrida, however, explains 
Benjamin’s ‘essential core’ to be that which holds the tenor and language together 
through central unity, what allows for the signified to adhere to the signifier in an 
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original work. This central unity borrows from the literality of the sacred text where 
the language and content are one and can only be transferable as non-translatable.77 
The central unity indicates the state of the ‘to be translated’ at the core of any 
attachment between meaning or content and language. This core is Derrida’s first 
metaphor that allows for unity between terms in a second metaphor, the tenor and 
language in the original. In turn, these lead to a third metaphor that unites tenor and 
language in the translation. The third metaphor is one which is described as the 
artificial unity between king and cape that distinguishes itself from the natural unity 
of fruit and skin. Translation’s artificiality derives from the fact that the king’s body is 
not there in the first place. There is only a cape enveloping the fruit-skin where the 
‘fruit insists upon becoming the king’.78 Translation consists of a tenor, compared to a 
body of the king that is only promised, and a language of translation as cape. The 
tenor of the original and the language that expresses it, the fruit and its skin, become a 
promise of a king defined by the language of the translation as cape that envelops it. 
The metaphorical cape function of the language of translation implies that the 
underlying original must be taken to be a royal body, a king, even though it is not 
there and is only promised. 
Derrida renders this unity of tenor to language in the original and, then, unity of 
that original to a language of translation mediated by the king’s non-existent body 
into a ‘royal couple’.79 By claiming that ‘it is difficult to separate the king from the 
royal couple’, Derrida draws attention to a re-conceptualization of the political aspect 
of the law into that of the translation contract.80 The non-existent, promised body of 
the king can only exist as a royal couple, a perpetual state of jointed-ness or contract. 
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In terms of translation, the royal couple that is enveloped with a cape subjects the 
process of the symbolizing-symbolized to yet another symbolizing act. In this process, 
the focus becomes on the activating mechanism that allows for the symbolizing act to 
continue on its course. This mechanism is evident in Derrida’s claim that the body of 
the king is a ‘decisive signature of a contract’.81 Being a legal document, the contract 
is an indication of the law that is set down and signed by two sides. However, instead 
of being signed by two sides, the contract, Derrida claims, is signed by the promise of 
a king’s body. In translation, the tenor and language in the original carry out a ‘first 
contract’ that is signed by their state of promised unity as a king’s body.82 In turn, this 
association of the royal couple and the body of the king carries out another contract 
through the cape. Derrida claims that ‘this couple of spouses (the body of the king and 
his gown, the tenor and the tongue, the king and the queen) [....] lays down the law 
and guarantees every contract from this first contract’.83 The secondary contract that 
joins the metaphorical cape to the symbol, the non-existent body of the king, derives 
from the first contract carried out by the royal couple. 
The political aspect of translation as a contract between the kingly cape and the 
absent royal body acquires its aesthetic value through the metaphor of light which 
both Derrida and Benjamin employ. Following the example of Benjamin, Derrida 
claims that the arcade of literalness ‘supports while letting light pass and the original 
show’.84 The source of this light, for Benjamin, is in pure language that ‘shine[s] upon 
the original all the more fully’.85 The German romantic resonances, especially with 
Novalis, in depictions of royalty resurface in this image. Novalis claims that ‘the 
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sphere of light’ is that found in ‘every citizen’ whose ‘utterances become brilliant, as 
poetic as possible’ around a king figure.86 The light, in this image, is a sphere that 
indicates brilliant and poetic expressions of a citizen inspired by a king as a source for 
that light. This brilliance is reflected as an ‘expression of the highest animation in the 
vicinity of the king’ who is ‘the sun in the solar system’.87 So, the sphere of light that 
shines through the arcade has its source in the king, according to the German 
romantics. Its effect is brilliant expressions that are described as poetic and animated. 
In this image, light inspires sound; the king as light inspires brilliant and poetic 
expression in his sphere. This sound is classified as not only an expression but also a 
form of behavior, ‘etiquette’, on the part of citizens. By etiquette, Novalis means a 
form of behavior, uttering, which is ‘susceptible to being regulated’.88 Etiquette as 
expression, formerly indicated as sound, is presented as being inclined to being 
regulated by the proximity of the king. Since this king, as I have mentioned, is non-
existent, the light could only be seen through its effects, the expressions of the citizens 
that are susceptible to being regulated by law. Within translation, poetic expression is 
the aesthetic reworking of the foundation of the law. 
As the aesthetic focus shifts to sound in etiquette defined by law, it borrows the 
contract form of law to further qualify the expression of citizens. The rendering of the 
romantic notion of poetic expression into a Derridean translation contract, I hold, 
finds its political roots in the development of contract theory as outlined by Charles 
Taylor. Based on Grotius’s early formulation of the theory, Taylor describes the 
contract as one carried out by individuals who ‘are meant to collaborate in peace to 
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their mutual benefit’.89 In its more modern formulations, contract theory comes to 
stand for the first modern secular move away from the Medieval conception of 
political order, as outlined by Kantorowicz, where the king’s ‘biological existence 
realizes and instantiates an undying royal “body”’.90 Contract becomes the consensual 
sound expression by citizens that used to indicate etiquette around light, the medieval 
king-figure in his cape. Derrida’s focus on the contract, which joins the non-existent 
body to the cape and is derived from another contract by a royal couple, paves the 
way for contract as secular consent that dismisses the cape altogether. The shift from 
kinghood to contract takes place through the medium of translation in an aesthetic 
reformulation of the political. The metaphor of the cape is overcome by the aesthetics 
of sound as expression in contract. 
However, before reaching that secular contractual dismissal of the cape, Derrida 
chooses to ‘add another cape floating even more’.91 The royal cape is said to be 
enveloped by a cape as a ‘wedding gown’.92 By surrounding the cape with a wedding 
gown, Derrida highlights another move in political theory that maintains the aesthetic 
aspect of the politics of translation, an aspect on which I will further elaborate in the 
following section. 
1.6 From Cape to Wedding Gown: Law, Contract and Love   
 
So far, I have shown how the process of the symbolizing process in translation 
starts off with Benjamin’s illustration of the cape as an indication of the political 
status of the law as contract. The contract between the cape and the absent body 
illustrates a secular political move away from the paradigm of the divinely ordained 
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king. This political move towards secular contractual politics maintains its aesthetic, 
romantic roots in poetic expression. In order to better explain this aesthetic shift from 
divine to secular sovereignty in translation, I first have to shed light on another 
metaphor that Derrida uses to qualify translation, that of the wedding gown 
surrounding the kingly cape. For Derrida, the cape is enveloped with another 
metaphorical fabric, a wedding gown that is said to float at a distance to the royal 
cape.93 He thus turns the symbolizing process of royalty to that of love which is 
reflected by a wedding gown. This move redefines the political aspect of translation 
through what Derrida calls the ‘movement of love’ that embeds contractual law and 
redefines it.94  
Derrida claims that the wedding gown is viewed in relation to an ‘untouchable’ 
that ‘orients the work of the translator’.95 This untouchable is claimed to persist even 
after the contract is signed at the small point of ‘communicable meaning’.96 The 
wedding gown shifts the focus away from the contractual nature of the joint, for it is 
not concerned with whether actual signing has taken place or not. Its preoccupation as 
translation is with an untouchable, a symbolic sense of completeness or wholeness 
that fuses the two sides of any contract in literality. With the untouchable as a 
promise, the symbolic can only expand with the hope of reaching it. It is in this sense 
that Derrida claims that translation puts ‘language into symbolic expansion’ where the 
symbolic stands for the ‘larger, the new vaster aggregate’ that ‘has still to reconstitute 
something’ rather than accomplish ‘restitution’.97 Translation’s concern is not with 
preserving the original as much as with reconstitution, forming aggregates and 
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expansion in a state of ‘openness’.98 This status of symbolic expansion is what 
Derrida qualifies as Benjamin’s ‘movement of love’ that does not ‘contradict unity’; it 
makes unity possible while forbidding totality.99 Unity, or symbolic completeness, 
rests in the state of possibility. Derrida’s movement of love is ‘the gesture of this 
loving one’ that ‘does not reproduce’ and ‘does not represent’ nor ‘render the 
meaning of the original except at that point of contact or caress, that infinitely small 
of meaning’.100  
For Derrida, this point of contact that allows for symbolic expansion is a 
‘marriage contract’ fueled by love and concerned with a promise of this 
untouchable.101 By turning language into an act of love that preserves the law within, 
Derrida rewrites Benjamin’s notion of law that indicates contract and is enacted in 
violence. In the ‘Critique of Violence’, Benjamin claims that ‘the origin of every 
contract also points towards violence’.102 So, the symbolic contract within translation 
preserves violence in the metaphorical guise of the cape. However, the cape is 
claimed to be surrounded by another metaphorical guise, that of the wedding gown. 
The law in the cape is encompassed by a romantic movement of love which Derrida 
employs to redefine law. He does that by resurrecting the German romantic 
resonances of Novalis’s work in Benjamin’s text. For Novalis, a law is ‘the 
expression of the will of a beloved person who is worthy of our respect’.103 Law 
becomes a linguistic expression of the will of a beloved. However, being a contract 
concerned with a symbolic aggregate, the Derridean law complements the will of the 
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beloved, the original, with the desire of the loving one, the translation. Between the 
will and desire, a symbolic system as aggregate forms itself while the translation 
pursues an untouchable, a promise of symbolic completeness. In this pursuit, the 
politics of law as violence is rewritten as the will of a beloved complementing the 
desire of a lover in a symbolic process. The law is defined by the semiotics of 
symbolism supplemented by a metaphorical expression of love.104 
As the wedding gown encompasses the royal cape and inserts the law in a 
movement of love, it reintroduces a romantic emotional dimension generated by the 
image’s aesthetic qualities. The wedding gown is a metaphorical depiction of not only 
a symbolic contractual consent in marriage but also a romantic emotional bond. In 
romantic terms, Novalis states that marriage is a ‘true, indissoluble bond’ that stands 
for ‘selfless love’, which is said to occupy the heart just as ‘its principle’ is in ‘one’s 
head’.105 This marriage of selfless love is based on the model of the ‘true royal 
couple’ that would be for the ‘whole human being’ just as a ‘constitution’ is for the 
‘intellect alone’.106 The wedding gown thus becomes the rewriting of the law aspect 
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of the cape into that of the marriage contract as a bond that needs the emotional 
dimension of selfless love. This emotional dimension, in turn, is embodied in the 
political figure of the royal couple that Derrida maintains through absence. The 
political, in this sense, reasserts itself as inherently aesthetic. 
The romantic roots of this interrelationship between the political and the aesthetic 
in Derrida’s theory of translation persist in his conception of justice. Romantically 
speaking, Novalis claims that selfless love, which activates the law as the will of the 
beloved, is preserved in the ‘just man and just state’.107 Novalis’s romantic notion of 
justice acts in selfless love through the bond of the state. In bonding through the state, 
justice and love are meant to overcome raw self-interest or egoism which is marked 
by sensuality and is a passion marked by the weakness of the will.108 By egoism, 
Novalis means the state that is run like a ‘factory’, a state that ‘will perish’ as it bases 
its politics upon the instrumental employment of the law to guarantee ‘self-
interest’.109 In this sense, law guided by egoism is weak while that guided by selfless 
love in justice is stronger and would give life to the state. The state thus becomes the 
space that negotiates contract theory through a move towards selfless love from 
instrumental ego-centered employment of the law. This move, I argue, is enacted in 
the metaphor of the cape that is overcome by the aesthetic dimension of the wedding 
gown as contractual sound defined by the emotional response of love. The contract as 
law has to be embedded in selfless love within justice, as ethical framework, so that it 
does not give in to its violent nature and turn into egoism and self-centeredness. In 
terms of translation, the gown becomes the aesthetic translation of divine sovereignty 
that justifies power into what seems like a secular version of sovereignty that 
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negotiates power in emotional terms. This aesthetic translation of the political, I will 
next show, revisits the role language plays in negotiating sovereignty. 
1.7 The Cape-Wedding Gown: The Language of Translation  
 
Having established the wedding gown as a secular political version of sovereignty 
that negotiates the law in a bond of selfless love, I now turn to the rewriting of the 
language of translation that this political move involves. The embedding of law in 
selfless love through justice re-qualifies the violence inherent in law as contract. The 
image of the cape and wedding gown thus presents Derrida’s political negotiation of 
‘the relation of violence to non-violence’.110 This negotiation, Derrida claims, directly 
relates to the role that language plays in this translation, an issue that I further 
expound in this section.111 
Derrida’s negotiation of the relation of violence to non-violence in the cape-gown 
image builds on Benjamin’s discussion of violence and language that he expounds in 
his ‘Critique of Violence’. As I have already mentioned, in the ‘Critique of Violence’, 
Benjamin claims that ‘the origin of every contract also points towards violence’.112 
Benjamin calls the contractual form of violence, ‘mythic violence’, where law-making 
and law-preserving show a constant strife for power within the state.113 Nonviolence, 
for Benjamin, can never ‘lead to legal contract’ as contract always generates violence. 
This nonviolent ‘sphere of human agreement’, for Benjamin, is best illustrated in 
language.114 In his explanation of the linguistic form of nonviolence, Derrida claims 
that Benjamin offers a political ‘critique of the sign’ that he further expounds in ‘The 
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Task of the Translator’.115 Derrida claims that language displays violence when it acts 
as a means to an end, when its essence is communicative or ‘semiological, 
informative, representative, conventional, hence mediatory’.116 However, this 
violence of language as a means to an end, Derrida claims, is disrupted by the ‘advent 
of nonviolence through a certain language’ of pure means, or as ‘means of 
communication as re-presentation’.117 Derrida also calls the latter the ‘order of 
manifestation, epiphany, pure presentation’.118 The relationship of violence to non-
violence within the political sphere is thus negotiated in the linguistic tension between 
a vision of language as a means to an end and one of language as pure means, a state 
of language that I will further explore in Chapter Three. However, the question I am 
concerned with here is how it is possible to linguistically transpose non-violence from 
the private sphere to the political sphere of state-imposed violence. A hint to a 
possible answer, I argue, seems to lie in Derrida’s notion of justice that allows for this 
embedding of law (the cape) in love (the wedding gown). 
According to Derrida, justice is a state of advent or ‘à-venir’ that orients the work 
of law.119 Derrida builds this argument upon Benjamin’s discussion of law and justice 
in his ‘Critique of Violence’. For Benjamin, mythic violence that reaffirms the law 
engenders the need for ‘law destroying’ violence that challenges the limits of the state 
and the law.120 Law-destroying violence is denoted as ‘divine violence’ enacted by 
God and built upon the principle of justice.121 Derrida qualifies Benjamin’s concept of 
                                                            
115 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 286. 
116 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 286. 
117 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 284. 
118 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 284. 
119 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 256. 
120 Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 150. 
121 Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, p. 149. 
Page 57 
 
justice, here, as a ‘justice without law, a justice beyond law’.122 However, Derrida 
also acknowledges that the ‘universalization of law’ is ‘in-scribed in the concept of 
justice’.123 Justice thus embodies a tension between its being an excess, an à-venir, 
and its being reducible to law. This is why Derrida claims that justice is ‘the 
possibility of deconstruction’ that is described as ‘an experience of the impossible’.124 
This experience takes place in the ‘interval that separates the undeconstructibility of 
justice from the deconstructibility of law’.125 By deconstruction, Derrida means the 
condition of the unfounded foundation of the law, an unfoundedness that borrows 
from the undeconstructibility of justice.126 This is how I would explain Derrida’s 
claim that ‘[w]herever one can replace, translate, determine the X of justice, one 
would have to say: deconstruction is possible, as impossible, to the extent (there) 
where there is an X (undeconstructible)’.127 Justice becomes the possible condition of 
the impossibility, an à-venir, which acts within the law yet escapes it. In its escape, 
justice creates an extra space that allows for other forces, not the least of which is love 
(even if it belongs to the private sphere and assumes an aesthetic significance), to 
come into play.128 Translation, in this sense, is a double process or a coupling between 
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the reduction of justice to law, the cape, and the maintenance of justice’s excess that 
can only be expressed through the aesthetic value of the wedding gown.129  
As deconstruction is made possible by and through the translation of justice, it re-
qualifies the medium of language through which this translation takes place.130 The 
‘advent’ of non-violence through language is described as a language of manifestation 
that contrasts with the violence of language as a means to an end. By referring to non-
violence as a language of manifestation, I argue, Derrida invokes the religious 
connotations associated with the language of revelation that orients the work of 
translation. The language of non-violence finds its proximity in religious revelation, 
the literality of the sacred text as forever ‘to be translated’.  
The link between the religious originary, revelation, and its linguistic 
reincarnation, manifestation, figures in Derrida’s concept of ‘prayer’. In ‘What is a 
Relevant Translation’, Derrida re-writes translation’s concern with the 
possible/impossible in deconstruction as a religious concern with prayer. He also 
explains translation to be ‘a discourse of prayer on prayer’.131 By prayer, Derrida 
refers to the request for forgiveness that marks the state of ‘elevation’ beyond the law: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the  'other  politics  [that] must  be  defined  as  the  response  to  the  advent  of  
another Justice' (p.161).  
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130 For a more extensive discussion on the intersection between deconstruction and 
translation, see Kathleen Davis, Deconstruction and Translation (Manchester, United 
Kingdom: St. Jerome, 2001). 
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The strength of forgiveness […] is more than just, more just than justice or the 
law. It rises above the law or above what in justice is only law; it is, beyond 
human law, the very thing that invokes prayer. And what is, finally, a discourse on 
translation (possible/impossible) is also a discourse of prayer on prayer. 
Forgiveness is prayer; it belongs to the order of benediction and prayer on two 
sides: that of the person who requests it and that of the person who grants it. The 
essence of prayer has to do with forgiveness, not with power and law. Between the 
elevation of prayer or benediction-above human power, above even royal power 
insofar as it is human, above the law, above the penal code-and the elevation of 
forgiveness above human power, royal power and the law, there exists a sort of 
essential affinity. Prayer and forgiveness have the same provenance and the same 
essence, the same eminence that is more eminent than eminence, the eminence of 
the Most High.132  
As the discourse of prayer on prayer, translation’s concern is no longer with law and 
with what in justice is law. The new dimension added with the symbolism of royalty 
surrounded by the wedding gown is that of prayer for forgiveness that is ‘more just 
than justice’ and ‘more eminent than eminence’. Prayer thus belongs to the order of 
revelation as elevation or eminence. In the form of discourse, prayer is a 
manifestation of that elevation. The discourse of prayer on prayer, then, qualifies the 
language of translation as a language that focuses within the work of manifestation 
and revelation on a divine request for forgiveness.  
This divine request, in turn, acquires a theological significance that marks the 
political concern with the excess beyond the law. In this sense, the political becomes a 
translation of a theological act. Earthly power, for Derrida, ‘resembles a divine 
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power’ when it seeks to deconstruct the law and exceed it.133 Following Kantorowicz, 
Derrida explains this resemblance as the king’s two bodies.134 The cape, therefore, is a 
witness to this translation of the theological into a political act that is guided by the 
experience of the impossible, the à-venir of justice.  
However, this divine request is not solely a religiously political act. Asking for 
forgiveness, for Derrida, is integral to asking and granting hospitality, the 
‘unconditional’ welcoming of the other, which acquires an aesthetic significance.135 
Derrida claims that 
whoever asks for hospitality, asks, in a way, for forgiveness and whoever offers 
hospitality, grants forgiveness—and forgiveness must be infinite or it is nothing: it 
is excuse or exchange [and..] inversely and first of all, the welcoming one must 
ask for forgiveness from the welcomed one even prior to the former’s own having 
to forgive for one is always failing, lacking hospitality.136  
In hospitality, both host and guest are inserted in a relationship of prayer for 
forgiveness that exceeds the state of the law. This excess, however, is not solely an act 
of the divine. For Derrida, hospitality is ‘an art and a poetics’ on which ‘an entire 
politics depends’.137 The translation of the theological into the political in Derrida’s 
formulation acquires an aesthetic value that is inspired by the love component of the 
wedding gown. The wedding gown of love thus denotes the extra layer of translation 
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between the theological and the political that inserts both in a relationship of 
hospitality.  
The cape-wedding gown, I hold, becomes the metaphor needed to depict the 
dynamics of translation as a form of hospitality. In a further elucidation of hospitality, 
Derrida claims that hospitality marks that state where ‘each concept becomes 
hospitable to its other, to another than itself that is no longer its other [emphasis in the 
original]’.138 Rewritten in terms of translation, violent law (cape) becomes hospitable 
to its other, non-violent aesthetics of love (the wedding gown), and in this process, 
opens up to an ‘other than itself that is not longer its other’ in the form of divine 
justice. In this negotiation between law and justice, translation as prayer acquires its 
aesthetic value through hospitality. Political sovereignty, now, rests upon the aesthetic 
translation of divine sovereignty. How this happens is what we will turn to next. 
1.8 The Aesthetic Translation of Sovereignty: Madness and Silence 
 
We have seen so far how the translation of the theological to the political acquires 
an aesthetic value of hospitality. Hospitality introduces aesthetics into this translation 
through the insignia of power, the cape of law and the wedding gown of love and 
contract. However, Derrida also claims that hospitality is a ‘madness’ that ‘registers 
[an] autodeconstruction in every concept’.139 When the cape opens up to the wedding 
gown, they both are subjected to the ‘deconstructive law of hospitality’.140 In aesthetic 
terms, translation becomes a concern with the state of ‘fabric’ of both garments, a 
state that Derrida describes as a ‘text of artifice [that] appears on the side of the 
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symbolic order’.141 The process through which the madness of hospitality auto-
deconstructs the cape and gown will thus be my focus in this section. 
However, before analyzing the auto-deconstruction of hospitality, I need to draw 
the reader’s attention back to translation’s ideal state set in the literality of the sacred 
text. According to Derrida, the prayer for forgiveness that qualifies the work of the 
translator maintains its messianic objective in the literality of revelation in the 
religious text, what he calls the ‘event’. For Derrida, the sacred text is the ‘absolute 
text because in its event it communicates nothing, it says nothing that would make 
sense beyond the event itself’.142 The event is the experience that characterizes the 
language of the sacred text as having no meaning beyond literality, or the ‘pas de 
sens’ of pure language.143 Moreover, the religious text as ‘pure transferability’ lends 
its effect to all texts otherwise.144 All translation is frozen in a state of ‘to be translated 
as law’; all translation is untranslatable, for there is no finality or final meaning to the 
text.145 Translation breaks the chain of meaning and signification and rests with 
language that is guided by its absolute ideal of literality. From the literality of the 
religious text, the translator is said to receive ‘all the signs of remoteness which guide 
him’.146 The translator is guided by the ideal state of the religious text’s literality, an 
ideal that leaves him with signs of remoteness that language depicts; these are the 
signs with which he sews the cape and attaches the gown.  
Haunted by signs of a remoteness that is difficult to pin down in language, a 
translation finds itself ‘at the edge of the abyss of madness and of silence’ where 
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‘meaning collapses’.147 Translation experiences the madness of deconstructive 
hospitality where theology, aesthetics and politics are placed on one continuum. Its 
experience shows up in the fold of silence that it incorporates in its many folds, a 
silence that Derrida claims ‘is not exterior to language’.148 Silence, here, is taken to 
stand for Benedictine silence, which is described by Vela-Santos in his ‘Verging on 
Divine: The Matter of Benedictine Silence and the Justification of Law and 
Language’ as that which ‘appeases or forestalls’ deconstruction.149 In silence, a 
translation anticipates the possibility of deconstruction inherent in language while 
seeking to forestall it by preserving a sense of deferral of meaning. Translation’s 
concern with deferral of meaning finds roots in the Derridean notion of différance as 
expounded in Of Grammatology (1967). For Derrida, signs refer to other signs in a 
‘movement of différance’ whereby signs are qualified by their difference from other 
signs and by the deferral of meaning to which they refer.150 This movement is best 
summarized in Derrida’s declaration that ‘différance defers-differs’.151 As original 
meaning collapses, a translation thus lays bare this movement of différance of signs. 
These signs that are haunted by a sense of remoteness or deferral of meaning 
characterize a translation’s navigation of this abyss of madness and silence. 
A translation, in this sense, employs language that is haunted by absence. Absence 
renders translation a language of symptoms where the symptom indicates the 
‘category of “maybe”, between the possible and the impossible’, the exception, and 
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the state of ‘meaning that no theorem can exhaust’.152 In translation, all words are 
symptomatic of what they could and could not ‘mean’ simultaneously, of presence 
that is continually haunted by absence.  By meaning, here, I refer not to signification 
but rather to meaning in relation to what is absent. The absence of the infinite as an 
imperceptible state of mediation has a language of its own: the language of absences. 
The regular use of language can only hint at this language of absences through 
symptomatic signs of empty vessels and images. This is why Derrida qualifies the 
marrying of the two languages in translation as a ‘properly symbolic event’ that 
‘appeals to a language of the truth. Not to language that is true […] to a language 
whose truth would be referred only to itself’.153 The language of translation rests 
within itself in a state of being symptomatic of that by which the language of signs is 
always haunted.  
The symptomatic language of silence in translation now subjects the politics of 
sovereignty to redefinition. Sovereignty is no longer the power imposed by the law; 
instead, it is a force of ‘disarm[ing]’ that characterizes power itself.154 In its divine 
form, sovereignty needs the kingly cape to make visible the law as ‘index of 
power’.155 However, that law, Derrida argues, is in a constant state of attempting to 
nail the infinite and excess of justice. For justice to be ‘legitimate’, to be 
acknowledged by law as law, it needs the word.156 This word, in turn, introduces the 
‘force’ of deconstruction that language employs to ‘disarm itself from itself’ and lose 
power enacted by the law.157 This process is what Derrida refers to as the ‘exercise of 
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force in language itself, in the most intimate of its essence, as in the movement by 
which it would absolutely disarm itself from itself’.158 Language, then, turns its force 
against itself in deconstruction. It initiates what Derrida calls the state of ‘auto-
immunity’ that ‘permits exposure to the other’ yet is ‘incalculable’.159 Being a 
‘syndrome whereby any organism (a body, a belief system, even a sovereign state) is 
compelled to attack its own immune system in order to preserve its own life’, auto-
immunity characterizes language in its state of disarming.160 Language’s immune 
system is embodied in the law that is being attacked by the juste of justice, the law of 
justice, in order to preserve itself. Language survives only as a state of continuous 
deconstruction that preserves the space needed for this self-attack or disarming. Its 
self-preservation can only exist as symptomatic of a disarming or auto-immunity.   
In terms of translation, this disarming is echoed by Derrida in his description of 
the ‘self-relation of the sacred body’ or the letter that ‘translates itself of itself’.161 
Translation becomes the process of disarming in which the force of language turns 
against itself. In translation, language loses the arm, the weapon, for power but 
maintains the symptom of that power in the cape. The king of translation disarms 
himself; he is left with his cape as symptom of the power that he once had. His only 
field of the ‘visibility’ of the law is that of the cape.162 However, that symptom of 
power, the cape, perpetuates the same process of auto-immunization that it has 
undergone. The cape is disarmed to become a wedding gown. So, the translation of 
the sacred body of the letter becomes a disarming when placed in language, a 
                                                            
158 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 238. 
159 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault 
and Michael Naas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 152. 
160 Arthur Bradley, ‘The Theocracy to Come: Deconstruction, Autoimmunity, Islam’, 
in The Politics to Come: Power, Modernity and the Messianic, ed. by Paul Fletcher 
and Arthur Bradley (London: Continuum International Inc., 2010), p. 174. 
161 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 133. 
162 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 126. 
Page 66 
 
disarming that gets rid of the cape, the symbol of power, law and justice as juste, to 
envelop it with the wedding gown, the metaphor of mediation in love and forgiveness.  
In the process of disarming in translation, however, the wedding gown of love and 
forgiveness risks becoming a symbol of power that needs disarming again. I read 
Derrida’s answer to this risk to lie in his discussion of Benjamin’s axiom that there is 
no ‘translation of translation’.163 For Derrida, translation marks this state of 
transferability as cape-wedding gown that characterizes a religious text. Translation as 
transferability is - in the end - only a ‘fabric’, an artifice that can be shaped into a cape 
or a gown.164 The only law left to govern translation, in this case, is the law of 
hospitality of one partner to the other in a wedding, the law of ‘madness of 
hospitality’, or madness as law, for the wedding is also a state of auto-
immunization.165 In one sense, madness grants ‘liberty to literality’ for there is no law 
to abide by except that of translation.166 Derrida claims that this law of the letter, in 
reference to literality of sacred texts ‘ceases to oppress insofar as it is no longer the 
exterior body or the corset of meaning’.167 In political terms, this cessation of 
oppression would become a ‘freedom that would no longer be the power of any 
subject, a freedom without autonomy’, for it is interior to the body, not exterior to 
it.168 However, that freedom is a madness that characterizes the state of auto-
immunity. In this sense, it could be concluded that translation becomes the process 
where the kingly cape opens up to the wedding gown but loses itself in the process, 
maintaining its state as an imagined ‘naked’ emperor, an emperor who ‘will wear new 
                                                            
163 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 126. 
164 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 125. 
165 Derrida, ‘Hostipitality’, p. 362. 
166 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 133. 
167 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 133. 
168 Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, p. 152. 
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clothes’.169 The emperor cannot be thought of except as in a state of the ‘will’, forever 
ready to wear, forever unable to do so. Translation loses control and regulation as it 
moves across the dimensions of the divine, aesthetics, and secular politics that the 
cape and gown denote; however, the symptoms of all these dimensions are still there 
in the potential state of the fabric to take shape as cape and wedding gown. However, 
this state of the artifice cannot translate itself except as a symptomatic language of a 
mad wedding initiating auto-immunity and contaminated by a silence of the empty 
vessels of words and images. 
Conclusion 
So, what happens, to go back to the question with which we started this chapter, if 
we read translation in political terms of a royal cape turned into a wedding gown? To 
put it simply, translation becomes the process whereby political sovereignty changes 
from the divine to the secular through an aesthetic process. The concentration of 
semiosis in the logos where meaning and sign coincide with divine sovereignty breaks 
up in a political shift to contract theory initiating the order of the secular. The 
breaking up of semiotic concentration takes the form of signs that can only refer to 
each other, as Derrida holds. However, that play of signs is subject to deconstruction 
that renders signs as empty vessels in a constant state of mediation, of being 
symptomatic of nothing but themselves as signs ‘wedded’ to other signs, hence, the 
wedding gown. In this transition, secular signs, as it were, that have lost the divine 
element of meaning recruit signs of other orders to make up for the loss of divine 
meaning. In both divine and secular forms, the sign is presented as in a constant state 
of reaching across enacted in the medium of aesthetics, the image. In the latter case, 
signs use the image qualities of the metaphor to elucidate their meaning while 
                                                            
169 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 125. 
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preserving a meaning from the divine in the form of a prayer for forgiveness. These 
signs, however, display themselves only as symptoms that characterize the state of 
mediation. The language of mediation in translation cannot be narrated except in 
images and religious language. To translate, a translator does not deal with semiotic 
systems alone; his or her role implies a redefinition of the prayer for forgiveness, 
justice, and law. Translation as cape-gown negotiates itself in a semiotic-aesthetic 
interaction between the theological and the religious notion of the prayer for 
forgiveness and the political field of law and justice. If every linguistic system is run 
by its own semiotic laws and aesthetic rules of the image and the sound in emotional 
and religious forms, this entails that attention to translation as mediation has to mind 
these aspects in the peace talks that it attempts to create with other linguistic systems. 
Even within the premises of the same semiotic system within one language, does that 
not render every word a state of its own or the state a word or world of its own?   
In an attempt to answer this question, the following chapter will be investigating 
the notion of mediation in what would qualify, from Derrida’s perspective, as a 
logocentric system constructed by the ninth-century Turkish philosopher, al-Farabi. In 
al-Farabi’s logocentric system run by an imam, the medievalist approximation to the 
western king, the question of translation becomes: how does the cape-wedding gown 
model of translation in mediation apply when the king is taken to be an imam, a 
medievalist approximation to prophet as king? Does the al-Farabi model allow for or 
foresee a Derridean move to the secular from the religious? And if so, along which 
lines? This is what we will turn to in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2     
 
TRANSLATING THE IMAM 
So let it be clear to you that the idea of the 
Philosopher, Supreme Ruler, Prince, Legislator, 
and Imam is but a single idea. 
Al-Farabi1 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that translation is the process whereby political 
sovereignty aesthetically shifts from the accessorial divine cape to the more secular 
contract-based gown. This shift is marked by signs as empty vessels of mediation that 
need the supplementation of different languages, one of the image and one of the 
religious prayer for forgiveness. In translation, the switch in the sounds of the 
different sign systems, the different languages, is accompanied by a transformation in 
the notion of mediation. This transformation is expressed in political and religious 
terms related to the notions of prayer, justice and law.  
The semiotic system that this chapter will investigate in terms of its relationship 
with the political and the religious is that constructed by the Persian/Turkish 
philosopher Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad Farab (hereafter, al-Farabi), 
c.872-950. Known as the Second Teacher, al-Farabi is well known for his engagement 
with Aristotle’s and Plato’s philosophy in his famous yet controversial Concordance 
of the Opinions of Aristotle and Plato that left its imprints on Sufi mystical thought as 
well as the more practical Islamic political thought. Borrowing from Plato’s Republic 
to write his Virtuous City and The Political Regime and from Aristotle in his 
                                                            
1 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, in Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato 
and Aristotle, trans. by Mahdi, Muhsin (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 
47 (#58) 
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Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, al-Farabi constructs his own system 
that fuses Aristotelian logic with Platonic politics within an overall Islamic 
systemized framework.2 From the Islamic tradition, he ponders questions of political 
and religious leadership in the figure of the imam running a Virtuous City. This imam 
as ‘supreme ruler’ and sovereign is said to receive revelation via a Neo-Platonic 
emanation from Intellects ending with an ‘Active Intellect’ that mediates between the 
‘being of the First Cause’ and the ‘rational part of the soul’.3 When the imam’s ‘soul 
is in union’ with the Active Intellect, or ‘divine mind’, revelation flows.4 By being in 
union with a mediating agent, the imam assumes the same function of mediation, for it 
is through him that revelation reaches humans. The imam thus embodies mediation 
himself.5 
The intriguing notion of mediation as a vehicle for revelation in the figure of an 
imam, the sovereign, constitutes the framework that this chapter adopts for 
reconsidering translation. The questions that will structure my exploration of the 
                                                            
2 This thesis is interested in al-Farabi’s work because of its relevance to contemporary 
debates on Political Islam. This interest has been sparked by Bassam Tibi’s claim (in 
Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus 
Global Jihad (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 211) that al-Farabi is 
important for the political debate today because his ‘aql-based [rationalist] philosophy 
is a lasting indication of a Euro-Islamic encounter at its very best’, especially that it 
‘could provide the framework  for Western- Muslim common ground in the age of 
migration’. Al-Farabi, for Tibi, highlights a concern with cultural encounter that 
characterizes the work of later Muslim thinkers, such as Ibn Rushd or Averroes. Al-
Farabi’s work, in this sense, is an early illustration of the modern concern with 
multiculturalism and democracy, which fundamentally question the notion of 
sovereignty, and which political Islamists struggle to define today. 
3 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, pp. 33–37. 
4 Mahdi Muhsin, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 155. 
5 Muhsin Mahdi (in Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, 
p.155) argues that the role of the divine mind ‘is not merely that of mediating between 
God and man but also that of acting as the vicar of God in creating things here below 
by providing the forms to all natural beings when their matter is readied by the 
movement of the heavenly bodies’. It is the first notion of mediation as vehicle for 
revelation that this chapter takes as framework for exploring translation.  
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translation of the imam are how would the imam, a medieval approximation to a 
mediating king, compare with the cape-wedding gown model of translation discussed 
in the previous chapter? Would this imamate model allow for/ foresee a religious-
secular move similar to the Derridean one? And how would such a system of 
mediation negotiate the relationship between law and justice? 
2.1 Mediation: Between Al-Farabi and Derrida 
 
To address mediation within al-Farabi’s model, the chapter will start by 
investigating the role of the imam as an agent of mediation between the divine mind 
and reason. Through this mediation, the ruler is said to become ‘wise, a philosopher, 
and in possession of complete practical judgment’.6 As a philosopher, he has wisdom 
or ‘knowledge of the remote reasons by which all the rest of beings exist and of the 
existence of the proximate reasons for things that have reasons’.7 In addition to 
wisdom, the imam possesses a perfect ‘practical intellect’ by which he ‘is able to seize 
upon what he ought to prefer or avoid with respect to each one of the matters [he is] to 
do’.8 Besides the theoretical knowledge of causes, the imam is able to run the 
Virtuous City and guide its citizens to attain highest perfection by virtue of practical 
wisdom. The goal of highest perfection is defined as happiness characterized as ‘the 
good, virtuous, and noble things’.9 An emotion that accompanies and indicates moral 
perfection, happiness is imbued with theoretical and practical significance that the 
philosopher-imam as mediator nurtures in the citizens of the Virtuous City.  
                                                            
6 Muhsin, Alfarabi, p. 162.  
7 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, The Political Writings: ʻSelected Aphorismsʼ and Other Texts, 
trans. by Charles E. Butterworth (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 30 
(#37). 
8 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 33 (#38). 
9 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 24 (#20). 
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As the concern becomes with living an emotion of happiness accompanying 
ethical perfection, the imam gives his role in mediation an aesthetic dimension that is 
concerned with emotional response. Actually, al-Farabi claims that etymologically 
speaking, ‘the idea of Imam in the Arabic language signifies merely the one whose 
example is followed and who is well-received or his purpose is well-received’.10  
Reception here marks the aesthetic dimension of the imam’s role. However, this 
‘well-reception’ on the side of citizens is said to be achieved by means of persuasive 
arguments that aim to convince the citizens of the ‘images’ of the theoretical things 
that he ‘invents’.11 By creating images to guarantee an emotional response, the imam 
imbues mediation with aesthetic features facilitated by a rhetorical use of language. 
The imam’s mission is to persuade citizens of the images that he makes up of the 
religious laws with which he runs the city. It is in this sense that what is philosophy 
for him and is recognized with certainty becomes established or delivered as ‘religion’ 
for others.12 He aims to create belief on the side of citizens through the creation of 
images that ‘make them follow after an imagined form of happiness’.13 His religious 
role, it seems, becomes an aesthetic exercise for the imagination that starts off with 
the invention of images that have emotional happiness as an end. 
The imam’s transfer into images of philosophical percepts is what I am referring 
to here as translation. My argument builds on al-Farabi’s own model of ‘transfer’ as 
inter-national translation or naqla, which he expounds in his Book of Letters or Kitab 
al-Huruf. Naqla is described as the process that follows the development of a nation’s 
language; it is a process of transfer whereby philosophical or religious notions get 
                                                            
10 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 46 (#57). 
11 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 47 (#59). 
12 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 41. 
13 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 41. 
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transferred into the discourse of other nations.14 These nations, in turn, find 
themselves inserted into a linguistic mission of coming up or adopting terms or names 
to cater for the national differences.15 This challenge of translation, I find, also takes 
place locally within the premises of the Virtuous City through the figure of the imam. 
The imam, however, translates the philosophical into the religious through similitudes 
or images. His model of intra-national transfer or naqla replaces the linguistic with 
the aesthetic to perform the same mission, negotiating the relation between 
philosophy and religion. 16 
So, the first part of the chapter explores the semiotic and linguistic system that al-
Farabi constructs and that the imam relies on to fulfill his role as mediator. I will, 
then, investigate the imam-as-translator who creates images to induce an emotional 
acquiescence, happiness. In this process, he qualifies mediation by giving it an 
aesthetic guise with a religion-creating function that is carried out via persuasive 
methods, political oratory. Rhetoric is employed ‘to arouse the resolution’ of citizens 
                                                            
14 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, ed. by Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar el-
Mashreq, 1969) in Leneshmidt Translations Resource Library 
<http://www.leneshmidt-
translations.com/alfarabi_book_of_letters_english/index.htm..> [accessed 4 June 
2014]( §§148-151). 
15 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, §154. 
16 Leo Strauss (In Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Press, 1952), p.15) highlights an important discrepancy in al-Farabi’s definition of the 
king among his different writings. This discrepancy relates to the link between 
philosophy and religion in the person of this king-imam. In al-Farabi’s Plato, Strauss 
argues, al-Farabi substitutes ‘politics for religion’. Al-Farabi associates the 
philosopher with the king, but he does not call this king, a legislator. He thus 
establishes the connection between philosophy and sovereignty, but not religion. Al-
Farabi shows that philosophy needs the supplementation of the “royal art” (not 
religion) in order for the public to attain happiness. By this substitution, al-Farabi, 
Strauss claims, lays the ‘foundation for the secular alliance between philosophers and 
princes friendly to philosophy’ and ‘initiate[s] the tradition whose most famous 
representatives in the West are Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli’. This substitution 
to which Strauss points, however, does not occur in al-Farabi’s other works with 
which I deal in this chapter. 
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to acts leading to happiness.17 By employing political oratory, the imam aims to cause 
the ‘souls of the citizens to grow reverent, submissive, muted, and meek’ and in favor 
of the acts he espouses or ‘confident, spiteful, insolent, and contemptuous’ of 
‘everything contrary to these acts’.18 Language, in this regard, employs the aesthetic 
medium of images for the creation of emotional ends linked to and leading to action.  
The aesthetic element that qualifies the mission of the imam-as-translator is 
further described by al-Farabi as aiming to strengthen the ‘part of the soul that is 
naturally equipped for happiness’.19 The ‘natural’ becomes the field of work for the 
imam-translator.  Language is used by the imam to train the souls of the masses and 
nurture the natural or rational as well as ‘appetitive’ qualities of the soul.20 Among the 
appetitive qualities that the imam is said to instruct and that the second part of the 
chapter will focus on is his notion of justice or ‘adl.21 Justice is claimed to be an 
appetitive moral of the soul that the imam as law-giver or legislator is supposed to 
train in his ‘formation of character’ of the citizens.22 It indicates what Mian in 
‘Muslim Political Philosophy and the Affective Turn: Farabi on Language, Affect, 
and Reason’ calls the ‘excess of reason (i.e. affect)’ that a law-giver trains via 
religious images or similitudes. 23 In this process, justice interacts with law and the 
latter with the former to form the city built on justice-law or law-justice. This 
interaction between justice and law, I hold, would qualify as al-Farabi’s notion of 
virtue within his Virtuous City. 
                                                            
17 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 38 (#44) 
18Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 38 (#44). 
19 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 37. 
20 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 14 (#7). 
21 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 16 (#8). 
22 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 35 (#39). 
23 Ali Altaf Mian, ‘Muslim Political Philosophy and the Affective Turn: Farabi on 
Language, Affect, and Reason’, Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies, 4 (2011), 47–70 (p. 
50). 
Page 75 
 
However, the reliance of the imam as mediator/translator on natural dispositions to 
establish his rule meets with the very nature of natural disposition, non-uniformity or 
difference in reception that the last part of the chapter will investigate. Among the 
citizens of the Virtuous City, there spring ‘weeds’ whose ‘position in the cities is like 
that of the darnel among the wheat, the thorns growing among the crop, or the other 
grass that is useless or even harmful to the crop or plants’.24 Divided into six classes, 
these weeds share in their contestation of the images the imam evokes. They carry out 
their contestation in different manners because of the differences in their natural 
dispositions, their rational and appetitive moral abilities. They thus challenge the 
imam’s address to natural dispositions, or what al-Farabi calls the imam’s 
‘instruction’.25    
By attempting to contest the imam’s sovereignty by activating natural dispositions 
that escape the imam’s address, the weeds show how the imam-as-translator becomes 
an imam-in-translation. When the imam as translator/ mediator relies on 
communicating with the natural through the aesthetic, he unintentionally, it seems, 
places himself in translation. The weeds only play the role of catalyst in this process.  
The imam translates himself by himself through his very reliance on the aesthetic 
medium to address natural dispositions. 
In translating the imam, the weed’s skepticism, I argue, displays a mechanism of 
contesting images that seems to aesthetically echo the Derridean notion of différance 
as raised in Of Grammatology (1967). For Derrida, signs refer to other signs in a 
constant state of différance, difference with other signs that also indicates the differed 
status of meaning. He describes this process as the ‘production of 
                                                            
24 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 42. 
25 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 35 (#39). 
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differing/deferring’.26 In the previous chapter, I showed how the signs in différance 
mark the abyss of madness and silence that a translation navigates. In this chapter, I 
rethink translation through al-Farabi’s imam model to investigate for hints, if any, of a 
possible différance at work.  
My investigation revisits the Aristotelian traces within al-Farabi’s writings by 
following Derrida’s example. Derrida introduces différance to deconstruct 
logocentrism, or the ‘metaphysics of presence’ within Western philosophy, that 
privileges a ‘transcendental signified’.27 His deconstruction emphasizes différance as 
a ‘(pure) trace’.28 The trace is the ‘originary condition of mediation, synthesis or 
complexity, rather than a present being, thing or entity’ that characterizes the state of 
every sign as sign.29 Derrida also refers to this originary state of mediation as ‘arche-
writing’ or originary writing that deconstructs the opposition between speech and 
writing.30 Whereas Aristotelian logocentrism took writing to be a supplement to 
speech, Derrida shows that writing is more ‘originary’ and is what defines the state of 
all signs, spoken or written.31 All signs are always in a state ‘of mediation, difference 
and relation’.32 How al-Farabi’s model rewrites this state of the sign in mediation thus 
becomes my question for this section of the chapter.  
Transposing the mediatory state of the signs from the Western context to the 
weeds’ construction of images, I argue that the movement of différance takes place in 
aesthetic terms. In the al-Farabian version, the appetitive or affective constitutes a 
                                                            
26 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 23. 
27 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 49. 
28 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 62. 
29 Arthur Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), p. 75. 
30 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 56. 
31 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 61. 
32 Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology, p. 54. 
Page 77 
 
foundational aspect of the sign. In oral speech, signs differ by virtue of the body part 
involved in their production. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, al-
Farabi highlights the ‘differences in the parts of the mouth that are actively or 
passively involved in producing the various sounds’ and that constitute the 
‘differentiae of letters’ in speech.33 Sound is described as an ‘affective quality 
(kayfiyyat infi’aliyya)’ that is the principle for differentiating among letters, the 
material of expression in speech.34 Writing then preserves the affective response, the 
sound, by recording the medium of the letter as material of expression. So, it could be 
said that script is not subordinate to speech in the Aristotelian sense; writing follows 
after an aesthetic refinement of speech that is linked to the affective quality just as 
speech follows after a refinement of the affective quality of sound. Mediation as 
originary trace, in this sense, can only be taken as a state of what I call ‘affective 
tracing’, and it is this affective tracing that differs among nations and characterizes 
translation. 
So, the model of mediation as imamic transfer or translator-in-translation, which 
al-Farabi offers, seems to be following similar Derridean semiotic motifs. The 
‘divine’ logocentric notion of sovereignty is deconstructed in an affective move 
towards what can be taken to be the secular: the nation’s natural dispositions that 
include moral virtues, especially justice. In this model of translation, the chapter will 
argue, the notions of divine and secular are renegotiated in aesthetic terms as the 
affective traces prove to be integral to the semiotics of speech and writing.  
 
                                                            
33 Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, p. 16. 
34 Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary, p. 16. 
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2.2 Language: Semiotics and Affective Aesthetics 
  
Before exploring the role that the imam plays as mediator, it is necessary that I 
explore the semiotic dimensions of mediation within al-Farabi’s philosophy. I shall 
thus begin my discussion by investigating the development of language in a nation as 
outlined in al-Farabi’s Book of Letters or Kitab al-Huruf, his commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, as well as his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 
or Kitab al-Ibara. For al-Farabi, a nation develops its own language according to its 
own ‘natural make-up’ which starts off with gesturing and producing speech sounds.35 
These speech sounds depend on ‘the character and temperaments of the organs of 
people’ who dwell in the same place.36 Speech is primarily taken to denote an organic 
natural response to sense perceptions. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, al-Farabi defines sound as ‘essentially an affection of the senses’ or 
‘kayfiyyat infi’aliyya’ that is the ‘genus of the material of expression’, the letters.37 
Describing the sound as an affection is an addition that al-Farabi integrates into his 
discussion of Aristotle’s logic as Zimmerman, the translator of Al-Farabi’s 
Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, claims. As an 
affective state, sound becomes the natural basis that characterizes the uniqueness of 
every nation’s language. Upon that affective uniqueness, words and sentence 
construction later develop in a process that ‘involves both our cognition and our 
affective sensory apparatus’.38  
                                                            
35 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, §121. 
36 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, §146. 
37 Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, pp. 16–7. 
38 Mian, 'Muslim Political Philosophy', p. 56. 
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Al-Farabi further maintains the value of the affective in his explanation of how 
speech and script, writing, develop in a nation through the medium of the ‘letter’.39 
He first highlights the distinction that Aristotle makes between ‘expression’, alfaz, 
and sound.40 Sound is the genus of letters that is also produced by birds and signalizes 
the terror, pleasure or aggression they feel.41 The latter is said to be better understood 
through the works of ‘those versed in the meters of poetry of that language who are 
concerned with the letters of their language’.42 Sound, in this sense, is concerned with 
the affective distinction among letters. On the other hand, expressions or alfaz are 
claimed to ‘signify by virtue of being common signs’ so that ‘when someone hears 
them, the thing of which the expression in question has been made, a sign comes to 
his mind’.43 Al-Farabi claims that these expressions ‘distinguish nations’.44 
Expressions become a nation’s attempt at conventionalizing its natural affective 
responses of sound through letters. Through convention, an expression maintains the 
affective element, the sound and its emotional connotations, even though the speaker 
might not be experiencing the affect at the moment of speaking.  
Following the Aristotelian tradition, these expressions are said to be common 
signs, nouns, verbs, etc., that structure speech preserved by script. Speech or qawl is 
explained to be ‘what comes out in the voice’, sawt, and ‘signifies in the first place 
thoughts in the soul’.45 Al-Farabi explains these traces in the soul by distinguishing 
them from pure ‘thoughts’, for traces indicate ‘the images of sense objects according 
to the sensation one had of them […] and other things, like the goat-stag and similar 
                                                            
39 Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, p. 16. 
40 Ibid., p. 16. 
41 Ibid., p. 20. 
42 Ibid., p. 16. 
43 Ibid., p. 11. 
44 Ibid., p. 12. 
45 Ibid., p. 11. 
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things, which the soul invents by combining images’.46 Traces in the soul thus 
indicate thoughts, sensations, images and their combinations that speech signifies 
through the medium of letters. Primarily constituted of sensations and images, traces 
in the soul need the medium of the affective, the letters, to vocalize themselves. In 
turn, when this speech is put in writing or script, it is said to rely on convention and 
‘mnemonic signs’.47 Under the effect of memory, letters become mnemonic signs that 
are used to preserve and inscribe the affective-sensation correspondence. 
Natural make-up and the affective-sensation, in turn, become the foundations for a 
nation’s formation of its own language and lexicon. From the affective state of letters 
that imbues speech and writing, a nation is said to develop its utterances and 
meanings through dialectical methods until they reach the investigation into 
theoretical philosophy as ‘in the time of Plato’ and ‘in the days of Aristotle’.48 
Philosophy is claimed to be taught to ‘the elect’ by means of ‘demonstrative methods 
only’, a method which I will discuss later on, while common instruction of the 
‘multitude’ takes the form of ‘dialectical, rhetorical, or poetical methods’.49 Here, the 
poetic and rhetorical imbue the teaching of philosophy with the affective-sensation 
dimension spoken of earlier and which I will be exploring more extensively in 
Chapter Four of this thesis. However, my interest here is in the fact that the 
instruction of the multitude proceeds by ‘imag[ing] forth such theoretical intelligibles’ 
and ‘excel[ling] in discovering each one of the political activities useful for the 
attainment of happiness, and excel[ling] in using all the means of persuasion about the 
theoretical and practical matters that are appropriate to teach to the multitude’.50 
                                                            
46 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
47 Ibid., p. 13. 
48 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf,§§142-3. 
49 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf,§143. 
50 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf,§144. 
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Teaching the multitude, then, resorts to the creation of images via rhetorical and 
poetic methods, which I take to constitute the medium of the affective aesthetic. By 
the aesthetic, I mean images that have affective connotations where emotions also 
play a major role.51  
Instruction, however, is not restricted to the aesthetic aspect of language. 
Affective aesthetics plays a role in forming opinions as a form of ‘religion’ or milla of 
the multitudes.52 Al-Farabi defines the milla as the process ‘by which the multitude is 
taught, its character is formed, and it is made to do everything with which to achieve 
happiness’.53 In this case, religion is defined by the response the imam awaits from the 
citizens: total belief and submission to his instruction. Citizens are supposed to 
directly believe in the images that aestheticize philosophy and tie it with emotional 
ends, happiness. The shift from philosophy to religion is thus marked by the 
persistence of the affective through an emphasis on the aesthetics of imaging and the 
emotional. The integration of the affective, emotional and imaginative in the 
development of language, therefore, highlights the aesthetic element that is deeply 
embedded in al-Farabi’s version of the Aristotelian semiotic system.54  
                                                            
51 Ali Altaf Mian (in ‘Muslim Political Philosophy’, 47–70) argues that there is a 
‘unison of reason and affect’ in al-Farabi’s ‘grounding of social and political 
existence in language’ (p.48). Mian distinguishes between the affects and emotions 
through emphasizing the non-rational aspect of emotions in the form of passions. He 
adopts Michael Hardt’s definition of the affect (in The Affective Turn (2007)) as the 
integration of the reason and the passions in the ‘way we think of the human 
condition’ (pp. 67-68, note 2). 
52 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, §144. 
53 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf,§§142-4. 
54 George Steiner (in After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1975)) argues that ‘language is more than communication’; 
it is ‘the dynamic mediation between poles of cognition which gives human 
experience its underlying dual and dialectical form’ (p.86). Here, Steiner refers to 
Wilhem von Humboldt’s On the Differentiation of the Structure of Human Language, 
and its Influence on the Spiritual Evolution of the Human Race (1883) in which the 
latter argues that ‘different languages engender different spiritual constructs of reality’ 
(Steiner, p.88). The reference to spiritual constructs and cognition is what I take to 
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2.3 The Semiotic-Aesthetic Medium: The Imam as Mediator  
  
So far, I have shown how language within the al-Farabian system is marked by the 
embedding of affective aesthetics in semiotics, which is employed for the ‘instruction’ 
of the masses.55 The person ascribed with instructing the multitudes in philosophical 
truths through persuading them of the images is the Imam, the ruler figure with unique 
attributes. The imam is a ‘Philosopher, Supreme Ruler, Prince, Legislator’ who is able 
to communicate effectively with these masses.56 The imam thus performs a unique 
communicative function that acquires aesthetic significance, which I devote this 
section to explore.  
As a sovereign, the imam is said to possess twelve innate qualities and six 
conditions that must develop in his character after maturity. Among the twelve innate 
qualities of perfection, he is said to have ‘fine diction, his tongue enabling him to 
explain to perfection all that is in the recess of his mind’.57 This innate communicative 
ability, along with all the other qualities, then, becomes the foundation for the skills 
he acquires after maturity. These include wisdom, complete prudence, excellent 
persuasion, [and] excellent imaginative evocation’.58 In addition to his possession of 
the theoretical knowledge that constitutes his wisdom as a philosopher, the imam 
should develop the practical aspects of that wisdom, taken here to signify the 
particular conditions that facilitate the application of theoretical knowledge.59 To help 
establish these political conditions, the imam must be able to produce imaginative 
                                                                                                                                                                          
correspond with the relationship of speech to the affections, imagination and memory 
in al-Farabi’s work. 
55 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 35(#39). 
56 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 47 (#58). 
57 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, On the Perfect State: Mabadi’ Ara Ahl Al-Madina Al-Fadila, 
trans. by Richard Walzer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 249. 
58 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 37 (#58). 
59 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 45 (#56). 
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impressions that are convincing enough for the citizens to follow. The images that he 
creates are supported by persuasive arguments to form the religion or milla of the 
masses. When the masses become ‘believers’ in the images that the imam creates, the 
imam will have fulfilled his function.60 The imam is recognized as an imam only after 
he becomes the ‘model, someone to be copied in his ways of life and his actions, 
[and] someone whose declarations and counsels are to be accepted’.61 
The imam’s instruction relies on creating imaginative impressions to convince the 
public of the ‘theoretical virtues’ that he intellects because of his ‘superior natural 
dispositions’.62 The imam cognizes these theoretical virtues by virtue of possessing 
‘great and superior natural dispositions, when his soul is in union with the Active 
Intellect’.63 The Active Intellect is the last and tenth intellect in al-Farabi’s 
Neoplatonic cosmology that ‘bridges the gap between the heavenly or celestial world 
and the sublunary world’ and is the agent of delivering revelation.64 In The Political 
Regime, this intellect is described as being the agent of ‘mediation’ between the ‘first 
Cause’ and men.65 This state of unity with the Active Intellect is incumbent upon the 
imam having superior natural dispositions necessary for him to receive revelation. In 
fact, the possession of superior natural dispositions defines the true notion of the 
imam’s sovereignty, as al-Farabi claims. To be a sovereign or a ‘prince’, the imam is 
said ‘to possess the power of the greatest ability’.66 His power is not dependent on 
external things; instead, it is a result of ‘his art, skill, and virtue’ being very powerful. 
Only a ‘great power of deliberation, and great power of [moral] virtue and art’ can 
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Page 84 
 
lead to the imam’s skill and art being powerful.67 It is upon fulfilling these conditions 
as a sovereign with superior natural dispositions that the imam’s soul becomes unified 
with the Active Intellect. In this state of unity, the imam assumes the role of the 
Active Intellect; he becomes an agent of mediation himself. By virtue of this 
mediation, the imam becomes a philosopher through the overflow of the divine mind 
to reason. Besides being a philosopher, he becomes ‘a prophet, warning about future 
events and telling about particular things existing in the present’ through the overflow 
to the imagination.68 The imam thus combines two roles, philosopher and prophet, 
through his role in divine mediation. 
As an agent of mediation characterized by the overflow of the divine mind to 
reason, the imam is charged with the mission of instructing men in the philosophical 
truths that overflowed. This model of instruction is said to ‘proceed by speech 
alone’.69 It involves ‘the sciences whose ultimate purpose is to make the beings and 
what they contain intelligible with certainty’.70 These sciences consist of two 
components: the principles of instruction and the principles of being.71 The principles 
of being are Aristotle’s four causes: the ‘formal cause’, the ‘agent’, the ‘material 
principle’, and the ‘final cause’.72 The principles of instruction are: 
(1) the conditions and states of the first premises and the order of their 
arrangement if they are to lead the investigator necessarily to the truth itself and to 
certainty about it; (2) the conditions and states of the first premises and the order 
of their arrangement when they cause the investigator to wander from the truth, 
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perplex him, and prevent him from perceiving even where the truth of his problem 
might lie; (3) the conditions and states of the first premises and the order of their 
arrangement when they provide belief and persuasion about a problem and make 
one even fancy that this is certainty although it is not; (4) the conditions and states 
of the first premises and the order of their arrangement when they lead the 
investigator not to the truth itself but to a similitude and image of truth.73  
These principles of instruction refer to the logical syllogistic arts of rhetoric and 
poetry along with demonstrations and sophistry. According to Fuad Said Haddad in 
Al-Farabi’s Theory of Communication, the ‘arts of communication constitute [….] 
various levels of the process of instruction’.74 Here, Haddad is referring to the five 
communicative arts of demonstration, dialectic, sophistry, rhetoric and poetry which 
are integral to al-Farabi’s theory of instruction described above. Obviously, the imam 
as mediator masters the art of communication according to context. This is why he 
chooses to resort to persuasive arguments, rhetoric, to instruct the ‘vulgar’ of the 
‘similitudes’ that he constructs.75 The vulgar only know the similitude or likeness 
created by these principles of instruction.  
In his role as mediator or instructor, the imam creates images to convince the 
masses that he deserves to be their ruler. He thus carries out an aesthetic function, the 
creation of images, with political ends. The citizens are supposed to imagine the 
principles through having ‘imprinted in [their] soul[s] their images, representations of 
them, or matters that are imitations of them’.76 The imam thus communicates with the 
imagination of the citizens aesthetically through the creation of images, 
                                                            
73 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 14 (#4). 
74 Fuad Said Haddad , Al-Farabi’s Theory of Communication (Beirut, Lebanon: 
American University of Beirut, 1989), p. 123. 
75 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 36 (#40). 
76 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 40. 
Page 86 
 
representations and imitations. Aesthetic communication with the citizens’ 
imagination is then supposed to prepare the citizens’ minds to receive the principles 
mediated by the divine mind: 
The relatively extensive and unusual account of the imagination in the Virtuous 
City presents it as a power that is continuous and communicates with the 
powers of sense perception, on the one hand, and of reason, on the other. It 
provides the link that unifies the process of human cognition. And it plays an 
active, creative role as mediator. It receives information from either reason or 
the senses, transforms it, and transmits it to, or prepares it for, the other power. 
Its first activity in this regard is preparing the way for reason to grasp the first 
principles of knowledge provided by the active intellect or divine mind.77 
As a medium of mediation between the senses and cognition, the imagination 
performs an active innate role that involves the creation of images and transformation 
of information between one faculty and another. It carries out this function to aid 
reason in receiving the philosophical principles that the imam ‘in whom the divine 
mind incarnates itself’ is teaching.78 However, in the case of the imam’s instruction, 
the creation of images is not left for the imagination of the public to negotiate by 
itself. The imam carries out this function for their imagination through the similitudes 
he creates. In this sense, the imam could be said to be re-appropriating the innate 
function of the imagination by exteriorizing it. He becomes an imagination 
exteriorized, a mediating agent that exteriorizes the link between the senses and 
cognition. He is now ascribed with a double mediating function: divine and 
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imaginative mediation. His divine mediation appropriates the imaginative mediation 
enacted within the aesthetic field. As a philosopher, he resorts to the imagination of 
the masses to create the imaginative impressions, images, to educate them. As a 
prophet, he needs his imagination for the overflow of revelation from the Active 
Mind. In this sense, it could be said that the imam becomes a vehicle of the 
imagination, his own and the masses’; this is what I refer to here as his aesthetic 
function.  
As an imagination exteriorized, the imam constructs images, adopting happiness 
as his aim. He ties his aesthetic function to emotional ends. By happiness, al-Farabi 
means, the emotional state that marks the ‘good without qualification’ that can only 
be achieved when citizens believe in the ‘first intelligible’ revealed via the Active 
Intellect.79 It consists in ‘the soul’s dissociating itself from everything material or 
bodily and joining the host of the separate intelligences in the intelligible world’.80 
This form of happiness that can be achieved in this life is said to become true and 
supreme after death when it takes the form of salvation where ‘the kindred separate 
souls increase in number and unite with one another’.81 True happiness is defined as 
the salvation through unity that the imam seeks to emulate in his Virtuous City and 
yet of which can he only be assured after the passing away of spirits who have gained 
good states.   
In order to reach this state of happiness, the imam is required to form characters, a 
process that defines the specific emotional response the imam seeks to achieve in the 
souls of the masses. Habituating or forming characters is defined as ‘the method of 
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introducing the moral virtues and practical arts in nations’ through arousing 
resolutions to perform acts.82 The imam seeks to habituate characters by arousing in 
them the ‘resolution to do these acts; the states of character and the acts issuing from 
them should come to possess their souls, and they should be as it were enraptured by 
them’.83 As an imagination exteriorized, the imam addresses the resolution to do acts 
through creating a feeling of rapture aroused by speech or deed.84 By employing 
political oratory, the imam aims to cause the ‘souls of the citizens to grow reverent, 
submissive, muted, and meek’ and in favor of the acts he espouses or ‘confident, 
spiteful, insolent, and contemptuous’ of ‘everything contrary to these acts’.85 The 
formation of character follows the supreme rulers’ inquiry into the human nature 
common to all nations and into the ‘human states of character and the acts for which 
all nations are equipped by that nature which is common to them’ and ‘by which 
every nation can be set aright and guided towards happiness’.86 So, the formation of 
character takes place as a process of introducing moral virtues through images and 
arguments that are compatible with every nation’s states of character.  
In this sense, the imam’s instruction aims to habituate the natural in order to 
naturalize the habit, which qualifies as an act of conventionalizing. The imam seeks to 
induce a conventional sense of the natural. By aiming to habituate characters and 
mold natural dispositions, then, the imam acquires his role as imam, for 
etymologically speaking, the imam ‘signifies merely the one whose example is 
followed and who is well-received or his purpose is well-received’.87 Reception 
determines the function of the imam as imam. As imam, his aesthetic imaginative 
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mediation moulds the natural dispositions of characters by arousing resolutions and 
acts according to a set virtue. To maintain this conventionalizing norm, the imam 
resorts to writing, another act that reinforces his aesthetic function, as the next section 
will show.  
2.4 Naqla/Translation and the Imam: Law and Justice   
As the imam embodies the mediation of the philosophical to create religion, his 
aesthetic function is carried out by establishing a link between the imaginative and the 
emotional. He relies on the aesthetic medium to mould natural dispositions or 
conventionalize them by habituating characters. The process of habituating characters 
takes place through the creation of images that address the imagination of every 
nation according to the potential of that nation. These images are said to be 
accompanied by persuasive arguments that can cause the souls to be either submissive 
or insolent. His aesthetic role, however, reinforces an overall Aristotelian 
logocentrism that this section will explore. 
In instruction and the habituation of character, the imam is described as resorting 
to writing to preserve the arguments used to convince the public of the desired milla 
or religion. These arguments are differentiated into ones that should be kept oral for 
their temporary character and ones that should be both oral and written, preserved 
permanently ‘in two Books, a Book of Opinions and a Book of Acts’.88 This script is 
said to preserve ‘the opinions and acts that nations and cities were called upon to 
embrace, the arguments by which he sought to preserve among them and to establish 
in them the things they were called upon to embrace so that they will not be forgotten, 
and the arguments with which he contradicts the opponents of these opinions and 
                                                            
88 Alfarabi, The Attainment of Happiness, p. 39 (#44). 
Page 90 
 
acts’.89 Opinions include ‘such things as God, His attributes, the universe, and so 
forth’ while actions refer to ‘such things as prayers and civic transactions’.90 The 
Aristotelian metaphysical distinction between speech and writing is refigured through 
this differentiation of speech into two kinds, speech/expression that corresponds with 
script to be kept in books and speech/expression that should not be turned into script 
because it is temporary. These books become a logocentric preservation of the imam’s 
arguments on actions and opinions. They are examples of the ‘venerable’ kind of 
writing which is employed ‘in the service of the virtuous king and the virtuous 
rulership’.91 The noblest kind of writing, in this sense, preserves the imam’s laws and 
is employed in his service to mold the characters of the citizens by investing in their 
natural dispositions. 
These opinions and acts preserved in books are described as being set down by the 
law-giver who ‘legislat[es] a divine law (sharī’a) or a religion (milla) for a particular 
nation’.92 Opinions and actions thus indicate laws that the imam founds as a law-giver 
or philosopher-legislator. Legislation signifies ‘excellence of [the imam’s] knowledge 
concerning the conditions of practical intelligibles’.93 As a legislator, the imam is 
concerned with finding and realizing practical intelligibles so that a nation can 
achieve happiness. These intelligibles are, then, ‘embodied in laws’.94 The process of 
aesthetic instruction, then, follows on from this setting down of laws. The political, in 
this sense, proves to be intertwined with aesthetics: 
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 The art of setting down laws requires the ability to excel in imaging forth such 
theoretical intelligibles that are difficult for the multitude to conceive, to excel in 
discovering each one of the political activities useful for the attainment of 
happiness, and to excel in using all the means of persuasion about the theoretical 
and practical matters that are appropriate to teach to the multitude. If laws 
dealing with these two classes [namely, the theoretical and the practical] are set 
down, and the means of persuading, instructing, and forming the character of the 
multitude are added to them, then a religion [milla] will have been realized by 
which the multitude is taught, its character is formed, and it is made to do 
everything with which to achieve happiness.95  
The imam, in this sense, renders law-making the foundation upon which a religion is 
formed. The conflation of the political and religious takes place through a process of 
instructing the masses in the philosophical matters via aesthetic media. His instruction 
aims to persuade as well as to habituate every nation’s characters.  
The setting of laws by the imam as a founder of a religion is correlated with the 
act of establishing names for these new laws. In the Book of Letters, this process of 
naming or establishing laws is discussed by al-Farabi within the larger context of 
translation as transfer or naqla. Naqla, or linguistic translation, involves transferring 
religious laws or philosophical notions and their names from one nation to another.96 
The process of transferring concepts is complemented by a process of name transfer 
where names are taken from the language of the masses and displaced into the laws or 
philosophical concepts instituted by the philosopher-legislator, the elect. Al-Farabi 
explains that ‘[n]ames of laws of a first religion’ are transferred to a new imported 
                                                            
95 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, §144. 
96 Ibid., §154. 
Page 92 
 
law, and ‘names of ordinary meanings’ to new philosophical concepts.97 Naming, 
then, becomes the process of conventionalizing new religious laws and philosophical 
meanings through transfer or translation.    
Although al-Farabi’s model of transfer or naqla involves a conventionalizing 
function according to context, it maintains the traditional sense of establishing a 
continuity of meanings between nations. In ‘La Naqla, Étude du Concept de Transfert 
Dans L’oeuvre D’al-Farabi’ (that is ‘Naqla, The Study of the Concept of Transfer in 
the Works of al-Farabi’), D’Arcy argues:  
Ainsi, dans les §§ 154–158 du K. al-Hurūf, le lexique de n-q-l est attribué aussi 
bien aux notions religieuses et philosophiques transférées (huit occurrences) 
d’une nation à l’autre qu’aux termes transférés du langage vulgaire au langage 
religieux et philosophique d’une même nation (cinq occurrences). Cette dualité 
seule permet de comprendre le sens exact de l’opération de traduction (naqla). La 
traduction n’est jamais chez al-Fārābī la répétition d’un terme étranger dans la 
langue propre. Cela est impossible parce que ce qu’il s’agit toujours de traduire, 
c’est ce qui n’existe pas encore dans la langue propre. Le problème de la 
traduction est alors un problème de recollement. Traduire, c’est maintenir la 
continuité de sens entre deux nations.98 
Thus, in parts 154-158 of the Book of Letters, the root n-q-l is attributed as well 
to transferred religious and philosophic notions (8 occurrences) that take place 
between one nation and another as well as to terms transferred from vulgar 
language [language of the masses] to religious and philosophical language of the 
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same nation. This duality allows us to understand the exact meaning of the 
process of translation (naqla). Translation, for al-Farabi is never the repetition of 
a foreign term in a nation’s/one’s own language. This is impossible because it is 
always the case that there will be notions to be translated that do not exist in the 
original language. The problem of translation, then, is a problem of establishing a 
link or continuity between two languages. To translate is to maintain the 
continuity of meaning between two nations.  
So, the transfer of philosophical and religious notions among nations parallels a 
naming process that bridges the gap between the elect and the multitudes, the vulgar. 
Bridging this gap becomes the conventionalizing mechanism that aids in maintaining 
the desired continuity of meaning between nations. In case the founder decides to 
apply foreign names to the transferred laws, he bridges the gap again by paying 
attention to pronunciation. He changes utterances to make their letters and formation 
the same as the letters and formation of the utterances of his nation so that they will 
find them easier to pronounce.99 In this sense, law-making, which is complemented by 
naming, constitutes translation as a process carried out by the imam in his aesthetic 
instruction as it is primarily concerned with guarding conventional naturalness. 
Instruction is thus integral to the process of transfer. It is translation only in the sense 
that it is the tendency to maintain naturalness through conventionalizing; it is naming 
that goes hand in hand with aesthetic instruction and habituating characters. 
The natural states of character or morals of the soul that the imam seeks to 
conventionalize are categorized into general and specific virtues. The general 
‘appetitive virtues’ include ‘moderation, courage, liberality, and justice’.100 The more 
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specific affections include ‘humility, respectfulness, gentleness, modesty, and 
friendliness’.101 These specific morals ‘rely on the Aristotelian notion of moral 
equilibrium’ between two opposing moral extremes.102 In both forms, the virtues are 
described as undergoing development though instruction. The latter-mentioned 
specific virtues are habituated via the poetic medium, which I will discuss further in 
Chapter Four. The former-mentioned general ones are habituated via political 
instruction. However, in both forms, these virtues derive their significance from their 
social value that instruction seeks to maintain by rendering their naturalness a matter 
of convention.  
The most important appetitive virtue that the imam cultivates in the citizens as the 
‘foundation on which the political order is erected’ is justice.103 Justice is an 
appetitive moral virtue that involves the general meaning of ‘a human being 
practicing acts of virtue, any virtue whatever, with respect to what is between him and 
someone else’.104 The ‘name of the more general’ justice is, then, used to indicate the 
more particular ‘species’ of justice that consists of ‘dividing’ and ‘preserving what 
has been divided’.105 In The Islamic Conception of Justice, Majid Khadduri explains 
the al-Farabian notion of justice that the imam embodies and enacts on the political 
level as follows: 
[…] the function of the Ruler is not just to preside over the City. He must combine 
all powers in his hands—executive, legislative, and judiciary—and, moreover, he 
must be endowed with a sense of justice which would enable him to operate the 
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public order in accordance with the standard of justice embodied in the Law.[..] 
the Imam is the Supreme Ruler and the source of all power of the virtuous nation 
(and potentially of the virtuous World-State). He holds the scale of justice in his 
hands, because he alone has the power to enact, interpret and apply the Law.106 
As a law-giver and philosopher, the imam maintains justice through the ability to 
operate the public order to fulfill a standard of justice in the law; this law is that 
named by convention and preserved in the Book of Acts and Book of Opinions. 
Justice thus becomes the interpretation of law to maintain justice though the public 
order. This process also involves applying justice to others or through others in line 
with the divine law. By virtue of the imam’s enactment of justice, the citizens will be 
molded to enact justice in both general and specific senses. The citizens will 
demonstrate justice in the general sense of applying virtue in relation to others. They 
will also enact it in the specific sense of making a division and preserving what has 
been divided. 
As the process of interpreting the law, justice qualifies the creation of images 
integral to law-making. Since law refers to religion as an image, justice becomes the 
aesthetic process of interpreting images. Justice, in this sense, indicates the selection 
of the right images and the interpretation of these images in order to instruct a 
particular nation and habituate their characters. The appetitive virtue of justice in 
citizens is thus molded aesthetically according to a standard of justice embodied in the 
interpretation of law.  
In this process, however, the imam faces the challenge of the differing natural 
abilities of individuals. For al-Farabi, individual ‘human beings are made by nature 
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with unequal powers and different preparations’.107 The differing natural abilities 
necessitate that the images be revisited to maintain justice: 
The founder is able to depict in correct images what he receives through the 
illumination of a divine mind. Because the divine mind’s light informs and 
controls its perfect imagination, it is able to grasp what is given to it with the most 
perfect image possible. The problem arises because images are necessarily 
particular and corporeal, which is true of both the images depicting theoretical 
things and those depicting practical things. They are also meant to be right, 
perfect, or adequate for the particular time and place and people for whom they 
are projected. But times change, religions expand, and followers with new and 
different traditions, languages, habits, and experiences enter the fold for whom the 
older images need to be interpreted or reinterpreted. And they need to be 
interpreted correctly, that is, turned back to their source. This is why the 
philosopher who wishes to interpret the images correctly needs to be concerned 
with the nature of images as well as with the truth.108  
The interpretation of images by the imam, I hold, indicates justice. By virtue of 
justice, the imam as philosopher is supposed to answer to a nation’s heterogeneity, not 
only in terms of natures but also in terms of differing contexts of time and space. This 
is why the imam and his successors are supposed to interpret and reinterpret; they aim 
to maintain political justice through their ability to politically conventionalize the 
natural sense of justice. The naqla or translation of justice as an appetitive virtue 
turned political can only take place through the reinterpretation of images that the 
imam carries out.  
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However, this process of aesthetic reinterpretation turns out not to be such a 
straightforward activity. The imam has to answer to a branch of the citizen population, 
discussed next, that do not take his images at face value. They constantly challenge 
his interpretations through falsifying the images that he creates.109 
2.5 Naqla/Translation and the Weeds 
 
As a translator, the imam bridges the gap between the elect and the vulgar by 
providing for a just interpretation of images that address the multitudes’ differing 
natural abilities. The laws start off as oral instructions that are preserved by the imam 
in writing or books. They are then translated into images that address the natural 
dispositions of the masses in order to habituate characters. In this process, legislation 
is the process by which the law, religion or milla, undergoes the effect of the 
convention of naming and justice. Justice is maintained through the process of 
selecting images that address the differing natural dispositions of the multitude. 
However, as this section will show, the aesthetic role of the imam turns out not to 
exist without any challenge. 
In the Virtuous City, a branch of the citizens, called the ‘weeds’, question the 
imam’s sense of justice by challenging the images and the arguments the imam 
employs. These weeds are described as the citizens whose ‘position in the cities is like 
that of the darnel among the wheat, the thorns growing among the crop, or the other 
grass that is useless or even harmful to the crop or plants’.110 They all share in their 
refutation of the imam’s molding of characters through instruction. They thus question 
the legitimacy of the political mission with which the imam has endowed himself. 
Despite their refutation, they are still considered as part of the citizens and are 
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‘submerged by the citizen body as a whole’.111 The weeds thus acquire significance 
because of their role in challenging the imam while maintaining their citizenship. In 
their continuous challenge, they lay manifest the mechanisms of sovereignty that this 
imam employs to maintain power. 
This branch of citizens is divided into six groups or classes who are all united in 
their unique aesthetic sense of revolt. Two groups contest by misinterpreting the 
‘expressions of the lawgiver and the statements that embody his percepts’, either to 
‘make the things they are after appear good’ or ‘because of their misconception’. 
These are the misinterpreters or maharrifa and the apostates, mariqah.112 Their 
misinterpretation takes the form of challenging the imam’s sense of justice which fails 
to address their natural disposition or ability. A third group, called the opportunists or 
mutaqannisun, substitute happiness as a goal for ‘other things that man can attain by 
means of virtue, such as honor, rulership, wealth, and so forth’.113 This group chooses 
to redefine the emotional goal of instruction as being one of material gain, such as 
wealth or power, rulership. Classes four and five intentionally falsify images and the 
persuasive arguments. While the first group is described as falsifying the images in an 
honest attempt at seeking the truth, the other falsifies the images because its members 
desire one of the aims of the ignorant cities. Finally, the last class falsifies images 
unintentionally due to a lack of power to cognize these images adequately. They end 
up in a state of perplexity that makes them contest the images via sophistic 
arguments.114 Broadly speaking, these weeds are motivated by their differing natural 
abilities to contend with images and the emotional end tied to them. Their contention 
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also involves contesting the persuasive arguments and misinterpreting the expression 
of laws. 
The weeds’ natural dispositions that differ in cognitive and imaginative terms lead 
them to misinterpret images, arguments and laws. By virtue of their differing natural 
dispositions, they thus redefine justice as the act of reinterpreting and multiplying 
images in accordance with the different dispositions. The role of the differing 
appetitive or affective dispositions in this matter is described as follows:  
For Farabi, all aspects of the existence of the public multitude are tied to its 
specific historical, spatial-temporal particularities. What we describe as 
someone’s disposition is therefore also a manifestation of his or her 
particularities. Farabi goes into a discussion of potentiality and actuality when 
talking about the nature of individuals. What becomes actualized in an 
individual, aspects of his or her cognitive and affective being, are particular 
natures toward which the individual is pre-disposed. What Farabi hints at is that 
the representational, the linguistic, and the culturally habitual come afterwards. 
Human bodies, explains Farabi, ‘have definite qualities and compositions, and 
their souls are disposed towards and prepared for cognitions, conceptions, and 
images to specific degrees both quantitatively and qualitatively’. In other words, 
what is actualized into intelligible sociopolitical existence is limited by what 
exists potentially in the matter that makes up human bodies. He continues, ‘their 
souls are affected by certain affections in specific ways and degrees’. Note how 
he pays attention to both cognition and feeling when he says that we 
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communicate the content of our cognition to others using the signs and sounds 
that our body permits us to produce.115 
The appetitive or affective becomes the premise of distinction among the humans’ 
reception of happiness. As a political value, happiness undergoes the effect of the 
appetitive and affective faculties. Furthermore, differences among people are 
attributed to the ‘signs and sounds’ that bodies allow for in conjunction with the 
cognitive level attained. This natural difference, then, explains the difference in the 
reception and production of images associated with happiness. The crucial point here 
is that the political proves to be inherently aesthetic. By investing in this aesthetic 
aspect, the weeds carry out a revolt from within the political. Their political 
contestation changes from being a purely political act into an aesthetic one of 
motivating the reinterpretation of images and symbols. In this revolt, they reinforce 
and further expand on the entanglement of justice with the aesthetic. 
By rendering political revolt an aesthetic value set by natural dispositions, the 
weeds redefine the act of translation in relation to justice. Instead of being an act 
instigated by the imam, translation is carried out by the weeds who seek to redefine 
justice. By falsifying the images and refuting the persuasive arguments as a medium 
for these images, the weeds indicate the failure of the imam in his address of their 
natural abilities. His partial failure at addressing natural abilities indicates his parallel 
failure to address justice. This is why the weeds extend the function of translation by 
redefining the parameters of the conventional. Translation no longer ends with the 
complementary movement between the concept and the name. The weeds activate the 
mechanism of multiplying images and interpretations in an attempt to preserve justice. 
In this process, they jeopardize the role of the imam as mediator, for they re-
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appropriate the role of the imagination. The weeds lay manifest the imaginative 
dynamics to which the imam resorts in order to maintain power. By reclaiming the 
role of the imagination, the weeds also subject the preserved religious laws that are 
depicted in the images to revision. This is why they set the ignorant city’s morals as 
legitimate ends and substitutes for the politically moral goal of happiness.  
Their redefinition of law thus challenges the Aristotelian logocentric metaphysics 
which the imam expounds in adopting books or writing to preserve oral laws. Their 
challenge to Aristotelian logocentrism is enacted through translation, the mechanism 
of justice, which invests in the aesthetic dimension of the affective and the image. In 
their role of challenging the sovereign, these weeds become the Middle Age 
precursors to what I hold to be the modern Derridean forms of political contestation. 
The weeds enact an aesthetic mechanism of political revolt that outlives and extends 
beyond the context of the Middle Ages. Their revolt against the imam is reincarnated 
in the modern-day revolts whose concern, I will show in the following chapter, is not 
with overturning regimes as much as with questioning the legitimacy of the political 
construction upon which any overpowering, logocentric regime is built. These 
parallels that I hold to exist between the weeds’ aesthetic challenge of the imam and 
the Derridean translation of sovereignty will thus be my next topic of discussion. 
2.6 The Translator-Imam in Translation 
 
By highlighting the aesthetic element within al-Farabi’s Aristotelian-based 
semiotic system, the weeds establish translation as a foundational aspect of that 
system. They thus initiate an act that is very similar to the Derridean deconstructive 
act of translating sovereignty, which I discussed in the previous chapter. Their 
translation of sovereignty is enacted as an act of redefining justice carried out in the 
address to natural abilities and dispositions. In their redefinition, the weeds extend 
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beyond the imam the act of translation or transfer reserved for him. In this process, 
they end up placing the imam himself in translation.      
By challenging sovereignty through translation, the weeds carry out what would 
resonate with the Derridean deconstruction of Aristotelian logocentrism.116 
Logocentrism prioritizes speech ‘over writing as the original or privileged means by 
which the presence of the logos is expressed’.117 In al-Farabi’s system, the imam 
fulfills a logocentric function as he maintains the privileged status of the philosophical 
truth to which he alone has access. Philosophical truth, the endowment of the Logos 
or the Active Intellect, occupies the signified dimension of the imam’s speech. This is 
why he later employs Books, writing, to preserve the logocentric truths that he had 
expressed in that speech. By enacting a logocentric function, the imam reinforces 
what Derrida would qualify as a ‘metaphysics of presence’ that distinguishes Western 
thought.118 Derrida defines the metaphysics of presence as the ‘exigent, powerful, 
systematic, and irrepressible desire’ for a signified.119 In this sense, the weeds’ revolt 
against the imam’s logocentrism could be said to be a medievalist precursor to the 
Derridean attack on the metaphysics of presence. The weeds thus carry out a 
medievalist variation of deconstruction that jeopardizes the state of the divine 
signified that the imam preserves.   
In their deconstruction of logocentrism, the weeds seem to rely upon the 
Derridean premise that all language is mediation. In Of Grammatology, Derrida 
claims that writing is another name for language itself as all language is characterized 
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by mediation, which he also calls ‘arche-writing’.120 In the case of the imam, 
mediation is enacted by virtue of the imagination and affective aesthetics, as already 
discussed. This sense of mediation associated with the creation of images is employed 
by the imam to deliver the philosophical truth to the weeds and other citizens. 
However, instead of receiving the images as illustrations of the truth, the weeds 
decide to contest the arguments and activate the multiplication of images.121 They 
thus distance the truth as a divine signified. In their act of distancing, they highlight 
the inherent inaccessibility of the truth and the state of all language as mediation. 
Furthermore, the weeds’ act of distancing through the multiplication of images 
challenges the imam’s logocentrism through investing in the Derridean notion of 
‘spacing’, or the deferment of truth.122 The imam’s images that ‘differ in excellence’ 
by being closer or ‘far[ther] removed from the truth’ are divided into levels.123 Upon 
contention of these images, the weeds are described as having their ‘imagination 
                                                            
120 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 56. 
121 Michael Shalom Kochin (in ‘Weeds: Cultivating the Imagination in Medieval 
Arabic Political Philosophy’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 60 (1999), 399–416) 
argues that al-Farabi’s philosopher is a mediator between philosophy or truth and 
religion or politics. Kochin adopts Plato’s notion of the noble lie to argue that politics 
is the process of creating images. The philosopher, in this sense, is supposed to 
embrace the power of the imagination and invest in it. He does that through 
instruction which is defined as the process of the ‘inculcation [of] images’ according 
to the ‘class of men’ and their ‘respective individual nature[s]’ (p.416). When the 
weeds thus ‘find the points of contention in the images of the truth’ and detect the 
‘lies’, the philosopher is supposed to instruct them according to their abilities (p. 404). 
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imamic system that links philosophy with politics and maintains the position of the 
weeds within the Virtuous City. Kochin’s argument, in this sense, differs slightly with 
this chapter’s argument as this chapter is concerned more with the affective role that 
the images play within instruction. The association that al-Farabi establishes between 
images and the affects compromises the link between philosophy and politics. Since 
images are affectively charged, instruction entertains the possibility of political 
contestation that places the weeds on the border within and without the city. They 
thus indicate the limits of logic within philosophy and politics that only the 
imagination can depict.  
122 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 39. 
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raised’ to the level of the image closer to the truth.124 The imagination as a vehicle of 
mediation becomes the site for hierarchical spacing of images that resembles the 
hierarchical vision of the cosmos. By adopting this structure for the imagination, the 
imam-instructor wants his citizens to believe that there is an end to the Derridean 
‘logocentric sublimation’ of the images, an end that is clear and indicates full 
presence as truth.125 However, the weeds respond by investing in a horizontal semiotic 
sense of spacing through activating the proliferation of images without the prospect of 
reaching a truth. In a sense, the imam’s vertical, logocentric sublimation of images 
that promises full presence as end is rewritten by the weeds as a Derridean linear 
spacing motivated by an absent signified. The structure of the imagination, of course, 
is rewritten in this process. 
In their act of spacing images, the weeds thus jeopardize the status of presence or 
truth itself. They read the imam’s creation of images to mediate philosophical truth as 
an indication of a ‘lack’ inherent to the ‘fullness’ of that truth, a lack that is marked by 
the ‘supplement’.126 The fact that truth actually needs images and mediation to be 
delivered becomes the weeds’ evidence that truth is lacking. Instead of being 
accessible to all, the divine signified appeals to the imagination for aid to reach the 
public. The truth is apparently haunted by a lack that needs the imagination to 
supplement. My reference to the role of the imagination as supplement here is 
borrowed from Derrida’s commentary on Rousseau’s ‘Essay on the Origin of 
Languages’. In this commentary, Derrida claims that the imagination is a ‘supplement 
within Nature as its play’.127 Rousseau’s state of nature is a site of play for the 
supplement. The supplement in Rousseau’s work indicates an ‘addition to something 
                                                            
124 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 54. 
125 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 71. 
126 Ibid., p. 157. 
127 Ibid., p. 258. 
Page 105 
 
that is already full’ as well as a ‘substitute’ for ‘something that is essentially lacking, 
insufficient in itself’, Nature.128 Derrida thus shows that presence, Nature, is 
continually haunted by an absence that ‘always calls for supplementation in the first 
place’.129 In a parallel sense, the weeds show that divine truth, an al-Farabian early 
variation of Rousseau’s sense of fullness, is haunted by an absence that needs the 
supplementation of the imagination. By virtue of that lack that needs supplementation, 
writing as the affective dimension of semiotics becomes the weeds’ version of 
mediation that defers presence, the imam’s truth, and characterizes language. 
In their contestation, the weeds thus invest in the imam’s distancing of 
philosophical truth to activate an aesthetic supplement through the multiplication of 
images. Their contestation takes the form of a reading that is very similar to a 
Derridean deconstructive reading, which I discussed in the previous chapter. The 
weeds read the imam’s absenting of truth to indicate a Derridean ‘limitlessness of 
play’.130 For the weeds, the images that the imam employs are signs rather than 
symbols of the philosophical truth. Reading the imam’s reliance on the ‘becoming-
sign of the symbol’ in their translation, the subjects contest the images in an attempt 
to play back.131 While the images and interpretations they end up with recognize the 
truth value of the image the imam tries to depict, they stand for what would qualify as 
Derridean counter-interpretations. These counter-interpretations show that ‘we can 
have no pure, unmediated experience of presence because all experience is filtered 
through the network of differential references that is variously named the arche-
writing, the originary trace, différance or the supplement’.132 As counter-interpreters, 
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one class of the weeds ‘put [its] fingers on the grounds of objection to those symbols 
[the images] and hold that they are inadequate and false’.133 They comprehend that the 
imam’s reliance on symbols that point to a transcendental signified is a logocentric 
and ontotheological attempt that enacts the ‘humbling of writing beneath a speech 
dreaming its plenitude’.134 They also recognize that the imam resorts to multiple 
images as signs, rather than symbols, that they can invest in and multiply further. 
Although the imam seems to be presenting a symbol, he is in fact making the citizens 
‘think only in signs’, in ‘representamen’ that ‘function only by giving rise to an 
interpretant that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity’.135 They thus choose to 
focus on the play of differences or ‘arbitrariness of the sign’, the arche-writing. In 
their deconstructive double reading of the imam’s signs, the weeds highlight the 
internal lack of the philosophical truth that is supplemented by images. 
Supplementation opens the field for their interpretation that triggers the mechanism of 
multiplication in sign form.  
In their reading, the weeds highlight and rewrite the mimetic aspect of the images 
that the imam employs. The images are supposed to represent the philosophical truth. 
The aesthetic function of representing through images, here, highlights a role for 
mimesis that is very similar to that Rousseau gives to imitation as the ‘essence of 
art’.136 According to Derrida, Rousseau discusses mimesis to show that imitation 
‘redoubles presence, adds itself to it by supplementing it’.137 Imitation in images 
produced by the imam could be said to be following a similar Derridean motif. 
Mimesis redoubles the presence of the truth by supplementing it. The imam’s 
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imitation in image forms, pedagogically speaking, can take the guise of examples 
needed to ‘detect certain similarities in between two different objects’ as one effective 
method of instruction.138 The weeds, however, trigger the multiplication of the 
examples in image form once they recognize imitation to be integral to the sign-
making strategy that their instructor employs. This imitation makes all classes of 
weeds, except one, attached to the substitutive signifiers, the images, instead of truth 
itself. One class of weeds is described as believing that ‘what they hold is the very 
same as what the man who really knows the truth asserts to be the truth’.139 The 
weeds apparently value the signs and images as truth. They thus display what 
Rousseau calls, the ‘perversion of imitation’.140 They read truth in the multiplication 
of images. Some of them are even said to create illusions and set their own created 
ignorant cities’ ends as the truth and as happiness.141 They thus enact the Derridean 
recognition that the ‘perverse use of the signifier’ refers to the ‘gap between the thing 
and its double’ that is ‘at once forbidden and tolerated by the structure of 
imitation’.142 Derrida asserts that ‘between the sense and its image’ there is a ‘lodging 
of falsehood, falsification, and vice’, what he calls the evil, the ‘disease of imitation’ 
or the ‘imitation within imitation’, that is ‘social’ in nature.143 In this sense, the 
weeds’ imitation is perverse, for they assume that the ends or the image of happiness 
that they hold is the same as the truth of happiness that their instructor, the imam, 
holds. By limiting value to the images, the weeds rid truth of its value as presence; 
they show that imitation, by nature, allows for their perverse play on images. 
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In ridding truth of its presence status, the weeds rework Aristotelian mimesis into 
an al-Farabian variant of ‘creative imagining’.144 The al-Farabian variant, unlike the 
Aristotelian one, is not concerned with truth or presence. The weeds’ form of mimesis 
is an active poetic process of multiplying images that seeks to distance truth. In his 
‘Treatise on Poetry’, al-Farabi explains poetic mimesis by claiming that ‘the imitation 
of a thing by that which is farthest from it is better and more complete than imitating 
it by that which is nearest’.145 By ‘farthest’, al-Farabi means adding a means of 
mediation between the object of representation and its imitation. Mediation, here, 
echoes Derrida’s sense of arche-writing as it risks and allows for arbitrariness. 
However, for al-Farabi, the poetic statement establishes this mimetic effect through a 
‘poetic syllogism’. This form of syllogism is not concerned with the truth. It is 
described as a ‘false’ syllogism as it aims not for truth but for creating conviction on 
the part of the hearer in the comparison or imitation made.146 Instead of being a case 
for rational and logical argumentation, the poetic syllogism displaces logic into the 
sphere of the aesthetic or the poetic. This is why one class of weeds claims that ‘there 
is no truth at all, that the man who fancies that he is led the right path to it is deceived 
and that the man who is supposed to lead people the right path is an imposter [and 
swindler] who is making statements of that kind as hankering after nothing else than a 
ruling position or some other good like it’.147 By denying truth and claiming that truth 
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is but a deception, the weeds introduce a world view that is built within the realm of 
the ‘false’, as factual, objective falsity.148  
In their worldview, the weeds employ mimetic mediation to indicate a Derridean 
sense of the ‘death of art’ that imitation entails.149 The truth so dear to the imam turns 
out not to be a truth, for it is perceived as plagued with lack. The philosophical truth is 
put to death as a lack that seeks supplementation by images and interpretations. This 
is why the imam fails to persuade all the weeds in his instruction; he indirectly teaches 
the reader-translators as poets to stick to signs and image interpretations and forsake 
logocentrism. These weeds anticipate the Derridean conclusion that ‘there is nothing 
outside of the text’.150 It is all a function of mediation and supplementation of a 
lacking truth, as it is impossible to ‘gai[n] access to any pure or immediate presence 
that exists wholly independently of the process of difference and deferral’.151 In this 
state of deferral, mimesis becomes the weeds’ poetic or aesthetic concern with the 
proliferation of images through mediation.  
As mimetic mediators, the weeds threaten the logocentric construction of the 
Virtuous City, which centers around an imam-instructor, aesthetically. They 
aesthetically reconstruct the ideals of the Virtuous City as images of the values of the 
alternate cities. In this sense, the Virtuous City becomes a text from which other texts 
or cities as possible images could spring. This proliferation of texts accompanies a 
parallel process through which the imam of the Virtuous City is put in translation. To 
respond to the weeds’ contestation, the imam undergoes a change of function. This 
change of function is explained in medical terms that acquire aesthetic significance. 
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The imam’s role as a philosopher, supreme ruler, prince, and legislator is likened to 
that of a doctor who is ‘concerned with determining the intermediate actions or 
percepts conducing to the healthy body, or the well-being of the state’.152 The imam 
fulfills the role of a healer for the natural wellbeing of the state. However, the 
wellbeing of the state is said to be jeopardized by the weeds who refuse to adopt the 
Aristotelian intermediate virtues. This is why the imam finds that he has to ‘treat each 
class of [the weeds] in the particular manner that will cure them: by expelling them 
from the city, punishing them, jailing them, or forcing them to perform a certain 
function even though they may not be fond of it’.153 As a healer, the imam perceives 
the weeds to be useless and harmful, deserving of jail and banishment, because they 
have challenged his images. Although he practices his sovereign role in the name of 
healing the body of the city, he seems to forsake the aesthetic basis upon which his 
sovereignty has been built. He forsakes his aesthetic concern with reception, as he 
applies force to guarantee reception. The imam translates into a sovereign, with the 
risk of becoming a dictator, who resorts to power and deprives the weeds of the 
protection of the city law. Instead of an instructor, he becomes a figure of power that 
practices force to expel and jail. In responding to the weeds, the imam undergoes a 
deconstruction of his inner coherence as he becomes a sovereign-dictator over his 
estate. In deconstructing the imam, the weeds deconstruct the logocentrism of the 
Virtuous City itself; the weeds show that the Virtuous City is a text from which other 
texts, other cities, could spring.  
As poets, the weeds employ poetic mimesis to oppose the imam and construct 
images of alternate cities through evoking their value systems. Expulsion from the 
Virtuous City would most probably mean for the weeds that they can now construct 
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the alternate cities whose values they evoked. Actually, by definition, the Arabic root 
word ‘nbt’ from which the term ‘weeds’ or nawabit is derived, also means sprouts.154 
The weeds, in this sense, stand not only for an opposition but also for regeneration. 
The weeds are sprouts or seeds for potential political constructions defined by creative 
images that evoke an alternative system of values. Even if they are said to be 
submerged by the citizen body, the weeds remain sprouts for potential city states, 
potential texts, constructed along aesthetic lines. Their potential constructions follow 
after the weeds’ ‘wandering imagination (takhayyul) and not opinion or 
knowledge’.155 In this proliferation of texts, virtues, especially justice, are rewritten in 
potential aesthetic terms, as the next section will show. 
2.7 Justice in Translation/Naqla 
 
As they deconstruct the imam’s writing, the weeds activate the notion of the text 
marked by mediation and deferment, arche-writing, in the play of signs. Their 
translation exposes the lack in the truth that needs the supplementation of images. By 
rendering the imagination a language of writing, the weeds redefine the dimension of 
the emotional or affective that the image is supposed to address. The weeds substitute 
desires, such as ‘honor, rulership, and wealth’, for the imam’s virtuous emotional end, 
happiness.156 Happiness that corresponds with truth, in turn, becomes an inaccessible 
emotional state characterized by lack and in need of supplementation. Instead of 
happiness, the weeds imagine substitutes that take form in desires and passions of the 
soul. For the weeds, these desires ‘discredit happiness’.157 This choice of substitute 
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desires, like the choice of substitute images, is a consequence to the differing natural 
abilities and dispositions of the weeds.  
By adopting the aims of the ignorant cities as desires, the weeds subject not only 
images but also emotions, specifically happiness, to a reinterpretation linked to 
natural abilities. Justice, as the quality indicating this re-interpretative act, becomes 
tied to the differing emotional guises for which the weeds aim. Under the influence of 
differing interpretations, the appetitive virtue of justice acquires different emotional 
connotations defined by the aims of the ignorant city. In one ignorant-city-
interpretation, justice is defined as being ‘identical with superiority gained by 
force’.158 Justice becomes a virtue proportionate to sovereign superiority and its 
related emotions of fear, weakness and danger. It is described as a state of ‘people 
apply[ing] the term “justice” primarily to actions which are the outcome of fear and 
weakness, and when the danger coming from the outside makes it imperative’.159 In 
this state of fear, citizens no longer aim to apply virtues in relation to others; they 
discover that they do not need all the virtues for the attainment of their end. It is 
enough for them to help each other with the objective of ‘attain[ing] riches’ and 
‘enjoy[ing] pleasures’.160 The harmony and justice which they may employ among 
themselves is described by al-Farabi as ‘something resembling justice and is not 
justice’.161 Justice, as resemblance, no longer signifies the appetitive moral sense of 
employment of virtues in relation with others. It is an action proportionate with the 
emotions of fear and weakness. These emotions displace happiness which, in turn, 
becomes an emotion associated with pleasures and material gain. 
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As the weeds’ vision of justice to which they subscribe indicates the act of 
resemblance, imitation-making, it reinforces the play of signs as arche-writing. 
Mediation and justice are now concerned with the creation and invention of images 
and signs in line with differing desires. According to al-Farabi, man’s 
‘substantification’ is due to ‘thought [or ‘speech’, logos]’, but writing belongs to the 
category of arts ‘through which something else comes from it’.162 Although the first 
half of al-Farabi’s statement reads as a purely Aristotelian axiom of speech’s primacy 
in substantifying man, the second half highlights the creative power of writing by 
bringing things into existence. So, writing is not only an envelopment or mediation of 
speech, it is supposed to create existence; it is a force of creation, an art. By rendering 
writing a force of creation induced by the passions, however, the weed-sprouts invest 
in the arche-writing at work through these images.  Motivated by the passions related 
to achieving superiority, the weeds enact what al-Farabi calls the ‘vile’ kind of writing 
that is employed ‘in the service of tyranny’.163 The creativity of writing is related to 
conquest, tyranny and force. However, this form of writing is presented as being no 
baser than the noble kind of writing that is employed in the service of the imam. Just 
as the imam has chosen to vary the images of truth, the weeds invest in the 
proliferation of images and multiplication of interpretations. The weeds show that 
both forms of writing are simply metaphoric displacements for one another. The 
imam’s goal of happiness cannot exile the work of the weeds’ passions just as the 
weeds’ sense of force is but a response that adopts and modifies the ruler’s laws. Both 
senses of writing are variations of images as signs in response to natural abilities and 
in line with justice. 
                                                            
162 Alfarabi, On the Perfect State, p. 93. 
163 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 60 (#93). 
Page 114 
 
The redefinition of justice in relation to writing highlights the role that the 
emotions play in re-interpreting truth, the divine signified, in image form. In their 
reinterpretation, the weeds display hints of a poetic form of logic that destabilizes the 
imam’s philosophically political one. While the imam employs images in rhetoric and 
political oratory to convince citizens of that truth, the weeds use images for the sake 
of multiplication and creating emotions that rewrite that truth. They thus display what 
al-Farabi calls a poetic aptitude concerned with making ‘excellent imaginative 
evocation of something’.164 Poetic logic becomes the weeds’ attempt to displace the 
value of truth. Truth is no longer a value that is tied with the philosophical and logical 
pursuits of the imam. Instead, it is established through connections between images 
that ‘lack concern with truth or [are] false’.165 On the plane of the poetic, images and 
the connections between them act on a pre-reflective and emotional level. In The 
Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna, Salim Kemal argues that the al-Farabian version of 
poetic discourse is concerned with inducing a ratiocinative response. Ratiocination is 
defined as a response or action in line with an emotion that is ‘pre-reflective’ or 
involuntary.166 For al-Farabi, the imaginative evocation causes a person to ‘seek or 
flee’ the imagined thing ‘even if he has not assented to it’.167 By assenting, al-Farabi 
means, rational persuasion. In this sense, a person, under the effect of poetic logic, 
responds with affective spontaneity that might contradict with what he rationally or 
logically believes that he should do. The poetic involves reasoning in a logic that 
differs from that supported by the imam. The weeds’ version of reasoning is heavily 
                                                            
164 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 36 (#56). 
165 Salim Kemal, The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), p. 
123. 
166 Kemal, The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna, p. 98. 
167 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 36 (#55). 
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charged with emotional connotations that render truth a value that is aesthetic rather 
than logical in nature. 
To achieve justice, the weeds’ emotional response redefines reasoning from being 
an act of philosophical logic into that of poetic logic. Poetic logic, however, entails 
the conscious recognition of the ‘conflict of emotion and deliberation’.168 They thus 
invest in ratiocinative reasoning through evoking the poetic and mimetic metaphors 
that reinforce the sign play. In this play, justice is rewritten in resemblance; it comes 
to qualify the mental exercise in ‘bridg[ing] the image with its object’ that is founded 
in mimetic translation.169 The exercise is described as more refined the greater the 
distance is between the image and the object, a distance created by the introduction of 
different media. By engaging the mental abilities in an aesthetic exercise, the weeds 
allow for alternative translations of sovereign imamic power. Aesthetic mental 
exercise becomes the weeds’ new notion of justice defined by bridging the gap 
between the image and object through an increment of distance and means of 
mediation. This increment in distance and media, in turn, contributes to the 
redefinition of ratiocination as the experience of conflict between the emotions and 
deliberation.  
In the connections they seek to establish, the weeds now deal with the imam as a 
sovereign-dictator and not the philosopher, legislator, and sovereign prince. They 
translate not only his images but also the laws that he inscribes as guarantees of 
happiness. The imam’s images introduce the weeds to what would qualify as the 
Derridean recognition of the ‘metaphoric origin of language’ that lacks the dimension 
                                                            
168 Kemal, The Philosophical Poetics of Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes: The 
Aristotelian Reception, p. 45. 
169 Laura U. Marks, Enfoldment and Infinity: An Islamic Genealogy of New Media Art 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2010), p. 
161. 
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of the ‘idea’, truth, or transcendental signified.170 In their deconstructive reading, the 
weeds decide to invest in the metaphors that the imam introduces and desecrate the 
dimension of truth within his images and laws. One method that they employ to 
hinder the imam’s instruction and contest his laws is sophistry. According to al-
Farabi, the last category of weeds employs ‘sophistic fallacies and deliberate 
falsification’ to reject the excellent city laws.171 In Al-Farabi’s Theory of 
Communication, Haddad defines Al-Farabi’s sense of sophistry as using ‘borrowed 
and common nouns that may have a variety of meanings’.172 The weeds thus resort to 
common nouns to contest the imam’s arguments and laws. In their contestation, the 
weeds enact the Derridean claim that language ‘plunges into the breach between the 
proper and the common nouns’.173 The weeds employ the common nouns as 
‘substitutes’ for the imam’s proper nouns, laws. 174 They turn the proper noun, the sign 
that the imam presents as the proper substantive signifier for the transcendental 
signified, into common nouns in the form of Derridean names that multiply.175 They 
introduce the movement of différance through not only their images but also their 
sophistic arguments. The play of names through sophistic fallacies, in turn, adopts the 
same mimetic mechanism of the play of images with which the weeds face the imam. 
Both forms of play become a function of justice as resemblance. Names as laws, 
similar to images as signs, vary according to natural abilities and affectivity. They 
both function by establishing connections and bridging gaps that defy logical 
reference to truth.  
                                                            
170 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 277. 
171 Alfarabi, On the Perfect State, p. 283. 
172 Haddad, Al-Farabi's Theory of Communication, p. 113. 
173 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 280. 
174 Ibid., p. 279. 
175 Ibid., p. 278. 
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By allowing for name-laws to multiply as common nouns chosen by the 
differentia of natural abilities and connected via sophism, the weeds present their own 
medievalist version of rationality. Their version of rationality highlights linguistic 
mediation and deferment as a form of mimetic translation or naqla. They set sophism 
and poetic mimesis to confront philosophical truth and deconstruct its claim to truth. 
They thus offer an affective version of rationality that does not abide by logical truth 
and that the latter can only express or define in such terms as ‘sophism’ and 
‘mimesis’. In this sense, the weeds could be said to introduce an amendment to the 
medieval categorization of the communicative arts or the rules of instruction. In their 
amendment, both language and images function by virtue of imitation for which logic 
fails to set the limits. 
The weeds’ contribution to thought, I hold, could be found in the name of the 
Virtuous City, al Madina al Fadila, to which they belong and from which they sprout. 
Etymologically speaking, the root word fdl of Arabic fadila, the virtuous, has the 
meaning of the great blessing and the surplus.176 Virtue, in this sense, is that of the 
initial state of added value.177 The Virtuous City is virtuous by virtue of the added 
value it bequeaths not only upon the political community but also upon thought in 
general through these weeds. This city is the birthplace of an alternative vision of 
rationality that allows for all other models of political associations to be affectively 
imagined. The Virtuous City is a beginning, a necessary origin, presupposed for the 
                                                            
176 Academy of the Arabic Language, eds., Al-Mu’jam al-Waseet, 4th ed (Cairo, 
Egypt: Maktabat al Shuruq al Dawliyya, 2004), s.v. fdl 
177 Leo Strauss (In Persecution and the Art of Writing, p.15) argues that al-Farabi calls 
the Virtuous City ‘another city’ as he means that it replaces ‘the other world or the 
other life’. For Strauss, this phrasing by al-Farabi is actually an indication that the 
latter ‘substitutes politics for religion’. The religious dimension of the city, in this 
sense, is actually a political one. For Strauss, the Virtuous City thus ‘stands midway 
between this world and the other world, since it is an earthly city indeed, yet a city 
existing not “in deed” but “in speech”’. 
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proliferation of all possible or potential political structures that, first, have to be 
thought affectively. 
Conclusion  
To conclude this exploration of al-Farabi’s version of translation, a reassessment 
of the opening question is due: What is the relationship between al-Farabi’s imam and 
Derrida’s king? And how do the concepts of translation they embody overlap with 
one another? The answer, I believe, lies in the reevaluation of the notions of 
mediation, translation and kinghood or power in the text mode the weeds initiate. In 
the medieval cosmological version of the Virtuous City, mediation is defined in terms 
of creating images that address the affective moral virtues, such as justice, according 
to natural abilities. Relying on this form of mediation, the imam seeks to reach 
citizens and convince them that the name, sign, signifier and signified coincide in the 
logocentric path to the transcendental signified, the philosophical truth. However, he 
receives a unique response from the weeds in his city. They not only play on signs as 
images but also employ sophistry or a play on names as common nouns. These 
citizens repeat and imitate the means, the images and names, employed by the imam. 
Being vehicles for the same act in mimetic translation, language and images thus 
cease to be separate domains. They form the aesthetic dimension of the political 
translation of sovereignty that transcends semiotic borders as language responds to 
images and images to words.  
In this state of translation, the imam and the weeds offer two models of mimetic 
translation which differ not only in practice but also in political end. The imam 
employs mimesis as an Aristotelian imitation of presence. In this act, he resembles 
Derrida’s conception of the king who reinforces logocentrism. On the other hand, the 
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weeds, whom I take to be precursors to modern day revolutionaries, employ mimesis 
as imaginative representation.178 Mimesis, in this sense, shifts the value of truth to the 
image as they evoke the process of imitation by imaginative representation that gains 
value the more media are added. The weeds thus initiate what would qualify as a 
Derridean move towards the cape and wedding gown as media for the imaginative re-
creation and translation of sovereignty. In this process, the weeds rework the whole 
political structure upon which the Virtuous City is built. They not only offer an 
alternative mode of sovereignty to that established by the imam but also redefine the 
dynamics of rationality in political thinking. The city now indicates the state of 
supplement from which the weeds as sprouts could spring with all potential forms of 
political constructions. These constructions are made possible only because of the 
affective rationality the weeds introduce to the political process itself. The translation 
of sovereignty, in this process, becomes the domain of affective or poetic rationality 
whose concern is with the mimetic relationship between language and images. 
The promise of alternative possible political constructions that springs from strife 
will thus be my following topic of investigation. The best illustration of the sprouting 
effect within the aesthetic translation of sovereignty, I hold, could be found within the 
context of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The Egyptian revolutionaries enact the 
weeds’ aesthetic function through emphasizing the role of the media as a platform for 
their collective imaginative attempt to overthrow the regime. They will be shown to 
offer a Derridean double reading that deconstructs the regime as the imam-king 
                                                            
178 This thesis’s argument that al-Farabi’s work is relevant to the reassessment of the 
contemporary political scene is inspired by the work of the Moroccan philosopher, 
Mohamad ‘Abd al-Jabri. Al-Jabri (in Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary 
Critique (Austin: The Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1999), p. 57) argues that al-
Farabi is the Middle Ages’ ‘Rousseau of the Arabs’ whose ‘militant rationalist 
discourse’ should be revived to re-evaluate and re-address the challenges that the 
contemporary Arab societies face. 
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figure. In their double reading, the modern weeds highlight the role of the ceremonial 
aspect of power. Imamic power, which adorns itself with a cape of logocentric 
mimesis, is translated through the adornment itself. By displaying mimesis to be a 
poetic rather than a logocentric construct, the modern weeds enact the translation of 
sovereignty as a form of contestation that pertains to the field of the aesthetic. They 
thus highlight the ceremonial aspect of power that Agamben (in The Kingdom and the 
Glory) calls ‘acclamation’ or ‘glory’ by introducing a twist into it. In their revision of 
acclamation, the weeds aim to contest power yet maintain their political concern with 
achieving a secular-like consensus aesthetically. To achieve this goal, the modern 
weeds find themselves facing the following questions: How can consensus, an active 
state of public opinion that maintains the concern with collective power, be achieved 
in the realm of the imagination? And what contribution can poetic logic, with its 
concern with the mimetic relationship between language and images, make to the 
contestation and the translation of sovereignty? Their negotiation of these questions 
shall thus be my next topic of investigation.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
THE MIMETIC TRANSLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE 2011 
EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 
 
Introduction  
 
In the past chapters, I have shown how translation marks the shift in sovereignty 
from a divine paradigm to a more secular contract-based model. In the contract 
model, consensus is established via means of iterability that acknowledges the 
possibility of repeatability or mimesis at the origin of every sign. The role that 
mimesis plays in creating consensus was then analyzed within the context of the 
Virtuous City to show how its consensual effect extends to the realm of the 
imagination. The weeds’ version of political consensus negates that of the imam. 
While the imam established consensus through a milla, a religion, that connects 
images to philosophy as a value of truth, the weeds rewrote the religious as poetic, 
consensual and imaginative creation. Within the realm of the imagination, mimesis 
becomes a vehicle for a collective creation, rather than imitation, of alternative 
possible political constructions. Poetic mimesis thus stands as doxa, the public 
opinion or belief, which the weeds reclaim. They try to gain control over public 
opinion as self-generated imaginative representation that borrows from different 
semiotic fields, images and language, to establish its political effect.1 Politics thus 
                                                            
1 Joep Lameer (in Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic 
Practice,(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994)) argues that al-Farabi’s theory of religion as 
imitative of philosophy relies on two Platonic themes. The first is this distinction that 
I invest in between knowledge or epistēmē and opinion or doxa, as argued for in the 
Republic. For Plato, doxa is formed ‘with respect to the sensible world, the objects of 
which reproduce the Forms, are images of them, in their own imperfect manner’. On 
the other hand, al-Farabi’s images are explained by Lameer not to ‘relate to the 
sensible world as with Plato, but to mental images or representations which result 
from the use of similes in a literary sense’. Doxa, for al-Farabi, is a form of popular 
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becomes the field of what I call mimetic translation concerned with the deconstruction 
of political sovereignty through a creative mimetic function. 
Adopting this framework of thinking about translation as mimetic, I will now 
explore the Arab Spring revolutions, especially the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, as 
political events that advance the deconstruction of power politics. The questions that 
structure my exploration are: What does it mean to say that translation of power is 
mimetic and how does it show in the overthrowing of the regime in the 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution? How does consensus as collective imagination, rather than public 
opinion, redefine the translation of sovereignty? What happens to justice when the 
translation of sovereignty correlates with a collective imaginative creation that 
borrows from different semiotic fields? And, most importantly, what does mimetic 
translation have to contribute to the thinking of the political? 
3.1 Mimetic Translation and Politics 
 
In my attempt to answer the questions that I outlined above, I will start this 
chapter by a close reading of the deconstruction of sovereignty that the 2011 Egyptian 
revolutionaries perform. The reading highlights how the modern weeds’ consensus 
takes the form of what Giorgio Agamben in his The Kingdom and the Glory (2011) 
calls ‘glory’. For Agamben, glory refers to the ‘ceremonial aspect of power’ that 
shows the fundamental role that consensus, established by such practices as 
acclamation, plays as a foundation for power.2 He explains acclamation to be ‘an 
exclamation of praise, of triumph (“Io triumphe!"), of laudation or of disapproval 
                                                                                                                                                                          
knowledge (p. 262). The second Platonic theme is the rule by law as an imperfect 
copy of the ideal constitution, an argument raised in the Statesman. This is evident in 
al-Farabi’s argument that laws put by the philosopher-king are imitations of 
philosophical truths (p. 263). These two Platonic themes, Laemeer argues, were 
combined and modified by al-Farabi who, then, explains religion to be an ‘imitative, 
popular expression of philosophical truth entire (or most of it)’ (p. 264).  
2 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 168. 
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(acclamatio adversa) yelled by a crowd in determinate circumstances’.3 Glory finds 
its correlates in the insignia of power, such as the empty throne and the cape, 
discussed in the first chapter. While the insignia of power, Kantorowicz argues, refer 
to the king’s second body, they are taken by Agamben to refer not ‘to regality, but to 
glory’.4 Within the context of the Arab Spring revolutions, however, glory becomes 
the modern weeds’ attempt to deconstruct the foundational aspect of glory to the 
establishment of sovereignty. The weeds thus seek to denude sovereignty from its 
mask in glory.  
One method that the opposition adopts to deconstruct sovereignty and that this 
chapter is interested in exploring is the literary variation on what al-Farabi describes 
as the weeds’ ‘abas[ing] the man’ in power, the regime, by creating illusions and 
images.5 The weeds’ translation, I argue, is best illustrated in their resort to an al-
Farabian version of comedy and satire to effect that abasement. Although al-Farabi 
discusses the weeds’ imaginative manipulation in relation to the truth, not the king, in 
his The Political Regime, he offers literary methods for abasing ‘rulers of cities’ in his 
Treatise on the Canons of the Art of Poetry.6 For al-Farabi, comedy is a poetic form 
that mentions evil things and satirizes ‘persons and blameworthy faults and 
unpleasant conduct’. One important feature of comedy is that it may add melodies ‘in 
which reprehensible characteristics that men and beasts have in common are 
mentioned, as well as ugly physical features shared by both’.7 The comic element 
abases political power by associating it with animal life. On the animal level, the 
                                                            
3 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 169. 
4 Ibid., p. 245. 
5 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 55. 
6 Vicente Cantarino, Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age: Selection of Texts 
Accompanied by a Preliminary Study (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), p. 113. 
7 Cantarino, Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, p. 113. 
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weeds employ yet another poetic form closely related to comedy: Satire.8 Satire has 
been described as ‘a meter invented by musicians aimed at causing with their chant, in 
beasts and generally all animals, some movements which were, astonishingly, quite 
different from their natural movements’.9 By inducing a non-natural movement in the 
animal, satire achieves the aim of comedy, the total deconstruction of the regime after 
its abasement. Comedy-satire thus denotes the weeds’ double reading mechanism for 
deconstructing power. 
This reading of comedy-satire that borrows from different semiotic fields is what I 
find to be best figured in the political cartoons on the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. The 
humor of cartoons is claimed by Charles Press in The Political Cartoon (1981) to be 
achieved by ‘revers[ing] the content of the symbol, especially those of the system’.10 
Translation of sovereignty thus takes the form of the cartoon’s reversal of the symbol 
that is employed to resist dictatorial regimes. These ‘cartoons of opinion’ are said to 
be ‘employed frequently and effectively as an aid in building up resistance to the 
policies of politicians and as a weapon of propaganda, generally in ridicule’.11 Instead 
of acclaiming the regime, the modern weeds are depicted by cartoons of opinion to 
build up consensus in the form of resistance concerned with the deconstruction of 
power through ridicule. They thus imbue their glorifying function with the cartoon’s 
‘reverse’ effect that the chapter will further explore. 
                                                            
8 O.B Hardison (in ‘Aristotle and Averroes’, in Poetics & Praxis, Understanding & 
Imagination: The Collected Essays of O.B. Hardison Jr, ed. by Arthur F. Kinney 
(Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1997), p.23) argues that Islamic 
Poetics ‘has initiated the process of assimilating Aristotle by misinterpretation’. One 
of these misinterpretations would be al-Farabi’s confusion of comedy with satire. 
However, contrary to Hardison’s argument, I hold that this confusion could be a 
politically-driven literary decision on the side of al-Farabi. Both genres of poetry 
illustrate a literary continuity that functions for political ends, the abasing of rulers.   
9 Cantarino, Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, p. 113. 
10 Press, The Political Cartoon, p. 227. 
11 David Keane, ‘Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 30 (2008), 845–75 (p. 849). 
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By playing on the representation of the symbol of the system through reverse 
acclamation, the cartoons illustrate the Derridean double reading discussed in earlier 
chapters. The system’s depiction will be taken to highlight an accepted commentary 
that is exceeded by an ellipsis in its reversal. The Derridean double reading of 
commentary and ellipsis is explained by Critchley in The Ethics of Deconstruction 
(1992) to be a reading that ‘interlaces at least two motifs or layers of reading, most 
often by first repeating what Derrida calls “the dominant interpretation” of a text in 
the guise of a commentary and second, within and through this repetition, leaving the 
order of commentary and opening a text up to the blind spots or ellipsis within the 
dominant interpretation’.12 In this double reading of commentary and ellipsis, 
translation indicates the process of the opening up of ellipsis in a dominant 
interpretation as a sovereign one. The deconstruction of sovereignty thus becomes an 
elliptical opening up marked by a mimetic play of signs that shows up at the moment 
of reverse acclamation. 
In reverse acclamation, elliptical reading emphasizes the role of mediation in the 
play of signs. Mediation thus becomes the vehicle for de-glorifying sovereignty. 
Mediation’s role in glory could be traced back to Agamben’s differentiation between 
subjective and objective glory. By subjective glory, Agamben refers to the Jewish 
tradition whereby acclamation is the ‘natural and joyous reply of men to the manifest 
glory of God’ which is replicated in the ‘honor bestowed upon profane powers’ or 
political figures.13 The subjective form is what takes place in the holistic state or 
nation state that is founded on the immediate presence of the acclaiming people. 
Objective glory, on the other hand, refers to the ‘neutralized state that resolves itself 
                                                            
12 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 23. 
13 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 200. 
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in the communicative procedures without subject’.14 The clearest manifestation of the 
objective form of glory in a neutralized state is the media that have allowed for the 
dissemination of glory yet have maintained dominance over all areas of social life.15 
While both forms of glory are fundamental aspects to the establishment of consensual 
power, it is the objective form, I argue, that initiates the deconstruction of 
sovereignty. Objective glory, I will show, is employed by the weeds to de-glorify 
sovereignty by giving value to the media. In their reverse acclamation, the modern 
weeds glorify mediation, social media, Facebook and Twitter, instead of the regime. 
These mediatic means are thus not taken for what Agamben claims is their value as 
means of social communication that disseminate glory.16 Instead, the media are 
employed to create a public imagination, not opinion. The modern weeds thus glorify 
the imagination and set it against the subjective glory reinforced by the regime. 
By acclaiming mediation, the modern weeds reinterpret the de-glorification of 
sovereignty as carrying out a creative revelatory function. De-glorifying sovereignty 
involves a state of language that Agamben characterizes as ‘inoperative’. By 
                                                            
14 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 258. 
15 Ibid., p. 256. 
16 This chapter differentiates between the role that social media, such Facebook and 
Twitter, play and that played by the regular media. The role of the latter is what 
Agamben explores extensively in many of his writings, and especially in his essay 
titled, ‘What is an Apparatus?’ Agamben (in ‘What Is an Apparatus?’, in What Is an 
Apparatus and Other Essays, trans. by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2009)) claims that the media are a form of what 
Foucault calls the ‘apparatus’ as a ‘machine of governance’ (p.20). For Agamben, an 
apparatus is ‘anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, 
intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of 
living beings’ (p.14). Although the media are taken by Agamben to assume a role in 
governance through a process of ‘desubjectification’ where individuals lose 
subjectivity to the machines or the media only to gain subjectivity in spectral form, 
their social media relative, I argue, plays a slightly different role (pp.20-1). Social 
media liquefy sovereignty; however, the notion of sovereignty and governance that 
they maintain is dedicated to the ‘invention’ of new use or profanation rather than the 
maintenance of an opinion.     
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inoperativity, Agamben refers to the non-instrumental use of language as the state of 
the purely ‘sayable’.17 In that state, language entertains the possibility of meaning 
without concern with achieving it. In his explanation of Agamben’s notion of 
inoperativeness, Leland de la Durantaye claims that ‘inoperativeness is not laziness or 
inactivity, it is the open space where formless life and lifeless form meet in a distinct 
life-form and form of living that are rich with their own singular potentiality’.18 
Inoperativity thus indicates the open space of potentiality. De La Durantaye refers to 
Agamben’s Profanations to explain the inoperative to be a deactivation of an old use 
of anything. Inoperativity is thus non-instrumentality. It is the state in which the focus 
shifts to the quality of pure means of something that cuts ties with its usual ends. 
Sayability thus qualifies the state of imaginative representation that is neither 
informative nor communicative. Language, for Agamben, becomes a potential not to 
signify, a Derridean trace that displays ‘potentiality that is capable and that 
experiences itself’.19 However, in order for language to experience itself, it must first 
unfetter itself from its instrumental function in glorifying sovereignty. By reversing 
their acclamation, the modern weeds break this link between glory and sovereignty, 
thus, exposing or revealing that which glory conceals: the ‘void’. By void, Agamben 
means the empty throne or the cape without the king, the ‘sovereign figure of glory’.20 
The empty throne of power, this chapter holds, marks the imaginative element within 
politics that manifests itself with the de-glorification of sovereignty. In that state of 
                                                            
17 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, pp. 251–2. 
18 Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 331. 
19 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Potentalities’, in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, 
ed. & trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (California, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999), p. 216. 
20 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 245. 
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the empty throne, inoperativity assumes a creative function that holds the promise of 
opening law and language up for play.     
3.2 Political Cartoons on the Egyptian Revolution 
 
The political cartoons’ potential as a translation medium for creating consensus 
and challenging the dominant sense of glory is best explained in Charles Press’s The 
Political Cartoon (1981). Press traces the history of cartoons from their Egyptian 
roots to their more current status as a force creating the current world politics’ 
‘climate of opinion or consensus’.21 According to Charles Press, the ‘first known 
political caricature seems to have been done 3000 years back—a portrait of the 
founder of the Sun God religion, King Akhnaton of Egypt, father-in-law of King Tut 
(ankhamen)’.22 These cartoons are distinguished by their being ‘a graphic art of the 
comment […] that muse upon the ridiculous and the incongruous in life’ and whose 
repeated theme is the ‘contrast between reality and the ideal’.23 Their political role is 
claimed by Press to be in their ‘ability to join with other media critics in creating a 
climate of opinion or consensus’ through ‘peddling assumptions about the conditions 
and problems facing the society, the nature and even sometimes their solution’.24 
Political cartoons become the aesthetic remodeling of secular political consensus that 
I referred to in Chapter One as a wedding gown. 
The cartoonists’ ability to create an opinion of consensus is claimed by Press to be 
due to their being ‘critics [who] not only interpret specific policies and politicians to 
those publics which pay attention to them, but they also project a judgment about the 
system itself—whether it should be regarded as legitimate and deserving of loyalty or 
                                                            
21 Press, The Political Cartoon, p. 49. 
22 Ibid., p. 33. 
23 Ibid., p. 11. 
24 Ibid., p. 49. 
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not’.25 These cartoonists appear to be offering a double reading of their own, a 
double reading that is not far away from a Derridean double reading, composed here 
of an interpretation and a judgment. The first reading of interpretation correlates with 
a Derridean sense of commentary that acts within the totality of reality and politics. 
This first reading, then, is complemented by a judgment which sets the ellipsis into 
play. This judgment, for Press, indicates the critic’s assessment of the system’s social 
justice.26 Here, the system’s social justice constitutes the judgment that exceeds the 
first reading of commentary. Moreover, by resorting to this double reading of 
commentary and judgment in his cartoons, the cartoonist— Press claims—is able to 
address the ‘intellect, conscience, and emotion’.27 The cartoonist does so by first 
presenting a ‘picture of reality that artists present to us as the essence of truth’, 
second ‘sketchily impl[ying], as to what they recommend ought to be done on behalf 
of the deserving’ and third ‘creat[ing] a mood telling us how we should feel over 
what is happening—amused, chagrined, or any one of the pedal stops up to outrage’ 
through artistic technique and allegorical imagery.28 So, the cartoonist uses his/her 
artistic technique to present a reading of commentary confined within the premises of 
political truth; this reading is then followed by an ellipsis of judgment that creates a 
mood about social justice. The cartoonists thus depict Press’s climate of consensus. 
However, this climate of consensus is founded on the belief that political conditions 
could be otherwise.29 The consensual belief that things could be otherwise is what I 
                                                            
25 Press, The Political Cartoon, p. 51. 
26 Ibid., p. 51. 
27 Ibid., p. 62. 
28 Ibid., p. 62. 
29Satire’s concern with changing the status quo through ridicule could assume a 
conservative stance or a more revolutionary form. Griffin (in Satire: A Critical 
Reintroduction, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), p.149) explains 
Ronald Paulson’s distinction between conservative and radical satire by claiming that 
the ‘conservative wants to conserve the best of tradition, the radical or revolutionary 
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take to echo Critchley’s ‘dissensus communis’ defined as a shared belief in the ‘ideal 
image of the world’ depicted in jokes.30 Here, ellipsis is taken to denote the 
disjunction between the real and ideal that the cartoonist qualifies by issuing a 
judgment. For Critchley, jokes are a form of consent that is not a shared common 
understanding, a sensus communis, but more a shared concession to an ideal image 
of the world, a dissensus communis. Humor thus qualifies the ellipsis that opens the 
reading up to alternative versions and alternative readings of consensus.  
The cartoons’ cognitive, normative and affective influences in forming a dissensus 
communis, I hold, are illustrated by Press’s citation of the historian W.A. Coupe who 
distinguishes cartoons into three general classes: the descriptive, laughing satirical, 
and destructive satirical.31 The three types are held to be reflected in the incongruity 
between the real and the ideal which is ‘at the heart of all satire’.32 The last class or 
destructive satire is said to question the system’s legitimacy or attack what the 
cartoonist regards as a ‘particularly virulent enemy of the system or of the way of life 
he or she cherishes’.33 It is the approach favored by revolutionaries regardless of their 
political orientation.34 This is why political regimes react violently to these cartoons. 
The cartoons’ major role as a tool of satire in the collapse of a number of despotic 
regimes around the world, such as that of the apartheid regime in South Africa and 
the military in Latin America, is claimed by Freedman in ‘Wit as a Political Weapon: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
wants to return to the roots to find a purity that has been corrupted’. Juvenal is taken 
to indicate the former while Lucian is taken to refer to the latter. Both forms of satire, 
for Griffin, are ‘oriented towards an ideal in the past’ despite their apparent 
difference. The notion of the ideal that both forms of satire maintain is the interest of 
this chapter. However, the notion of the ideal which is adopted by this chapter does 
not necessarily limit its orientation to the past. 
30 Simon Critchley, On Humour (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 90. 
31 Press, The Political Cartoon, p. 75. 
32 Ibid., p. 75. 
33 Ibid., p. 78. 
34 Ibid., p. 78. 
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Satirists and Censors’ to be the reason behind the censorship that these regimes, 
including the Egyptian regime, imposed on them. In Egypt, censorship, forbidden by 
constitution but allowed during a state of emergency, has been activated by imposing 
this state of emergency since the (now ousted) president Mubarak took over in 
1981.35 Thus, most cartoonists avoided the presidential taboo until ‘at last the taboo 
was smashed beyond repair by the massed protesters exultantly waving caricatures of 
Mubarak in Cairo's Tahrir Square’.36 Similiarly, Issandr El Amrani in ‘Three 
Decades of a Joke that Just Won’t Die’, claims that political cartoons have been the 
Egyptian’s ‘aggressive weapon of political dissidence’ towards their ex-president, 
Mubarak.37 Egyptians, it seems, resort to cartoons as a means of what the sociologist 
Max Weber called the ‘moralization of hurts’ where the sense of deprivations 
indicate an injustice that can only be overcome through reform.38 Political cartoons 
have been used as a method of expressing political dissidence as a form of sensus 
communis achieved by the dissensus communis, whereby ‘humour familiarizes us 
with a common world through its miniature strategies of defamiliarization’.39 In this 
world, there is political consensus around the necessity of reform for the purpose of 
justice. However, this consensus is achieved only by defamiliarising the regime as 
                                                            
35 The state of emergency marked by the disruption of the rule of law has been 
discussed extensively by such thinkers as Agamben, Schmitt and Benjamin. In 
response to Benjamin’s and Schmitt’s take on the subject, Agamben’s notion of a 
state of emergency or state of exception is explained by de la Durantaye (in Giorgio 
Agamben: A Critical Introduction) to be ‘a revolutionary state in which a totally 
different- and difficult to define relationship of law to life would prevail’ (p. 345). 
Agamben’s state of exception indicates the ‘originary form of the law’ that is 
‘disactivated’ in order for it be ‘irreverently to[yed] with’ (p. 346). This is why 
Agamben calls for a Benjaminian ‘real state of exception’ as a desirable state where 
all instrumental use of law would be abolished (p. 344).  
36 Leonard Freedman, ‘Wit as a Political Weapon: Satirists and Censors’, Social 
Research, 79 (2012), 87–112,271 (pp. 91–92). 
37 Issandr El Amrani, ‘Three Decades of a Joke That Just Won’t Die’, Foreign Policy, 
2011, 89–90 (p. 90). 
38 Press, The Political Cartoon, p. 113. 
39 Critchley, On Humour, p. 18. 
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real and evoking a sense of potential ideal in overcoming this real, an ideal that 
renders the modern weeds into sprouts- an argument I made in Chapter Two. 
 By seeking to revolt against despotism and raising the issue of justice and 
indignity, these cartoons acquire an ethical significance.40 The political cartoons’ 
revolutionary and ethical potential is what I take to echo Critchley’s claim in The 
Ethics of Deconstruction that the Derridean clotural reading is that which allows the 
question of ethics to be raised within deconstruction. Ethics indicates an ‘interruption 
of ontological closure’ which is achieved through presenting a ‘history read from the 
standpoint of the victims of that history’.41 The revolutionaries become the victims of 
history who initiate an ethical interruption to the ontological closure that the regime 
imposes.42 Their ethical interruption takes the form of a clotural reading that the 
                                                            
40 This study is interested in satire for its revolutionary potential. However, it must be 
mentioned that satire has not always been historically associated with revolutionary 
potential. To this effect, Griffin (in Satire: A Critical Reintroduction, (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1994), p. 154-60) argues that satire ‘can rarely be 
measured in terms of political change or even personal conduct’ (p.160). For Griffin, 
satire acquires its importance from its being ‘intellectually subversive’, not practically 
so (p.159). In satire, ‘moral victory is more important than local political victory’ for 
‘it has not been convincingly shown that satire has the power to encourage the actions 
or alter the attitudes of its readers’ (p.154-9). However, Griffin does not completely 
deny the political effects that satire sometimes has; he remarks that a satirist ‘may lose 
some battles yet will eventually win the war’ (p.159). It is in this sense that I argue 
that satire, within the Egyptian context, is politically and practically relevant. The 
widespread employment of political cartoons to satirize the regime is taken to indicate 
a culmination of a history of battles that has led to the revolution and resulted in the 
people eventually winning ‘the war’ or the revolution, in this case.  
41 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 30. 
42 Reread from Walter Benjamin’s ‘On the Concept of History’ (in Walter Benjamin 
Selected Writings, ed. by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, trans. by Edmund 
Jephcott and Others (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003)), 
Critchley’s victims of history assume the title of the oppressed whose task is to 
initiate a ‘state of emergency’ which is ‘not the exception but the rule’ and that really 
defines the appropriate conception of history (p.392). Benjamin’s state of emergency 
would not involve a promise of redemption; instead, it ‘must strive anew to wrest 
tradition away from the conformism that is working to overpower it’ (p. 391). So, the 
state of emergency is that where Benjamin’s  oppressed allow for ‘spiritual things’ 
that are ‘alive in this struggle as confidence, courage, humor, cunning, and fortitude, 
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cartoons capture graphically. This reading is described as a ‘movement of alterity’ 
that interrupts the first reading, the commentary or the ‘logocentric textuality’ that is a 
‘patient and scholarly commentary following the main lines of the text’s dominant 
interpretation’.43 So, the first reading that the political cartoons depict is that shedding 
light on the finite totality of the commentary. This finite totality of commentary, I 
hold, figures in depicting the opposition of the weeds to the regime. This is a 
commentary because it maintains the guise of the political act built on the binary 
opposition of regime/victims or ruler/ruled. However, this commentary is interrupted 
via a second reading that indicates an ethical ellipsis captured by the joke. The joke 
presents the ethical movement, the openness to alterity, by raising ethical questions 
related to justice through evoking potential political consensus as an imaginative ideal 
that could escape that condition of political opposition.44 
In this chapter, the cartoons’ revolutionary potential, as has been mentioned, will 
be analyzed within the contemporary context of the Arab Spring.45 This chapter will 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and have effects that reach far back into the past’ to ‘call into question every victory, 
past and present, of the rulers’ (p. 390). 
43 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 30. 
44 Michael Dillon (in ‘Jacques Derrida’, in Palgrave Advances in Continental 
Political Thought, ed. by Terrell Carver and James Martin (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 260-73) claims that Derrida’s deconstruction marks the 
‘possibility of another kind of politics’ or ‘another kind of belonging’. This 
‘belonging together revolves around the insatiable call of the ethical to which Derrida 
claims that we are continuously exposed by virtue of the wholly Other’ (pp.266-7). In 
this sense, the Egyptian revolution demonstrates an attempt to grapple with the 'call of 
the ethical' which the regime attempted to suppress and deny. The protestors 
demonstrate what Dillon calls the ‘comprehensive political responsibility […] 
towards a future that we have to be ‘hospitable towards’ (p.272). Their revolution 
redefines the political in their hospitable response to an unknown future that they 
decide to embrace. 
45 Here, it must be mentioned that the historical role that cartoons play is not always 
discussed as a purely revolutionary one. Spielmann (in Cartoons From Punch 
(London: Bradbury and Agnew, 1906), p.v.) claims that the cartoon ‘is not to be 
considered merely as a comic or satirical comment on the main occurrence or 
situation of the week, but as contemporary history for the use and information of 
future generations cast into amusing form for the entertainment of the present’. The 
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limit its scope to cartoons featuring in the Arab media to show how these cartoons 
depict a double reading of the Egyptian revolutionaries’ experience. These cartoons 
will be analyzed for the reading of commentary in the representation of the system, 
the Egyptian regime or the ousted president Mubarak, which the revolutionaries 
reverse. I will investigate this against the backdrop of Agamben’s notion of glory built 
on acclamation. Collective hailing, in this reading of commentary, is taken to stand 
for the revolutionaries’ attempt to desecrate and profane the regime instead of to 
praise it. The regime as a manifestation of sovereignty thus undergoes a process of de-
glorification in what I call ‘reverse acclamation’, a concept which I explain further 
next. 
3.3 Reverse Acclamation 
 
Political cartoons dealing with the 2011 Egyptian Revolution can be interpreted as 
depicting the political struggle as a double reading initiated by the weeds. In their 
political reading, the weeds’ commentary highlights their attempt to deconstruct 
power through reducing the sacred shield of power to profanity. In subjective glory, 
acclaiming the king assumes a negative sense of denouncing him. However, in order 
to desecrate his sacred shield, the weeds highlight the role of arche-writing and 
mediation as a semiotic field to verbalize any acclamation. They thus incorporate the 
other form of acclamation, objective glory, to effect their profaning act. The voicing 
of glorification, in its subjective and objective forms, is thus reversed from an act of 
praise to that of de-glorifying or overthrowing the regime that this section shall 
proceed to explore. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cartoon’s contemporary historical role is taken in this chapter to give credibility for 
the victims of history by being a documentation of their revolt through the 
entertainment that the joke offers at present.  
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One element of sacredness that the regime employs to reinforce its sovereignty 
and that the revolutionary weeds seek to deconstruct is that of acclamation, but in 
reverse negative form. Agamben claims that the acclaiming people is one form of the 
glorious apparatus through what he calls ‘immediate and subjective glory’. This form 
of glory takes place in the holistic state where the people hail a sovereign symbol of 
power. These two constituents of glory, the acclaiming public and the sovereign 
symbol of power, figure in almost all of the cartoons dealt with in this chapter. 
However, the main feature that these cartoons focus on is what I call ‘reverse 
acclamation’ where acclamation is employed to overthrow the sovereign symbol 
instead of praise him. Such a state is what I hold to figure in the following cartoon: 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1. Mubarak clings to the throne. 46  
This cartoonist presents a double reading whereby all components of subjective glory 
are present as desecrated. The king is represented on his throne in the presence of a 
public that would otherwise be hailing his presence. However, that acclamation, 
instead of expressing praise, requests the king to depart. The banners that are held up 
read ‘Leave’ and address a king clinging to a throne that is on the verge of being 
toppled. In this sense, subjective glory employs its own mechanism of praise to 
introduce profanity into the shield of sacred spirituality that the king attempts to 
                                                            
46 Nasser Al Ja’afari, Mubarak clings to the throne [Cartoon], Alarab Alyawm, 7 
February 2011, p.16. 
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create. Through reverse acclamation, the king or imam figure is presented as a 
political functionary subject to the collective will of the weeds.47 The figure of the 
sovereign is thus made profane after its sacred shield which ‘separated and petrified’ 
it is ‘disenchant[ed] and return[ed] to use’ by the modern weeds.48   
In their reverse acclamation, the weeds not only desecrate sovereignty by turning 
the content of acclamation from praise into a departure order but also by delivering 
that acclamation in a sovereign comedic and satirical form. The weeds employ al-
Farabi’s poetic satire to ridicule sovereignty and induce an unnatural movement on 
the side of the regime: departure. Before inducing the unnatural movement, the 
weeds, however, need to compare the king to an animal before employing satire to 
induce the now transformed animal to follow orders and leave. This is what I hold to 
figure in the following cartoon:  
 
 
 
 Fig.2. Mubarak should leave. 49  
                                                            
47 I employ ‘reverse acclamation’, here, to later highlight the role that mediation 
plays in the deconstruction of sovereignty. Political formation, in this sense, is still 
negotiated and problematized in terms of sovereignty, but in the negative German 
baroque mode of the ‘lack of sovereignty’. Whereas sovereignty used to originally 
stand for the immediacy of decision-making in the pre-modern period, it is faced with 
the realization of its incapacity to make a decision in the modern period (cf. footnote 
73). This incapacity of making an immediate decision, or the implied reliance on 
mediation, is what I claim the cartoons to highlight in the state of reverse acclamation. 
This state, I argue, holds a promise for politics.  
48 Agamben, Profanations, p. 74. 
49 Saad Hajo, Mubarak should leave [Cartoon], Al-Safir Newspaper, 2 February 2011, 
p.16. 
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The poster on the back of the king with the crown, the regime, shows the king without 
the crown and looking like a pig. The king assumes the insignia of power, the crown 
of glory, which Agamben claims is ‘derived from the diadem that is owed to the 
triumphant imperator or athlete as a symbol of victory and expresses the glorious 
quality of eternal life’.50 However, in their satirical stance, the weeds turn the king 
into an animal who can be trained to follow orders and carry out an unnatural 
movement, departure. They thus reduce his sacred shield of crown and throne to 
profanity. He assumes an animal nature that is ready to follow orders and leave —
however, not without a fight: 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. A smooth transition of power. 51  
 
Negative or reverse acclamation delivered in satirical form is then employed by 
the weeds to introduce the opening up of ellipsis by reinforcing arche-writing and 
mediation. The caption in the cartoon before last reads: ‘Whether King or Writing, we 
do not want you!’ This is an Egyptian variation on the coin flip phrase ‘heads or tails’. 
Interestingly, the Egyptian coin has historically had the face of a king on one side and 
writing on the other; thus, highlighting the correlation of the notion of kinghood to 
writing. As a logocentric preservation of speech, writing is taken to indicate the law 
that the weeds seek to appropriate to fight back the regime. Reverse acclamation, 
which the weeds employ to profane the spiritual shield of the king, double-reads the 
                                                            
50 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 247. 
51 Abdallah Jaber, A smooth transition of power [Cartoon], Al Jazirah, 4 February 
2011, p.30. 
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semiotic tools of logocentric sovereignty, of the primacy of speech over writing, 
which the king employs. In a Derridean attempt to deconstruct power, the weeds show 
how the king establishes and secures his power through speech that is primarily a 
writing of law. Instead of presenting acclamation of the king via speech (as in speech 
bubbles, for example), the cartoon before last and the one preceding it capture their 
address via writing. Their acclamation is expressed via held banners or written 
captions with the phrase ‘Leave’. The weeds thus employ the king’s own implicit tool 
of sovereignty, writing, against him. They thus reduce the king to silence in the non-
verbal depiction of a king clinging to his throne as language ceases to aid him. In their 
acclamation, the revolutionaries display signification as arche-writing by practicing 
the Derridean ‘writing as an event of reading’.52 By setting up the mechanisms of 
writing, writing as practiced by the regime and arche-writing as endorsed by the 
weeds, as a continuation of one another, the cartoon hints at the consequence: silence. 
In the horizontality of semiotics and logic through arche-writing, the death of the 
subject, discussed in the earlier chapter, ensues.53 Silence, illustrative of the dead 
subject, beholds the king in desecration and the throne in emptiness as it opens the 
reign of mediation, the graphic media, for reading. 
By introducing arche-writing to illustrate that mediation is integral to sovereignty, 
the weeds highlight the other form of glory that Agamben calls objective glory. 
Agamben claims that the glorious apparatus includes the ‘mediatic and objective 
glory of social communication’.54 Objective glory is the form of glory in which the 
cartoons invest so as to portray liquefied sovereignty as mediated public acclamation. 
Instead of the immediate presence of the citizens to acclaim a king, the media are 
                                                            
52 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 159. 
53 Ibid., p. 71. 
54 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 258. 
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introduced to liquefy sovereignty while maintaining the guise of glory as acclamation. 
In the objective form of glory, ‘[w]hat was confined to the spheres of liturgy and 
ceremonials has become concentrated in the media and, at the same time, through 
them it spreads and penetrates at each moment into every area of society, both public 
and private’.55 Although Agamben claims that his reference to the role of the media is 
that of it being an ‘originary democratic phenomenon’, he emphasizes Habermas’s 
conception of popular sovereignty that ‘dissolves itself and is liquefied in such 
communicative procedures’.56 The media, therefore, liquefies sovereignty while 
designating glory itself. Arche-writing as mediation, in this sense, becomes but 
another apparatus of glory assigned with the mission of dissolving sovereignty. 
The mechanism of dissolving sovereignty is best illustrated in the following 
cartoon where both subjective and objective glory are put in engagement with one 
another. Mediation, the TV set as indication of objective glory, intercepts subjective 
glory, the acclaiming people’s address to the sovereign figure of glory, the king on his 
throne. As in the previous cartoons, address to the king is a case of reverse 
acclamation. However, this time, a play on language and semiotic fields is the focus: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The people want to topple the regime.57 
 
                                                            
55 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 256. 
56 Ibid., p. 257. 
57 Amr Selim, The people want to topple the regime [Cartoon], Almasri Alyoum, 30 
January 2011, p.16. 
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On the verbal level, the TV represents the people who ask the regime to leave in their 
famous declaration, ‘The people want the fall of the regime’, nizam. On the other side 
of the monitor, the now ousted president sits in his throne telling himself in vernacular 
Egyptian Arabic what translates as ‘Thank God, my name is not the regime’, and is 
meta-phrased as ‘Thank God, not my name the regime’. On the non-verbal level, the 
Egyptian cartoonist’s first reading as commentary highlights the order of the logos by 
depicting glory through the acclaiming people along with the throne, the 
governmental appropriation of glory as power.58 However, being a joke, the cartoon 
invests in the incongruous representation between the reality and the ideal. The 
people, instead of acclaiming the king, are, in fact, asking for his departure and for a 
fall of the regime. The king’s only response to these appeals is to sit, relaxed, in his 
throne which has become the couch of a TV viewer. He has become a passive 
spectator on sovereignty, a sovereignty that is detached and denuded from its mask in 
glory.  
The modern weeds thus inscribe a reverse form of acclamation that they associate 
with denouncement and condemnation instead of praise.59 In their reverse 
acclamation, the translation of sovereignty takes place through denuding sovereignty 
from its mask in glory. However, their reverse acclamation acquires its major 
significance because it highlights how the weeds initiate an ellipsis that reads the 
                                                            
58 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 239. 
59 As ‘reverse acclamation’ becomes an illustration of the lack that characterizes 
sovereignty, it could point to the state of political promise that this lack holds. 
Michael Dillon (in Biopolitics of Security: A Political Analytic of Finitude (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2015), p.13) qualifies Samuel Weber’s ‘lack of 
sovereignty’ that characterizes the German baroque as a ‘deficiency of the sovereign’, 
and ‘therefore on the stage that it fails to command, enter other formations of power, 
other rules of truth and truths of rule’. The deficiency of the sovereign, therefore, is 
indicative of a promise that other formations of power are possible. Politics, in this 
sense, becomes a preoccupation with redefining the formations of power beyond the 
question of sovereignty itself. 
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negative of deconstruction in mediation.60 What this means is what we will turn to 
next. 
3.4 Inoperativity and Mediation 
 
In the previous section, we have seen how in a state of revolution, subjective glory 
in the form of acclamation can be employed as a tool to desecrate the government and 
de-glorify sovereignty. Double reading represents the mechanism whereby 
acclamation assumes a reverse form that not only profanes but also employs the 
government’s own tool, writing, against it. Through their elliptical reading captured 
by the cartoons, the weeds draw attention to arche-writing and mediation as integral 
to the deconstruction of sovereignty. Social media as mediation become further means 
for the liquefaction of sovereignty. 
The media’s role in liquefying sovereignty is discussed by Agamben in relation to 
Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle (1967). For Agamben, the ‘spectacle’ is the 
‘expropriation and the alienation of human sociality itself’ whereby, as Debord 
claims, the ‘social relation among people [is] mediated by images’.61 In this new 
sociality, the real world is transformed into an image and images become real.62 
Images thus mediate the relationship between people. For Agamben, the resulting 
spectacle, the society mediated by images which stand for ‘means [being] 
simultaneously ends’, marks the alienation of sociality.63 However, alienation is not 
                                                            
60 For Critchley (in The Ethics of Deconstruction, pp.21-9), reading for the negative is 
the practice of deconstruction that is not a negative act of demolition. Deconstruction 
is rather the reading that ‘destabilizes the stability of a dominant interpretation’ of a 
text by saying what ‘philosophy is unable to say’. It is with destabilizing 
interpretation that this chapter grapples.    
61 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, ed. by Sandra Buckley, Michael Hardt, 
and Brian Massumi, trans. by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 78.9. 
62 Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 78.9. 
63Catherine Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), p. 126. 
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restricted to images; it also affects language. Agamben comments that ‘[w]hat 
hampers communication is communicability itself’ characterized by the ‘alienation of 
language itself, of the very linguistic and communicative nature of humans’.64 
Language is alienated or separated from the sphere of the profane, the ‘free use of 
man’.65 Alienation of sociality and language via the spectacle thus reinforces a notion 
of sovereignty built upon ‘exclusion and violence’.66 This is why the profane, the 
return to ‘common use’, becomes the only means available to overcome sovereign 
exclusion. One form that overcoming sovereignty takes, I argue, is a liquefied form 
which, Agamben in The Kingdom and the Glory claims, is carried out by social 
media. Social media become a means for the non-instrumental use of language that is 
marked by the process of returning language to the field of the common.  
     Social media, therefore, facilitate the translation of language from alienation, the 
sphere of the sacred, unto profanation through the liquefaction of sovereignty. In The 
Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben calls the non-instrumental or profane use of 
language, inoperativity.67 By inoperativity, Agamben ‘highlights the power of a 
relation to things, concepts and ultimately law itself that desacralizes and plays with 
things as a child does with toys’.68 Language becomes inoperative when it is played 
with and loses its instrumental function to inform or communicate information. 
Playing with language through inoperativity represents Agamben’s response to 
Derridean deconstruction that ‘choos[es] to  dwell  in  aporias  and harness their 
strength rather than see[k] a way out of  them’.69 While Derrida’s deconstruction 
allows for an ‘indefinite deferral of signification’ through ellipsis, Agamben takes it 
                                                            
64 Agamben, The Coming Community, pp. 79.0–81.2. 
65 Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben, p. 127. 
66 Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, p. 175. 
67 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 239. 
68 Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben, p. 131. 
69 Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, p. 190. 
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to reinforce an instrumental use of the inoperative. In Derrida’s version of double 
reading, the ellipsis constitutes the means whose end is the opening up of a text to 
further interpretations. However, for Agamben, that only leads to a ‘nothing’ that is 
‘dangerous for those around it only when it is closed off as sacred, presented and 
prized as something that is the province of the few’.70 This is why Agamben proposes 
profanation or play of language that allows for ‘invention’ to overcome the status of 
the sacred that deconstruction could assume. The profanation of language or the 
‘creation of new use’ is only possible by ‘deactivating an old use, rendering it 
inoperative’.71 One example that Agamben gives for the inoperativity necessary for 
profanation is that of the poem that loses its communicative end and rests with 
sayability.72 
Language’s sayability or inoperativity is what I hold the cartoons experiment with 
by depicting the failure of communication between the sovereign, the king as 
president, and the acclaiming people. Here, I would like to highlight that the notion of 
inoperativity that I adopt for my argument in this chapter focuses on the failure of 
communication, language facing and experimenting with the possibility of becoming 
a means without an end. Whether sayability of the poem or the quality of being a pure 
                                                            
70 Ibid., p. 190. 
71 Agamben, Profanations, p. 86. 
72Agamben borrows the notion of inoperativity from Jean-Luc Nancy’s The 
Inoperative Community (1986). Nancy (in The Inoperative Community, ed. by Peter 
Connor, trans. by Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney 
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1991)) argues that the 
‘inoperative community’ indicates a ‘being-in-common [that] is not a common being’ 
(p. 29). It emphasizes ‘communication’ and ‘exposing sharing’ that is ‘prior to any 
address in language’ (p. 29). This community as communication is concerned with the 
‘appearance of the between as such’ and rejects any ‘connection or joining from the 
outside and from any notion of a common and fusional interiority’ (p. 29). In other 
words, the inoperative community is what rejects the bios, the outside, and the zoe, 
the fusional interiority. This is why Nancy, echoing Blanchot’s claim that a 
community cannot take place through the domain of ‘work’, claims that community is 
‘not a work or even an operation of singular beings’ and is ‘made of the interruption 
of singularities, or the suspension that singular beings are’ (p. 31). 
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means is a state that the modern weeds successfully reach is a question which I will 
delay answering to the following chapter. So, on the path towards the state of being a 
pure means, language, I argue, shows the first signs of inoperativity in the cartoons 
through the people’s and the president’s statements in which, as Agamben quotes 
Spinoza to say, ‘language, which has deactivated its communicative and informative 
functions, rests within itself, [and] contemplates its power of saying –potenza di 
dire’.73 The statements are in a deactivated mode in terms of communication and 
information giving. In this deactivated mode, language opens itself up to the 
possibility of a new use. Language’s inoperativity, therefore, marks the moment of 
‘profanatory potential’ that this chapter centers around and that presents itself in 
comical form.74 
Going back to the following previously-discussed cartoon, the inoperativity of 
language is represented by the failed communication between the acclaiming people 
and the sovereign, the president as king. The loss of communication is effected 
through a play on the proper name. The people ask for the ‘fall of the regime’ while 
the president is grateful and thanks God that his name, ism, is not the regime, nizam: 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. The people want to topple the regime. 75  
                                                            
73 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, pp. 251–2. 
74 Agamben, Profanations, p. 88. 
75 Amr Selim, The people want to topple the regime [Cartoon], Almasri Alyoum, 30 
January 2011, p.16. 
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By thanking God, the ultimate Glory, the president appropriates the acclaiming 
people’s expression into the sphere of the logos, the proper name. He sits on the 
throne and thanks God that his name is not the regime. By reinforcing the logocentric 
reading of the people’s claim, the president practices the reading of commentary that 
Critchley, referring to Levinas, calls the language of the Said, the logos, and the finite 
totality. The king’s inoperative disarticulation through the proper name, the Logos, 
aims to return the performative Saying of the citizens to the Said, the name. The king 
tries to preserve the status of acclamation as praise for him as sovereign by diverting 
the collective desecration away.  
In order to effect this re-appropriation, the king relies on a disarticulation or play 
with language that assumes ethical significance associated with his own downfall.76 
Through disarticulation, the king as imam involuntarily applies what Critchley calls 
the ‘logic of the fault’ which is marked by the ethical nature of the Saying preserved 
within the Said. For Critchley, the ‘logic of the fault, of violence and ingratitude, is 
not accidental but essential to the ethical event of the text’, for ingratitude is a 
‘necessity or fatality within ethical Saying’.77 Through the faulty reading in 
disarticulation, the president cannot escape the ethical Saying that the weeds initiate, 
for his faulty interpretation becomes an event of Saying itself. He highlights the 
failure of meaning making inherent in the logocentric law system he represents. This, 
in turn, works against him as representative of the symbolic order. Here, it must be 
                                                            
76 Differentiated from Derrida’s focus on the semiotic nature of play, Agamben’s 
sense of play assumes a quasi-political sense related to law. Mills (in The Philosophy 
of Agamben, pp. 125-6) explains Agamben’s sense of play to be that which ‘allows 
for the profanation of the law, where this is understood as the non-instrumental 
appropriation of law and ultimately its deactivation’. This sense of play does not mean 
‘simply the annihilation of law nor the constitution of a new law; instead, it is law 
rendered inoperative, and as such, the gate to justice’. Justice indicates a state of the 
world that is no longer ruled by law. 
77 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 137. 
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mentioned that faultiness and violence are taken to be instances of opening up to the 
Other that are neither for nor against the logocentric work. Knowingly or not, the 
president starts his own process of descent the moment he resorts to faulty 
interpretations of the direct Other, the citizens in this case. His faulty reading through 
disarticulation opens up the dimension of ethicality through inoperativity. 
Inoperativity, which constitutes one of the mechanisms of glory itself, initiates a 
movement of ethicality that jeopardizes glory from within. The mechanism through 
which inoperative language in the cartoons jeopardizes glory is what we will turn to 
next.  
3.5 Inoperativity and the Ethicality of Mimetic Translation  
 
As already mentioned, Agamben highlights the work of glory through its two 
apparatuses: the acclaiming people as people-nation and the mediated people-
communication. What starts off as reverse acclamation with subjective glory, the 
weeds taking acclamation as a guise to make their request for the king to leave, 
becomes a state of liquefied sovereignty through mediation, so far depicted in the TV 
set. Mediation allows for reverse negative acclamation to present itself as inoperative 
language and disarticulation or play taken for amusement in these cartoons. 
However, as this section will proceed to show, disarticulation highlights the 
generative role of mimesis as a vehicle of profanation in this state of inoperativity.  
By playing on language and images, political cartoons portray the role mimesis 
plays in inoperativity. Recall that mimetic translation was taken to denote two 
aspects of translation that differ in reference. The imam adopts what qualifies as 
logocentric mimesis in the imitation of presence. On the other hand, the weeds 
introduce the Derridean notion of mimesis as iterability, yet with a twist. Their twist 
makes iterability a case marked by aesthetic imaginative representation (discussed in 
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Chapter Two). The possibility of repetition integral to the sign becomes a condition 
of repeatability marked by aesthetic imaginative means. Whether imitation in 
cartoons involves language or image, it becomes integral to the functioning of 
inoperativity. 
In the case of the following cartoon, the inoperativity of language is evident in 
disarticulating the proper name, as I discussed earlier. This time, however, the 
cartoonist depicts it as being a mediated address from the revolutionaries through 
social media, Facebook. Disarticulation that started off on the side of the king, in the 
earlier cartoon, now extends to the revolutionaries who finally managed to actualize 
their ethical appeal to topple the regime. Their ethical appeals for the regime to leave 
start off as a deliberate disarticulation in which the revolutionaries refuse to say the 
name of their ex-president and insist on using the noun, nizam, regime, to address 
him. Then, as the cartoon shows, when their appeal finally succeeds, they celebrate 
the king’s downfall by employing mimesis to rework or imitate the name of the 
sovereign, the president, Mubarak:  
 
 
 
 Figure 5. Mubarak successfully removed.78  
 
                                                            
78 Imad Hajjaj, Mubarak successfully removed [Cartoon], Al Quds Al Arabi, 14 
February 2011, p.19. 
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The cartoon congratulates Egyptians on their feat in the expression of joy written next 
to the flag. The graphic medium instructs readers to ‘say mabrouk’, or 
congratulations, ‘NOT Mubarak’, a homonym indicating another expression of 
congratulations, usually associated with formal Arabic, but also the name of the 
president, Husni Mubarak. The instruction is delivered in a mediatized version of 
social communication whereby contacts can be deleted on Facebook. Social media 
that stand for people-communication, objective glory, allow for the inoperative 
disarticulation in language, the cessation of the informative meaning in the word, 
Mubarak, to function in favor of the deletion of Mubarak, the deletion of the image of 
the ousted president. So, disarticulation works on the order of the logos to cancel an 
image of the president as king in an ethical appeal issued by the weeds. Again, 
disarticulation through imitation of language brings ethics into the equation. The 
modern weeds’ concern is with the prospect of justice that is depicted as a cancelation 
of this representative of the sovereign. 
Besides working on the order of the proper name, the mimetic translation which is 
fundamental for inoperative language extends its effects to the image in mediatized 
creation to face emotions induced by sovereign exclusion, fear generated by the sense 
of sacred-induced alienation. The media’s role in activating inoperativity through 
image is represented in Arabic cartoons through what I hold to be Derrida’s 
reformulation of Rousseau’s ‘perversity of imitation’.79 One of the signs that is 
subjected to the play of imitation in a lot of Arabic cartoons is that of the pyramid, as 
a symbol of the Egyptian notion of kinghood. For example, in the cartoon below, the 
protestors are represented as having constructed a protest tent that imitates the 
pyramid. They are also represented as using the computer, the main means for social 
                                                            
79 Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 203–5. 
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communication or objective glory, to help them face the sovereign. They thus display 
the role that mediated imitation plays in relation to inoperativity: 
 
 
 
 Figure 6. The pyramid of fear 80  
 
The writings on the tent read: ‘We will not be afraid’, and the caption over the 
pyramid reads, ‘The pyramid of Khofo’ a homonym indicating not only the name of 
the oldest and strongest pharaoh, Khofo, but also the Egyptian slang word for fear. 
The pyramid is the symbol for fear and kinghood. This pyramid and its related 
caption, however, are brought to stark contrast with the caption over the tent that 
rhymes with that over the pyramid yet reads: ‘Conquered his fear’. The caption also 
borrows the same letter formation of that over the pyramid. In this case of mimetic 
translation in inoperativity, the fear induced by the pyramid of fear, the symbol of the 
king, wakes the weeds up to a Derridean recognition that fear lies at the origin of 
language.81 This is why they seek to appease this fear by constructing another sign of 
sovereignty, the tent, to imitate the pyramid in mimetic translation. They also 
emphasize mediation through the image of the computer, or technology, as a tool for 
social media access. Mimetic translation thus becomes one distinguishing feature of 
inoperativity that is marked by overcoming the sphere of sacred exclusion and fear. 
                                                            
80 Imad Hajjaj, The pyramid of fear [Cartoon], Al Quds Al Arabi, 10 February 2011, 
p.19. 
81 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 277. 
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In this state of mimetic translation in inoperativity, fear is not the only dynamic of 
sovereignty that the weeds deconstruct in the name of justice. In the cartoon above, 
there is an interesting play on the time frame where antiquity or majesty in the build-
up of the pyramid is brought into stark contrast with modern technology and 
inexperience of construction. The weeds break the effect of molding through memory 
by activating the signs of modern technology and instant access allowed by social 
media. The essentiality of time to the deconstruction of sovereignty negotiates itself in 
a play on the notions of synchrony and diachrony which I reconsider in the light of 
Derrida’s and Agamben’s works. The Derridean perspective is what I borrow from 
Critchley’s double reading of Levinas’s texts. Double reading, for Critchley, displays 
the ethical gesture of the text through a reduction of the synchronic to the diachronic 
as a ‘time of justice’.82 The diachronic is the time of the now that social media 
communication allows without necessitating the presence of the people addressed. For 
Critchley, there is a ‘reduction of the Said to the Saying’ in double reading; this 
reduction is marked by a move from synchrony to diachrony or from the synchronic 
reduction of ‘time to space’ to the diachronic ‘coming apart of time’ or the ‘the time 
of the lapse’.83 He emphasizes Levinas’s Bergsonian claim that ‘diachrony is the real 
time of Saying, whereas synchrony is the abstract time of the Said’, for ‘diachrony is 
the primordial, or authentic, time from which the vulgar, inauthentic conception of 
time as synchrony is derived’.84 Through play on the time frame in mimesis that 
emphasizes the lapse in the now moment, these citizens initiate the ouverture of ethics 
and the question of justice. 
                                                            
82 Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and 
Contemporary French Thought (New York: Verso, 1999), p. 155. 
83 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 165. 
84 Ibid., p. 166. 
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For Agamben, however, the reduction of synchrony to diachrony as a time of 
justice is rather a ‘crossing’ of the two in what he calls the archē. For Agamben, the 
archē does not have a merely chronological meaning as the beginning or start of 
history. Rather, it signifies ‘not a given or a substance, but a field of bipolar historical 
currents stretched between […] an archi-past and the present’.85 He gives an example 
of the archē in the photograph that is taken to signify an original. The archē is 
supposed to make ‘the inquirer’s present intelligible as much as the past of his or her 
object’.86 Through an image, an inquirer sheds light on the present through 
highlighting in this present an unknown aspect that has archaic value. This process, 
which he calls the ‘archaeological’, allows the inquirer to put the image or the thing 
investigated to a new use as each new image becomes an original up for study.87 This 
putting to new use marks the striving for justice. 
Agamben’s notion of justice as a profaning or putting to new use of an archē is 
taken here to mark the cartoon’s activation of the Saying that is not exhausted by a 
Said. While social media are a medium for Saying that deconstructs and de-glorifies 
sovereignty, their presentation in cartoons as such renders them an element of the 
archē. So, when the cartoonists juxtapose the pyramid to the tent in the cartoon above 
or social media to the Eagle of Saladdin in the following cartoon, they do not solely 
represent the deconstruction of sovereignty through a reduction of synchrony to 
diachrony. They could be said to be investigating justice by bringing to light an archē 
that could be put to new use. In the cartoon below, for example, social media, 
Facebook, are represented as being at the heart of what stands for the Egyptian 
historical legacy, the Eagle of Saladin:     
                                                            
85 Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, trans. by Luca 
D’Isanto and Kevin Attell (New York: Zone Books, 2009), p. 110. 
86 Agamben, The Signature of All Things: On Method, p. 32. 
87 Ibid., p. 31. 
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Figure 7. Facebook and the Eagle of Saladin. 88 
 
In this cartoon’s highlight of an archē, Facebook, featuring an Egyptian salute, is 
placed within the heart of the Egyptian flag’s Eagle of Saladin. Saladin is the first 
sultan of Egypt who received the title of king, or malik, and is known for ‘uniting, 
under his own standard, all the Muslim territories of Syria, northern Mesopotamia, 
Palestine, and Egypt’.89 Double reading features, here, in the doubled interpretation of 
glory. The symbol of sovereignty, the Eagle of Saladin, corresponds to the historic 
logocentric reading that is disrupted by the ellipsis of the now initiated by the 
‘economy-glory apparatus’.90 The objective glory of mediated social communication 
that liquefies sovereignty is presented to hold subjective acclamation at its heart. In 
turn, objective glory, Facebook, is at the heart of the symbol of sovereignty, the Eagle 
of Saladin. The mimetic aspect of translation plays with glory through presenting it in 
three forms that are imitative of one another, an iterability that only the cartoon as a 
manifestation of an archē could capture. The cartoon’s crossing of the synchronic 
with the diachronic through mimetic translation presents the attempt to shed light on 
                                                            
88 George Bahjouri, Facebook and the Eagle of Saladin [Cartoon], Al-Ahram 
Newspaper, 14 February 2011, p.10. 
89 Paul E. Walker, ‘Saladin (Ayyubid Sultan)ʼ, in Encyclopædia Britannica, 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/518809/Saladin> [accessed 4 January 
2013]. 
90 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 251. 
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an archē of de-glorifying sovereignty. This, in turn, opens up the question of ethics 
and justice that I will proceed to discuss in the following section. 
3.6 The Struggle for Justice 
 
The double reading of the weeds depicted by the cartoons captures the rupture of 
ellipsis through inoperative language. By disarticulation, inoperativity shows its first 
traces that are marked by language which ceases to operate for informative or 
communicative purposes. Language is, instead, frozen in image form subject to play 
in new use through mimetic translation. Mimetic translation reveals an archē inherent 
in the negativity of acclamation in the mediated liquefaction of sovereignty. Liquefied 
sovereignty, in turn, opens the question of elliptical ethics as a political struggle for 
justice, a struggle that this section devotes itself to explore. 
Mimetic translation as a vehicle of imitation in image and language employs its 
inherent inoperativity to investigate the ethical framework necessary to accomplish 
political justice. Although this chapter adopts an Agamben-inspired view on justice as 
a non-instrumentalization of language, it holds that such cannot be reached except via 
a Derridean-inspired ethical framework. I borrow the argument for an ethical 
framework for political justice from Critchley who claims that ethics is ‘ethical for the 
sake of politics’.91 He explains, ‘ethical obligation to the Other opens into wider 
questions of justice for others and for humanity as a whole’.92 In order for the ethical 
to become a vehicle for the political, Critchley adds, it is necessary for a community 
to have a double structure.93 This community of double structure is defined as ‘a 
                                                            
91 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 223. 
92 Ibid., p. 226. 
93 Gavin Hyman (in Traversing the Middle: Ethics, Politics, Religion (Eugene, 
Oregon: Cascade Books, 2013), pp.114-22) argues that Critchley ‘was mistaken to 
look to Levinas’ to provide Derrida with the ‘ethical and political supplement’ that 
deconstruction needs (p. 122). Both, for Hyman, need the supplement of an 
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commonality among equals which is at the same time based on the inegalitarian 
moment of the ethical relation’.94 A community needs to emphasize a sense of 
commonality that, however, guards difference as inegalitarianism. The commonality 
of the equal, in what he calls ‘ethical love’, requires a ‘doubling of discourse, 
whereby the response to the singularity of the Other’s face is, at the same time, a 
response to the prophetic word, to the word that makes the community a 
commonality’.95 This appeal to ethical love that marks the address to justice is what I 
hold to figure in the double reading that this cartoon presents: 
 
 
 
 Figure 8. The most beautiful valentine 96  
The caption reads: ‘The most beautiful Valentine’, a Valentine marked by the 
computer screen that reads: ‘We love you, Egypt! The youth forum’. The lady in front 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘unequivocal universal’ or a ‘guiding positive universal vision’ within politics (p. 
120). Levinas’s ethical contribution outlines what ‘politics should avoid: 
totalitarianism, violence, fascism’, but it does not provide a ‘substantive vision of that 
which politics should promote’ (p.118). However, Hyman admits that ‘there are 
circumstances in which such political modesty may be appropriate’ as ‘the domain of 
the universal does potentially harbor totalitarian outcomes’ (p. 120). I take the 
Egyptian revolution, in this sense, to be one such circumstance. The Egyptian 
revolutionaries struggle with the deeply-rooted political universal in the guise of the 
nation-state. This universal has justified and led to the totalitarian agenda that the 
former regime carried out. This is why, I argue, ‘political modesty’, Critchley’s 
project, is a possible framework to revisit the revolution. The revolution outlines the 
attempt to expose the universal, the nation-state project that led to a totalitarian 
regime, to the singularity constructed by the protestors. This exposure may not lead to 
a ‘guiding positive universal vision’, but it does start a process of reassessing a 
universal (the nation state) that has long been left unquestioned.  
94 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 227. 
95 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, p. 227. 
96 Imad Hajjaj, The most beautiful valentine [Cartoon], Al Quds Al Arabi, 15 February 
2011, p.19. 
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of the screen is Egypt as she wears a pyramid crown with the name, ‘Egypt’, engraved 
on it. The computer screen, the medium for objective glory, communicates a message 
of love, in what could be read as an appeal to justice, a justice that has discarded of 
the president, through a love message to the queen, Egypt. 97   
However, the cartoon’s play on ethical love draws attention to a struggle that the 
weeds face in their address to justice, signified by the cartoon’s choice of image to 
refer to Egypt. The struggle is depicted through the weeds’ challenge to overcome 
subjective glory. To explain this, I recall my discussion in Chapter One about 
Novalis’s ‘will of the beloved’ and Derrida’s ‘movement of love’.98 Love was 
discussed then within the context of the wedding gown that signifies consensus or 
contract theory. Consensus denoted the movement that complements the will of the 
beloved with the desire of the loving one, the translator, in an aggregate symbolic 
system that makes unity possible while forbidding totality.99 This movement of 
complementation was said to address an untouchable, the promise of justice.100 Justice 
allows the complementary movement of love through consensus that unifies but does 
not totalize. In a similar fashion, I take the scene of glory, presented in the above 
cartoon, to ponder consensus as a case of popular sovereignty. In this scene, 
acclamation joins the people in objective glory through mediatized social 
communication or acclamation that voices love. However, in the objective glory of 
liquefied sovereignty, they choose to address justice through presenting it as a 
                                                            
97 In a discussion of Bataille’s notion of love, Nancy (in The Inoperative Community, 
p.38) holds that ‘[l]ove does not complete community’, but rather ‘exposes the 
unworking and therefore the incessant incompletion of community’. Love, Nancy 
argues, ‘exposes community at its limit’. Love is another form of ‘unworking the 
community’ or rendering it inoperative. 
98 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 122. 
99 Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, p. 122. 
100 Ibid., p. 122. 
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sovereign, a queen variation of a king with a crown.101 The cartoon thus presents the 
challenge that the weeds face in negotiating ethical love and justice. Their nation-state 
model is not over yet, for the message totalizes difference in a single address to a 
beloved in the figure of a sovereign. In other words, ethical love seems still to be in 
the process of making, for the will of the beloved is still confused with the desire of 
the loved one, and the movement of love is still in its crib. The cartoons depict the 
weeds’ struggle to fashion consensus through presenting how semiotics fails to supply 
them with media, language and image, to properly address justice and establish ethical 
love. Mediated justice is reduced to the figure of the sovereign. The revolutionaries’ 
message of love is a song of praise to the queen that has not yet become the hymn of 
pure inoperativity or sayability. 
     However, these cartoons still celebrate their attempt at ethical love and address to 
justice in the struggle.102 For example, the address to justice is represented in the 
following cartoon as the mission of the athletes who are passing the torch on. The 
torch, known to be lighted by the rays of the sun through a mirror held by a priestess, 
is believed to be an indication of peace and brotherhood. By partaking in this race, the 
                                                            
101 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 256. 
102 Ziad El Marsafy (in ‘Action, Imagination, Institution, Natality, Revolution’, 
Journal for Cultural Research, 19 (2015), 130–38) explores the creative aspects of the 
2011 Egyptian Revolution by referring to Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘action’ as 
natality or creation. He argues that ‘by bringing people together, action […] makes 
the world and takes us farther away from the worldless universe of oppression and 
dictatorship' (p.136). The protestors, in this sense, become 'exemplary political actors 
capable of serious feats of imagination and protest, ones that have radically and 
definitively redefined the spaces we inhabit as something other than places devoted to 
violent control, injustice and oppression'. In their protests, 'those revolutionary 
writers, fighters, teachers and protesters; those people [define] the condition of 
natality and of this new citizenship that is (still) being born in Egypt' (p.137). The 
protestors thus conceive a new form of citizenship in their creative action. This new 
citizenship is defined by their address to justice that they carry out through ethical 
love. In this address, it could be argued that the protestors’ chants are instances of 
linguistic natality or a natality to which language is sensitive. 
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citizens of Egypt and Tunisia reinforce brotherhood and peace. They thus embody an 
attempt at the Levinasian sense of commonality as ethical love and difference: 
 
 
 
 Figure 9. The Arab race.103  
By depicting the revolutionaries’ attempt at ethical love through their race, the 
cartoon hints at a finish line to which the race will eventually lead. Their finish line, 
as depicted in the following cartoon, announces justice as a democratic project which 
can be reached. The weeds thus come to stand for Critchley’s ‘citizenship as 
philosophical activity’ where Democracy, the political construction for justice marked 
by the power of the people, is perceived not as an existent political form but as a 
‘project to be attempted’.104 The project of Democracy that the race leads to takes on 
the guise of the sun in the following cartoon: 
 
 
 
 Figure 10. The sun of democracy.105  
 The Sun in the cartoon says ‘Democracy’. The pyramids read ‘Freedom, Justice, 
Equality’. So, the citizens as athletes practice ethical love through the brotherhood of 
                                                            
103 Nasser Al Ja’afari, The Arab race [Cartoon], Alarab Alyawm, 13 February 2011, p. 
16. 
104 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, pp. 238–240. 
105 Mohamad Abu-Afifa, The sun of democracy [Cartoon], Al Ghad, 4 February 2011, 
p.12. 
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the torch. Similarly, they recall Critchley’s sense of philosophy, which is obviously 
very different from al-Farabi’s logocentric sense of philosophy as divine truth, 
through perceiving of democracy as a project or a Derridean ‘to come’ state that can 
eventually be reached.106   
However, the citizens are again depicted as resorting to the same glory symbols, 
the sun and writing, language, which the sovereign employs to establish power. They 
thus lay bare the fact that instrumental logic upon which the king-imam relies to 
establish power persists. Although their race for democracy succeeds in ridding the 
king of his crown, cape, and insignia of power, such as the pyramid, the weeds end up 
employing the same symbols, insignia, they seek to abolish. In the earlier cartoons, 
the queen wears a crown, and the pyramid, though imitated, reads democracy. 
Borrowing Critchley’s terms, the employment of the same symbols of the king means 
that the spirit of philosophical questioning has not broken loose of the fetters of law-
related symbolism. In Agamben’s terms, the weeds still struggle to depict the status of 
Agamben’s ‘law, and politics, deactivated in play’ and thus ‘the gateways to a new 
happiness’.107 For Mills, when law is ‘rendered inoperative’, it becomes what 
Benjamin calls ‘the gate to justice’.108 As the cartoons show, their race still adopts 
king-related symbolism as that of the sun that shines upon Egypt: 
                                                            
106 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, 
and the New International, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 
64. 
107 Agamben, Profanations, p. 76. 
108 Mills, The Philosophy of Agamben, p. 126. 
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Figure 11. A new 
sunset.109 
Figure 12. Good morning, 
Egypt.110 
Figure 13. The victorious 
Sphinx.111 
The first and second cartoon read a ‘New Dawn’ and a shiny ‘Good morning, Egypt’ 
while the third cartoon presents the light and the sign of victory from Egypt’s 
historical symbol, the Sphinx. In these cartoons, the pursuit of justice fails to escape 
the symbolic mode. The cartoons’ double reading becomes an attempt at grappling 
with Agamben’s question whether ‘it is possible to think politics—beyond the 
economy and beyond glory’.112 So far, my discussion has shown that the attempts 
have struggled to do so but have not fully succeeded: these attempts to overthrow the 
dictator in the name of the people are still caught in the same instrumental logic that 
produced dictatorship in the first place. Instrumental logic hampers the attempt of 
mimesis to indicate the trace through imaginative creation; the weeds can only imitate 
immediate political presence through its insignia of power. 
Within the limits of mimetic translation, the weeds continuously face the archē of 
the insignia of power which reduces them to subjective glory. Subjective glory, in 
turn, prevents the weeds from liquefying sovereignty in the form of objective glory. 
They thus highlight the Agamben-related fact that these two forms of glory are 
                                                            
109 Abdallah Mahrouqi, A new sunset [Cartoon], Akhbar Al-Khaleej, 12 February 
2011, p. 28. 
110 Habib Haddad, Good morning, Egypt [Cartoon], Al Hayat, 13 February 2011, 
p.10.  
111 Elie Saliba, The victorious Sphinx [Cartoon], Al Watan Newspaper, 12 February 
2011, p.31.  
112 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 259. 
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actually ‘two faces of the doxa’.113 Consensual public opinion, the doxa, glorifies the 
instrument of objective glory, social media, instead of employing it to liquefy 
sovereignty. As the cartoon below shows, the revolutionaries end up acclaiming the 
means of mediation as a condensation of the mediatic glory of social-communication:  
 
 
 
 Figure 14. Hailing social media. 114  
 
In this cartoon, social media as the means of the liquefaction of popular sovereignty 
become the subject of popular acclaim. The weeds underscore what Derrida claims is 
the very structure of the sign that operates by Rousseau’s ‘disease of imitation’ or the 
‘imitation within imitation’ that is not a disease in the first place.115 The signs of 
sovereignty and glory can only operate by substitution, or mimetic translation, where 
the media stand for the cape and crown. The weeds thus emphasize the logocentric 
appeal of al-Farabi’s category of citizens who assume that ‘what they hold is the very 
same as what the man who really knows the truth asserts to be the truth’.116 Their 
public opinion or doxa is summarized in an acclamation or glorification directed to 
one figure and one sense of truth, that of the one sovereign, whether it takes the form 
of the media or the king’s cape. In this cartoon, the revolutionaries maintain their state 
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as the people-nation despite the role that the people-communication media played; it 
seems that popular sovereignty is not fully liquefied as yet.  
Not only are the weeds still in a state of subjective glory directed to the media as 
the new sovereign, they also seem to be employing this new sovereign to imitate and 
thus displace the old sovereign, the president. Through mimesis, they limit justice to 
imitation, then, the replacement of sovereignty in image form: 
 
 
 
 Figure 15. ‘Departure Day’. 117  
 
Social media in the letter-image, the symbol for Facebook, assume the language status 
of the people whose banners lose linguistic content. Facebook is also the torch of 
brotherhood, unity, and ethical love, discussed earlier. The revolutionaries seem to 
talk in images as they employ the image of Facebook to confront what used to be the 
direction of their acclamation, the king as sword. Although the people-communication 
means hailed by the people-subject against the sovereign is supposed to reach justice, 
the struggle is still presented as a confrontation, a duality of good and evil, on which 
the historical and logocentric sense of authority rests.  
In this confrontation, the sovereign, the ex-president, destroys the remote control 
in the cartoon below as he tries to reverse the effect of what the media faces him with. 
Logocentric thought, symbolized by the king, cannot acknowledge mediation or 
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arche-writing. This is why from the perspective of the king, the media are reduced to 
a window in the following cartoon: 
 
 
 
 Figure 16. No change in the Egyptian scene. 118  
 
The caption reads, ‘No change in the Egyptian scene’. The media, the reign of the 
image, become the window facing the president with imminent reality. The subjective 
glory of the people-nation is perceived by the sovereign as an imminence that the 
window presents. This is why the president reduces the media, employed by the 
weeds to desecrate him, to technology, a remote control in the hand of the sovereign, 
with which he can manipulate the scene of acclamation at any moment. The ex-
president tries to manipulate the image through its language, technology, yet fails.  
His failure is depicted in a scene that captures the comic sovereign instance of 
political transformation that can only be translated in mimetic terms. Within the field 
of Derridean semiotics, the cartoon depicts the scene of reverse acclamation as one 
where the public hold banners that read nothing while the president is reduced to 
silence. It is neither writing nor speech that the cartoon wants to highlight; the cartoon 
underscores the abyss of madness and silence, which I discussed in Chapter One of 
this thesis. This silence, Derrida claims, is not ‘exterior to language;’ it indicates the 
absence that characterizes language and renders translation a language of 
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symptoms.119 Through this silence, semiotics undergoes the effect of ‘inoperativity’ as 
it hands the reign over to the aesthetic. Our focus now turns to the affective as a force 
that imitates semiotics and formulates a politics of potential that the last section of this 
chapter will explore. 
3.7 Justice, Potentiality, and the Archē of the Empty Throne of Power  
 
The weeds’ struggle for justice has met with the failure of semiotics to supply 
them with signs and symbols of justice that are not imitative of sovereignty. The 
failure of semiotics thus limits them to subjective glory within a nation state. Despite 
their resort to the media to liquefy sovereignty in objective glory, they are still 
portrayed, at face value, as subject people glorifying a sovereign. However, as already 
discussed, their glorification is actually a case of reverse acclamation or a ‘de-
glorification’. In their reverse acclamation, they employ mimetic translation as 
aesthetic imaginative creation to expose the archē of sovereignty or power that glory 
covers up. They translate sovereignty by exposing the empty throne of power or 
Agamben’s notion of the ‘void’ that glory conceals. The void marks not only the 
absence of the sovereign but also a state of the limit of language in glorification. In 
this state, language becomes inoperative as an ‘Idea of language’ or language’s end.120 
This is what Agamben labels the state of potentiality. 
The modern weeds translate politics from divine to secular, from cape to gown, by 
taking the desecration of the sovereign’s insignia of power, discussed earlier on, to be 
a mimetic effect of their acclamation. Mimetic translation makes the desecration of 
power resemble an acclamation through inoperativity. In acclamation, the weeds 
render inoperative the voice by rendering desecration a form of praise that celebrates 
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what Agamben calls the void as the ‘sovereign figure of glory’.121 These protestors 
are actually asking for a sovereign, the king, to depart so that the sovereign figure of 
glory, the void, could manifest itself.122 The weeds are not concerned with the 
departure of the regime as much as with acclaiming this void that they judge to be a 
relief from repression. Relief from repression is taken here only in the sense that the 
void or empty throne is the denuding of sovereignty from its masking in glory. In this 
act of denuding, the modern weeds seek to expose the archē in sovereignty that could 
open up the throne, and hence the insignia of power, to new use. The empty space, the 
empty throne, thus activates Agamben’s sense of potentiality of the ‘not to be’.123 The 
empty throne indicates the quality of pure means that could rescue language from 
instrumentalization as a glorifying apparatus for sovereignty. Acclaiming the void or 
the empty throne is what I hold to figure in the following cartoon: 
 
 
 
 Figure 17. The scream of the youth 124  
The weeds’ glorification, which desecrates in praise and praises in desecration, is 
directed towards the void, the empty thrones. The cartoon, captioned with the phrase 
‘the scream of the youth’, marks the revolutionaries’ celebration of their success in 
ousting the president. Their scream is not depicted as speech. Instead, it is presented 
                                                            
121 Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, p. 245. 
122 Ibid., p. 207. 
123 Agamben, ‘Potentalities’, p. 182. 
124 Omayya Joha, The scream of the youth [Cartoon], Alraya Newspaper, 12 February 
2011, p.30. 
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as an empty and angry shout whose force creates the void and overturns the throne 
that would usually hold it secure. The affective aspect of energy in the voice and 
anger is what matters in this depiction. Instead of having acclamation stand for 
Agamben’s sense of the ‘eternal amen’ raised in paradise, the place of happiness and 
justice, it becomes a neutral case of high sound whose energy is in its loudness and its 
mimetic repetitiveness, not in its being a case of glorification. This energy of loudness 
and mimetic repetitiveness imposes upon Benjamin’s sense of pure language or the 
sound, still unfettered by signs, signification and all linguistic function. Pure 
language, in this sense, plays its notes through energy or loudness, not words. 
Inoperativity celebrates the void in a language of sayability, an ability to say or 
not say, which cannot be uttered in semiotic means. It marks a vision of language that 
pits Agamben’s notion in juxtaposition with Derrida’s. Here, ‘the key moment [is] the 
point of articulation and division itself’, says Catherine Mills in commentary upon 
Agamben’s take on language. Whereas Derrida emphasizes the ‘divisions of 
presence/absence, sensible/ intelligible, or signifier/signified’ in the différance of the 
two sides, Agamben focuses on the division itself. For Derrida, the voice is a 
‘phenomenological voice’ that ‘keeps or guards silence’.125 This voice ‘maintains its 
self-presence and presence to meaning by cutting off all relations with the outside, the 
exterior and the worldly—that is, with textuality in general’.126 From a Derridean 
stand-point, the shout is the phenomenological voice that disrupts relation to textuality 
or ‘verbal communication’. ‘Non-verbal communication’ thus marks what Critchley 
calls, ‘ethics’.127 The ethical originates from the phenomenological voice that explores 
itself by absenting the world. By exploring the voice as a writing, Derrida introduces 
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the trace as a différance of the two sides or arche-writing. On the other hand, 
Agamben freezes the division or point of articulation as a ‘tension that preserves 
difference while establishing unity’.128 This point of articulation qualifies the moment 
of inoperative language as that which unifies while establishing difference through 
acclamation and language that is purely sayable. This point of articulation seems to 
divide the phenomenological voice within itself without breaking it. It preserves 
difference while founding unity in the voice. This is what I claim to figure in the 
move from the field of semiotics to that of the affective and aesthetics that the cartoon 
depicts. The affective state of anger preserves difference through the loud and 
repetitive notes of pure language; however, this difference is not pronounced as 
difference but as a unity of political significance in the space of the voice. 
The political significance of the open mouth that utters this shout of semiotic 
silence, this inoperativity, is taken up by Jean-Luc Nancy in his The Inoperative 
Community (1986). For Nancy, the open mouth stands for ‘exposing sharing’ that is 
‘prior to any address in language’. Nancy explains this exposure to be ‘words [which] 
do not ‘come out’ of the throat (not from the ‘mind’ ‘in’ the head): they are [instead] 
formed in the mouth’s articulation. This is why speech—including silence—is not a 
means of communication but communication itself, an exposure’.129 This open mouth 
as communication becomes, for Nancy, ‘the limit at which all politics stop and 
begin’.130 Its political significance lies in the fact that it denotes a community in 
which the voice that is ‘always divided from itself, always different’ announces a law 
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and denotes a ‘logos of the community’.131 Nancy’s open mouth is the precursor for 
the moment of division as inoperativity that Agamben later expands through 
acclamation. In the inoperative language of the open mouth, politics becomes ‘that 
way of opening community to itself’, to its being a voice. Nancy’s notion of politics 
in an inoperative community is further explained by Critchley to be that which 
explores le politique, politics as essence, instead of la politique or the ‘political [that] 
is founded philosophically’.132 The latter is taken to hinder the exploration of the 
former. In this sense, the open mouth is the voice that escapes the chains of 
philosophy in order to articulate ‘le politique’, politics as essence. The voice of 
inoperativity thus marks the initial point from which the exploration of le politique 
can start. 
In the attempt to think le politique that the voice of inoperativity allows, I have 
suggested that the affective, imaginative and aesthetic could be the field to explore. Le 
politique becomes the exploration of politics as a potentiality in the ‘existence of non-
Being’ of a community. This community is constituted of people who are capable of 
their own ‘lack’ and where every individual is ‘in relation to [his or her] 
incapacity’.133 In this community of potentiality, ‘human beings are the animals who 
are capable of their own impotentiality’.134 Agamben hints to this state in what he 
calls the sphere of politics as ‘pure mediality without end’ which is ‘not a state but an 
event of language’.135 The political notion of sovereignty, in this sense, becomes an 
event of language marked by ‘de-glorification’ which exposes the empty throne of 
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power as a medium or means without an end. This capacity of the inoperative voice to 
articulate a politics of potentiality as essence is what I will take on in the following 
chapter through a study of the media that the voice takes in poetry with their affective 
and their imaginative potentials.136 
Conclusion 
So, to sum up, we return to the questions with which we started our exploration: 
What does mimetic translation mean and what does it contribute to an overall 
exploration of politics? And why approach a rather serious venture through the 
comical and satirical? On one level, it is only the comical and satirical that can 
provide us with space to play with the limits of language and explore for possibilities 
of profanation or new use. The translatability across the semiotic fields of image and 
language is carried out in a mimetic form in which the image imitates language and 
language repeats the image. In this mimetic translation, however, repeatability is an 
imaginative representation, concerned with the media introduced to emphasize 
creative difference. 
The cartoons on the Egyptian Revolution engage with the political through the 
insignia of power, glory. Glorification, a fundamental aspect of sovereignty, becomes 
the very element that jeopardizes sovereignty when it takes a reverse form. In reverse 
acclamation, modern weeds preserve the guise of glory, consensus, while profaning 
the sovereign. Profanation becomes the linguistic means that rids all that denotes 
sovereignty from its shield of sacred exclusion and brings it back to common use as a 
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state of being a pure means without ends. The media, the chapter has shown, plays a 
fundamental role in this process through reducing to inoperativity all ends of language 
and law. Perceiving social media’s potential to initiate inoperativity, the modern 
weeds turn to it to displace sovereignty. However, in their act, they lay bare an archē 
of the empty throne of power or the void that glory conceals. Sovereignty is revealed 
to be nothing but a shield, a throne, which harbors and promises nothing but 
emptiness within. The void becomes the promise of justice that could bring back to 
common use all that was surrounded by that shield of sacredness.  
Moreover, as the cartoons have shown us, the state of the void marks the 
revolutionaries’ collective attempt to deconstruct sovereignty through the power of 
the imagination that manipulates representation. Their collectivity that is 
distinguished by its affective and emotional aspect voiced frustration and desire for 
change. This emotional and imaginative aspect, as the following chapter will show, 
holds promises on the political level. On the political plane, the imaginative signifies 
potentiality that hands the reigns of politics over to the aesthetic and imaginative, the 
poetic, to fulfill what semiotics has failed to achieve. The poetic marks the attempt of 
politics to theorize and carry out justice as a process of profanation that highlights the 
quality of pure means of language and law. The political mechanism through which 
justice becomes a concern with profanation shall thus be explored in the following 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE 2011 EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION: POETIC TRANSLATION AND THE 
NEW MORAL ORDER OF JUSTICE 
 
Introduction 
We have seen in the past chapters how translation is the aesthetic process of 
overcoming sovereignty within language that is marked by a paradigmatic shift from a 
cosmic divine to a more secular contract-based model. In this process, justice 
becomes the concern with returning to common use what has been relegated to the 
sphere of sacredness and separation. This sphere of sacredness defines language as a 
tool for a particular end; language is defined in terms of its instrumental purposes, i.e. 
communication or information-giving. However, within the context of the Arab 
Spring, I have shown how language loses its instrumental character as it becomes a 
tool for experimentation. Linguistic experimentation takes the form of the protestors’ 
public acclamation that is employed to overthrow a dictator instead of acclaim a 
sovereign. In what I called ‘reverse acclamation’, the protestor weeds illustrate a 
dynamic process underway in language whereby language suspends its status as a 
means to a specific end and thus becomes de-instrumentalized. Although the apparent 
employment of language can be said to be the political mission of overthrowing 
dictatorship, the previous chapter has shown that this instrumental purpose is nothing 
more than a ridding of the sacred shield with which power wraps itself. Power 
becomes an empty throne, a shield or cape, which marks the opening up of language 
for new creative use, a use that this chapter will proceed to explore further.  
To investigate the essential role of language in establishing and, in turn, 
deconstructing sovereignty within the context of the 2011 Egyptian evolution, this 
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chapter will explore the slogans and chants of the revolution, especially that of ‘al 
sha’ib yureed isqat al nizam’ or ‘the people want to topple the regime’ that marks the 
start of the revolution in Egypt and in other Arab Spring countries. My exploration 
will be guided by the following questions: What role did slogans and poetic chants 
play in the revolution and in overcoming dictatorship? How does the poetic modify 
translation as the negotiation of the divine with the secular, and what is the role of the 
poetic in rewriting the political-theology of translation? What does chanting as a 
ritualistic practice with poetic content reveal about how the Egyptian protestors give 
meaning to the role of revolutions? And finally how could the poetic as a creative tool 
contribute to political deliberation on the revolution? In all these questions, I 
investigate how linguistic play could shed light on a construction of political theology 
that is unique to the translation of sovereignty.   
4.1 Linguistic Experimentation and Re-writing Political Theology 
 
To address the relationship of poetry and political theology, I will start my 
exploration by examining the act of chanting and demonstration as ritualistic 
practices. In ‘The Poetry of Revolt’, Elliott Colla claims that the act of ‘singing and 
shouting with large groups of fellow citizens has created a certain and palpable sense 
of community that had not existed before’.1 Chanting, according to Colla, has played 
an essential role in consensus-making and community building within the revolution. 
Inspired by Charles Taylor’s concept of the ‘social imaginary’ as outlined in his A 
Secular Age, I take chanting to be a ritual or common practice that is made possible 
by a common and shared understanding of what a community is. Taylor explains the 
social imaginary to be ‘the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings’, 
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a way which is ‘often not expressed in theoretical terms’ but rather in ‘images, stories, 
legends, etc’.2 The act of chanting thus becomes a common practice which lays bare 
‘a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ and a common understanding that involves a 
refashioning of social surroundings.3 As a practice that manifests a shared 
understanding, chanting took place alongside demonstration, another ritual that plays 
a major role in modern secularism. According to Taylor, a demonstration indicates a 
ritual that involves the understanding that protestors ‘remain within certain bounds, 
both spatially (don’t invade certain spaces), and in the way it impinges on others (this 
side of a threshold of aggressivity—no violence)’.4 The very act of demonstration is 
an act that is ‘already in our repertory’ as demonstrators ‘know how to assemble, pick 
up banners, and march’.5 Demonstration and chanting are the two forms of practices 
that this chapter will investigate as displaying a common understanding and a shared 
sense of legitimacy that marks the translation into what seems like a modern secular 
sphere. 
Within the context of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the shared sense of 
legitimacy and construction of meaning, I hold, is established by a poetic imaginative 
impulse that characterizes the demonstration and chanting. The protestors defied the 
regime by chanting ‘the people want to topple the regime’, a chant which is inspired 
from a poem written by al-Shabbi (1909-1934) under the title ‘Life’s Will’ (1933). 
The particular verse of concern to this study is the first that reads: ‘If the people want 
life, then fate will answer their call’.6 By constructing their chant from al-Shabbi’s 
poem, the protestors display a collective sense of meaning-making that characterizes 
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their state as a nation. I am informed in making this argument by the framework that 
al-Farabi establishes for a nation’s development of common opinion. For al-Farabi, 
the emergence of poetry is founded upon a nation’s use of the ‘meanings’ paradigms 
and images as means of making them understood or as substitutes for them’.7 In this 
sense, a nation’s common paradigm of meaning-making and metaphorical 
construction manifests itself primarily through their poems. Poems and common 
chanting, then, reflect their world view that defines their identity, their moral beliefs 
and their common interpretation of the world. 
Within the modern context, the role that al-Farabi gives to poetic speech becomes 
relevant only if reread through the lens of the role that Taylor gives to romantic poetry 
in modern secularism. Despite the wide historical gulf between al-Farabi’s medieval 
and Taylor’s contemporary philosophies, they both highlight the formative aspect of 
poetry in the construction of a community’s paradigm of meaning-making. Taylor 
claims that the modern social imaginary is built upon the ‘decline of the old order 
with its established background of meanings [that] made necessary the development 
of new poetic languages in the Romantic period’.8 Romantic poetry thus reflects the 
decline of an old moral order and its background of meanings and the rise of a new 
one. Much similar to the argument made by al-Farabi, Taylor shows how poetry, in 
the romantic form, is directly connected to a background of meanings, what he calls a 
moral order. While poetry within al-Farabi’s philosophy fits into an overall cosmic 
order, its role in the training and formation of the imagination is indicative of its 
function in the construction of a more secular-like moral order. The weeds rely upon 
the imagination to construct a moral order that differs and eclipses the Virtuous City’s 
cosmic construction. Their employment of poetry’s formative role, therefore, would 
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predict Taylor’s formulation of the role that romantic poetry plays in the construction 
of the modern moral order. Taylor’s arguments, in this sense, takes al-Farabi’s 
argument a step further by shedding light on the change in meaning-making and 
moral orders that poetry can reflect. 
In line with the above argument, I will devote the first part of the chapter to 
investigate the moral order that the chant, which is inspired by al-Shabbi’s poem, 
portrays. The first verse that reads ‘If the people want life, then fate will answer their 
call’, I will show, sheds light on an important paradigm of meaning-making that the 
chant ‘The people want to topple the regime’ emphasizes. The paradigm, which I am 
referring to here, is the portrayal of a nation’s formation of the collective will. While 
the verse links the collective will of the people with the desire for life to which fate 
will answer, the chant defines the people’s will as a collective wanting to topple the 
regime. The political desire for toppling the regime thus qualifies the collective sense 
of the will as a desire for life that religious fate will realize. This, I argue, constitutes 
the moral order which the protestors seem to portray in their chant.   
The link that I build between the collective will, fate and political liberation as the 
moral order that the protestors rely on is justified by the historical underpinnings of 
al-Shabbi’s poem. Al-Shabbi wrote the poem in 1933 in an attempt to urge Tunisians 
of the time to resist French colonialism. Resistance to colonial subjugation is the 
impetus behind the poem’s apparent investment in the doctrine of free will against 
what El Alaoui calls the ‘anti-life forces’ of colonialism. These forces, El Alaoui 
claims, are still at work in modern Tunisia.9 Within the Egyptian context, in ‘Islamic 
Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement’, Abdulkader Tayob 
makes the similar claim that the revival of the doctrine of free will has played an 
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essential role in overthrowing colonialism in the Arab World. Tayob quotes Kerr’s 
Islamic Reform and Legal Theories of Muhamad ‘Abdu and Rashid Rida (1966) to 
show how Egyptian thinkers, such as Muhamad Abdu, revived the Mu’atazili belief in 
free will ‘in the hope that it will redress the fatalistic attitude that many Egyptians had 
adopted to their political situation’.10 Tayob’s quote, here, draws attention to the 
essential role that the revival of the Mu’atazili belief in free will played in resisting 
colonial rule and as inspiration for poets, such as al-Shabbi, to motivate people to 
action. This theological and political revival of the debate, I argue, lives on and 
resurfaces in the chants of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. By chanting for the 
collective will, the Egyptian protestors resurrect the age-old belief and present a moral 
order where free will could overcome modern-day political subjugation that invests in 
religious fatalism. 
The reliance on theological discussions of free will to overcome political 
subjugation actually extends farther back than the Mu’atazilite’s eighth to tenth 
century formulation of this creed. Historically speaking, the Mu’atazila is a ninth-
century-school within Islamic theology that is based on rationalism. The school’s 
investment in the doctrine of free will has roots in a seventh century philosophical 
school of free will called Qadariyya. Qadarites, adherents of Qadariyya, adopted the 
assertion that ‘power was worthless as long as one did not prove worthy of it’. To 
defend their argument, they invested in the ‘heresy of free will’ to protest the 
Ummayads’ claim that ‘their governmental power had been a gift of God, a rizq, 
predetermined and irreversible’.11 The qadarite movement was thus as much a 
political movement that sought to overcome the political sovereign power in rule at 
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the time as it was a religious movement that advocated free will to justify its political 
stand. The qadarite-mu’atazili doctrine of free will thus presents a moral order that 
interconnects religion or theology with liberation from political subjugation or 
fatalism, an interconnection that the 2011 protestors seem to resurrect in their chant. 
However, the modern resurrection of this theological and political debate acquires 
unique features that reflect a secular shift within this moral order. Having sampled the 
works of the Romantic School, al-Shabbi reformulates the doctrine of free will in his 
poem romantically: qadar or fate becomes a response to the human will for life. 12 By 
qualifying the will as one concerned with a desire for life to which fate responds, the 
poem modifies the moral order of earlier times. Whereas the qadarite-mu’atazilite 
moral order presents will and fate in a fight to establish hegemony over one other, the 
romantic moral order offers a more complementary portrait of the work of the free 
will and fate. Fate becomes a response that complements the desire for life, the 
romantic notion of free will, in order to overcome political subjugation. In this 
modern moral order, fate no longer signifies political subjugation nor justifies it. This 
new moral order echoes Taylor’s notion of the social imaginary that breaks off with 
the pre-modern ‘cosmic imaginary’ which is built upon a pre-modern hierarchical 
political model of the king ruling a kingdom.13 However, instead of a complete break, 
the Egyptian social imaginary maintains elements from the cosmic scheme, i.e. the 
notion of fate. This is why I argue that the modern moral order marks a secular shift 
within a cosmic imaginary, rather than a complete division from it. Justice becomes 
the medium that allows for this shift. 
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The modern secular shift within the cosmic imaginary is especially made evident 
on the linguistic plane, just as in Taylor’s modern moral order. According to Taylor, 
modern poets made up ‘new languages’ and explored words ‘with their ontological 
meanings as it were in suspense’.14 Similarly, the modern protestors carry out a 
linguistic mission that introduces the secular shift within their cosmic moral order 
through word play. The protestors, I argue, follow the example of al-Farabi, an 
affiliate of the Qadarite movement, who translated his implicit belief in Qadariya 
through a play on the term qadar, as the translator of his Commentary on Aristotle’s 
De Interpretatione, Zimmerman, argues.15 In his Commentary, al-Farabi refers to the 
human will, usually called irada, as qadar. Linguistically speaking, qadar or fate 
could indicate God’s ordinance or human prediction. However, al-Farabi conflates the 
two in his attempt to defend and endorse his political and theological beliefs. Al-
Farabi’s play on word meanings presents a linguistic scheme that the protestors 
reproduce in their romantic exploration of word meanings related to their revolution. 
By exploring and playing on terms, the protestors emphasize a secular-like streak of 
linguistic play, a linguistic qadarism, that breaks the link between words and their 
ontological meanings. 
The modern protestors, mimicking what could be called the al-Farabian model of 
secular-like language play, introduce their reformed moral order through coming up 
with what looks like a new language. The protestors introduce a unique use of terms, 
sometimes translated, to signify the political aspects of the revolution. One such term 
is al dawla al ‘aamiqa or ‘deep state’.16 Another term of interest is al dawla al 
                                                            
14 Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 351–7. 
15 Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, pp. cxvii–iii. 
16 For Issandr El Amrani (in ‘Sightings of the Egyptian Deep State’, Middle East 
Research and Information Project, 2012), the term ‘deep state’ originates from 
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madaniyya or ‘civil state’.17 The modern weeds employ these terms to label political 
phenomena that they found that they were struggling with and facing for the first 
time. In this creative role, the protestors highlight the role of the linguistic medium 
through the political expressions that they translate or borrow yet attempt to put in 
new use. The expressions acquire new and sometimes opposing connotations in the 
naqla or transfer that the weed protestors perform. These protestors thus mimic the 
role of what al-Farabi calls the ‘oral transmitters of poems’ who are a nation’s first 
wise men who are concerned with fashioning a language for a nation by correcting 
utterances and creating ‘uncommon expressions’ for previously unnoticed 
coincidences. They are also said to ‘contrive names’ for that nation.18 By creating a 
new language from borrowed expressions in naqla or transfer, the protestors initiate a 
quasi-act of nation-building through reforming the moral order of that nation. The 
protestors’ translation, in this sense, becomes a paradigmatic secular shift within a 
divine moral order that takes place through the de-instrumentalization of language. 
The de-instrumentalization of language results from the creative mimetic translation, 
which I argued for in Chapter Two. In their naqla, the weeds-oral transmitters of 
poems display the imaginative creativity of mimetic translation through articulating 
ambiguity within language. Instead of using language to denote or create a reality, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Turkey and is employed in Egypt to refer to the security agencies and state 
bureaucracy whose influence the revolution disrupted but the army later reasserted.   
17 Fawaz A. Gerges (in ‘The Islamist Moment: From Islamic State to Civil Islam?’, 
Political Science Quarterly, 128 (2013), 389–426) claims that the term ‘civil state’ 
has been employed by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s to show that they no 
longer favor the theocratic Islamic state model. Avoiding the use of the expression 
‘secular state’ that is associated with irreligiosity, they resorted to the term as an 
escape mechanism. However, Arab Islamists, Gerges argues, have not formulated a 
political theory that would explain what they mean by a civil state, hence, the 
ambiguity of the term that has been invested in by the many secular and religious 
parties and that this chapter explores.    
18 Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf,§130. 
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protestors show how language itself is a field of a secular play within the divine 
whose anchor is in the field of the social imaginary.  
4.2 The Poetic Medium and the Chants of the Revolution  
The chanting of poetically inspired slogans was one feature of the Egyptian social 
imaginary that distinguished the 2011 revolution. As in earlier versions of Egyptian 
uprisings, the 2011 revolution demonstrated how poetic chants have always been the 
‘“soul” of the revolutionary moment’.19 According to Elliott Colla in ‘The Poetry of 
Revolt’, chanting has the ‘power to express messages that could not be articulated in 
other forms, as well as to sharpen demands with ever keener edges’.20 Within the 
context of the Egyptian revolution, chanting thus became an act of demand and 
struggle that was not ‘reducible to a text’.21 
Historically speaking, poetry has always played a major role in almost all 
Egyptian uprisings: 
Many of these revolutions have had their own poets. 1881 spawned the neo-
classical qasidas of Mahmoud Sami la-Baroudi; 1991, the colloquial zajals of 
Bayram al-Tunsi. Salah Jahin became one of the leading colloquial poets of the 
1952 revolution, and his patriotic verse became core material for ‘Abd al-Halim 
Hafiz, who pinned his career to Nasser. From the same period, Fu’ad Haddad’s 
mawwals also stand-out—and are still sung today. Since the 1970s, it has been 
Ahmad Fu’ad Nagm who has played the leading role as lyricist of militant 
opposition to the regimes of Egypt. For forty years, Nagm’s colloquial poems—
many set to music by Sheikh Imam- have electrified student, labor, and dissident 
                                                            
19 Lewis Sanders IV and Mark Visonà, ‘The Soul of Tahrir: Poetics of a Revolution’, 
in Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir, ed. by Samia Mehrez 
(Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), p. 213. 
20 Colla, ‘The Poetry of Revolt’, pp. 49–50. 
21 Ibid., p. 49. 
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movements form the Egyptian underclass. Nagm’s poetry ranges from praise 
(madh) for the courage of ordinary Egyptians to invective (hija’) directed at 
Egypt’s overlords- and it is no accident that you could hear his songs being sung 
by the leftist activists who spearheaded the first day of revolt on January 25. 
Besides these poets, we could mention many others—Naguib Surur, ‘Abd al-
Rahman al-Abnoudi, Tamim Barghouti—who have added to this literary-political 
tradition in their own ways.22  
Since 1881, chanting has taken on different poetic forms, whether praise or invective, 
to express the revolutionaries’ political dissidence and create change. Political 
opposition has since taken the guise of chanting that was closely intertwined with the 
literary tradition of poetic construction. 
Among the many poetic chants of the revolution, this chapter is interested in that 
of al sha’b yurid isqat al nizam or ‘The people want to topple the regime’. The slogan 
cites the opening line of Abu Qassim al-Shabbi’s 1933 poem, ‘The Will to Live’:      
If, one day, the people want to live, then fate will answer their call 
And their night will then begin to fade, and their chains break and fall. 
For he who is not embraced by life’s passion will dissipate into thin air, 
Woe to him whom life loves not, against the void that strikes there, 
At least that is what all creation has told me, and what its hidden spirits declare. 23 
Another translation of this stanza reads: 
When people choose 
to live by life’s will 
                                                            
22 Colla, ‘The Poetry of  Revolt’, p. 49. 
23 Colla, ‘The People Want’. 
Page 181 
 
Fate can do nothing but give in; 
     the night discards its veil; 
all shackles are undone 
Whoever never felt 
life celebrating him 
must vanish like the mist; 
whoever never felt 
sweeping through him 
the glow of life 
succumbs to nothingness.24  
The first verse that reads: ‘When people choose to live by life’s will’ or ‘If, one day, 
the people want to live’, is the source from which people borrowed and replicated the 
call: ‘The people want to topple the regime’.25 In chanting, the protestors translate the 
poem’s will for life as a political desire for the toppling of the regime, thus 
establishing the close link between the political and literary traditions. 
The slogan was not the only political translation of the poem’s first verse. The 
poem was resurrected in the work of an equally distinguished Egyptian poet, Ahmed 
Abdel Muti Hijazi. Hijazi employed the verse to write a new ode to the Egyptian 
Revolution. In ‘The Soul of Tahrir: Poetics of a Revolution’, Lewis Sanders IV and 
Mark Visonà translate Hijazi’s poem as follows: 
                                                            
24 Abu Al-Qasim Al-Shabbi, ‘Life’s Will’, in Modern Arabic Poetry : An Anthology, 
ed. by Salma Khadra Jayussi, trans. by Sargon Boulat and Christopher Middleton 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 97. 
25 Colla (in ‘The Poetry of Revolt’, p.50) lists many reasons for the widespread 
employment of the slogan inspired by the poem. Among these is the slogan’s clarity 
compared to the subtlety of the more ironic slogans. Another reason is the slogan’s 
regular metrical and stress rhythms as well as the fact that its cadence is borrowed 
from pre-existing slogans whose rhythm is a ‘familiar part of the soundtrack of 
Arabic-language activist public culture’. 
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If the people will to live today 
Then they must be free from fear 
And carry in the palm of their hands 
Their soul  
And follow it deeply into danger 
In order to earn their fate! 
If the people will to live today 
Then the slaves must rise 
In fury 
Endure the bite of hunger 
But not endure the bite of the shackles. 26  
In this poem, Hijazi is said to clearly ‘develop the themes of Al-Shabbi’s first 
stanza— freedom and chains’ as an ‘official call to arms, motivating Al-sha’b [the 
people] to action’. 27 Hijazi writes his ode to motivate action by emphasizing the 
political aspects of al-Shabbi’s poem: freedom from the chains of servitude and 
subjugation. The political theme of freedom in Hijazi’s and al-Shabbi’s poems thus 
proves to be the impetus for action on the side of the people, an action that first started 
with chanting for the fall of the regime.28 
                                                            
26 Sanders IV and Visonà, p. 230. 
27 Ibid., pp. 230–1. 
28 Sanders IV and Visonà (in ‘The Soul of Tahrir’, pp.213-248) offer and discuss the 
translations of the revolution’s poems and songs in order to show how themes, such as 
identity, are in a continuous state of change as the revolution progresses. They claim 
that intertextuality and the structural complexity of the texts continuously challenged 
their attempts to translate these poems. Describing these challenges as instances of 
‘resistance to translation’, they define translation as an act of ‘creative design rather 
than the orthodox practice of an invisible translator’. Translation, for them, indicates a 
creative process and an interpretation of the structure of the original text whereby a 
translator negotiates challenges only to be transformed himself/herself in the 
experience of liberating an original text (p. 242).The creative aspect of translation is 
an issue that I will further explore later on in this chapter. However, I should mention 
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In a move very similar to Hijazi’s, yet with a more satirical tone, the hip-hop 
artist, DJ 3mr 7a7a or ‘Amr Haha writes a song titled ‘The People Want Five Pounds’ 
Phone Credit’ in an obvious attempt to mock the poetic slogan ‘even as he champions 
it’.29 Haha’s song supports the poetically-inspired slogan only to reveal the ‘tiredness 
of the slogan’ which has become a ‘discursive scaffolding for hanging every new 
demand’.30 The song thus becomes another translation, a social one, which reflects the 
close links between the political and literary within the social imaginary of the 
Egyptian revolutionaries.31   
By adopting and rewriting the verse from al-Shabbi’s poem, Haha’s song and 
Hijazi’s poem illustrate a distinctive feature of the 2011 Egyptian revolutionaries’ 
social imaginary: their collective interpretation and reformulation of their social 
surroundings in political-literary terms. The protestors assert their collective will and 
desire for decent life and political change through the poetic medium. As an element 
of the social imaginary, poetry becomes the impetus behind not only voicing political 
demands but also revolutionary demonstrations and action on the political field. How 
poetry motivates political action is thus the question I devote the following section to 
explore. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
here that my notion of translation differs from Sanders IV and Visonà’s as I posit 
translation to indicate a political and theological negotiation that takes on a linguistic 
aspect, and not a linguistic experience that transforms a translator in the original text’s 
mode of survival.  
29 Colla, ‘The People Want’. 
30 Ibid. 
31Elliott Colla (in ‘The Poetry of Revolt’, pp.47-52) comments on the genre of the 
poetry that distinguished the revolution as one that ‘has real potential for humor and 
play, reminding us of the fact that revolution is also a time for celebration and 
laughter’ (p.49). By rendering revolt a time of celebration, poetry draws attention to 
its own potential to rewrite a revolution. In this sense, Colla argues that the ‘poetry of 
the streets’ is a form of ‘redrafting the scripts of history in the here and now’ (p.52). 
Poetry thus redrafts historical scripts through the different forms it takes, satirical or 
otherwise. 
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4.3 Poetry: Between the Social and the Cosmic Imaginary 
 
The practice of common chanting that spread all across Egypt and other Arab 
Spring countries shows that there was what Taylor calls a ‘shared sense of legitimacy’ 
given to this act and the poetically inspired slogan, in particular.32 I argue in this 
section that this sense of legitimacy is derived from a common background of 
meaning making that is displayed in this poem. I build this argument on the role that 
al-Farabi gives to poetry in the reflection of a nation’s common ‘meanings’ 
paradigms’.33 The common paradigm of meaning-making is taken here to be reflected 
through the images that constitute the people’s ‘social imaginary’, defined by Taylor 
as the way to collectively imagine a social life.34 It is by exploring the poetic that this 
section hopes to shed light on this social imaginary of the protestors. 
Poetry, according to al-Farabi, involves creating imaginative impressions that tie 
in with moral conditioning. All poetry, for al-Farabi, aims at the improvement of the 
rational faculty and the ‘accidents of the soul’ in order to approve the good and scorn 
the evil things.35 It breaks down the excessiveness of the accidents of the soul related 
to weakness, such as pity and grief, and those related to strength, such as anger and 
pride, and brings them back to moderation. The poetic imagination thus acquires a 
moral dimension that ties in with moderation and reinforces the values of good or 
evil. In poetry, the creation of imaginative impressions influences rational 
development and the performance of action consequent to this development. Besides 
rational development, the correction of the accidents of the soul that lead to good 
                                                            
32 Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 171–2. 
33Alfarabi, Kitab al-Huruf, §129. 
34 Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 156. 
35 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 36. 
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action can only be achieved through an imaginative impression that involves 
response, approving the good and holding in scorn what is evil. Action is thus 
determined by the imaginative, which is integral to the rational and constitutive of the 
moral sphere. In this sense, it could be argued, following the suggestion of Taylor, 
that the imaginative plays a significant role in constructing a moral order. Within this 
moral realm, poetry aims to train and improve the soul so that it becomes a moderate 
one whose accidents are applied in good deeds.  
However, in The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna, Salim Kemal draws attention 
to another function of poetry that is more reflective of a poet’s apprehension of the 
world and the process of meaning-making. Kemal argues that for al-Farabi, poetry is 
‘self-reflective because it shows us how we operate generally, and poets succeed not 
just when they promote good through the content of poetry but when the exercise of 
their poetic art addresses and examines the very mechanisms by which we apprehend 
objects and events at all’.36 The moral order that poetry constructs through its content 
induces self-reflection on the mechanisms of apprehension and making sense of the 
objects of perception. The poetic reflects the way in which people process meaning or 
moral values and make sense of the world around them.  
Within the context of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the slogan inspired by al 
Shabbi’s poem could thus be read to reflect the revolutionaries’ apprehension of life’s 
events. The particular representation of life that reflects their apprehension is in the 
first verse of the poem that reads: ‘If, one day, the people want to live, then fate will 
answer their call’. The slogan replicates the emphasis of the poem on the people’s will 
or want to resist tyranny and attain freedom. According to Khadija El Alaoui in 
                                                            
36 Salim Kemal, The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), p. 
128. 
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‘Chanting Tahreer and Compassion: People as Poetry’, the fact that the slogan repeats 
the anti-colonial poem serves to show that a similar motif is still underplay:     
The Tunisian people’s chant of their quintessential, anti-colonial poem, composed 
for their grandparents to resist ‘the nights’ and ‘chains’ of (French) colonialism, 
suggests that the fight against anti-life forces is not over yet. The culture of 
colonialism structured through the logic of few masters and masses of slaves has 
never vanished but mutated into a new form: vassal states, or what sociologist 
Fatima Mernissi calls ‘initiative deprived states’, serving an imperial order now 
led by the United States. Al-Shabbi’s poem centered on people and their will-to-
life blessed by all creation—except perhaps those who cannot relieve themselves 
from the burden-to-subjugate—beautifully and powerfully captures what 
Tunisians were about to achieve: the ousting of a local dictator, who had the 
support of France and the United States, and the inspiration of a whole region to 
pour into the streets to end oppression. It is important to note that, like Darwish’s 
poetico-political quest during the siege of Beirut, Al-Shabbi does not claim to be 
the one who knows and therefore teaches what oppressed people should do to end 
the ‘nights’ and break the ‘chains’. He simply uses the materiality of language to 
express and bear witness to what ‘all creation’ has told him. It is in this sense that 
the poet names the open secret: after all the hidden spirits do not hide, but declare 
their desires and aspirations, which the poet defiantly captures and disseminates in 
poetic form.37 
The motif of resistance to anti-life forces, colonialism, persists in a metamorphosed 
form of resistance to modern-day dictatorships which the poem advocates through the 
romantic reference to nature. The chanters replicate this poem because it reflects their 
                                                            
37 El Alaoui, ‘Chanting Tahreer and Compassionʼ, pp. 13–4. 
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apprehension of life and their construction of a unique moral order. This order, a 
secret that nature communicates, defines the resistance to power as a collective will 
for life that fate will reward.  
By preserving the role of fate as an answer to the people’s will that nature 
announces, the poem reflects a moral order that renegotiates the social imaginary in 
terms of what Taylor would call, the cosmic imaginary. For Taylor, the cosmic 
imaginary defines the place of nature in our moral sensibility.38 However, instead of 
taking nature to reflect a chain of being instituted by fate and enacted on the social 
platform, the protestors seem to introduce a rewriting of that order whereby resistance 
to power on the social and political plane negotiates that relation.39 How this new 
moral order negotiates the relation between the cosmic and social is what I will turn to 
next. 
 
 
                                                            
38 Taylor, A Secular Age, p. 323. 
39 Mariz Tadros (in ‘Introduction: The Pulse of Arab Revolt’, IDS Bulletin, 43 (2012), 
1–15) argues that the events, chanting and peaceful demonstrations, which took place 
in Tahrir Square, created ‘a space and time-bound moral economy’ that was not 
reflected in the ‘power configurations’ after the revolution (p.10). Tadros draws 
attention to the transitory nature of the moral economy within a state of revolution. 
This moral economy is described as being space bound, for peaceful demonstration 
was a characteristic of the revolution, only in Tahrir Square but not in the whole of 
Egypt. It was time bound as the agreement between Islamic and secular parties to 
raise only patriotic slogans was dispensed with after the ousting of Mubarak. After the 
revolution, tolerance was abandoned in favor of reinforcing hierarchies. Although 
Tadros highlights the fact that the moral economy was transitory, he claims that 
‘keeping the memory of the moral economy of Tahrir Square alive is important for 
youth activists’ to resist any claims of ownership of the revolution that other political 
forces may make (p.11). Tadros’s insistence that the memory of the moral economy 
be kept alive to reinforce a sense of agency is my impetus to investigate whether a 
time and space bound moral economy could not be indicative of a more subtle 
understanding of what constitutes a moral sphere, an understanding that could 
reinforce the choice that a transitory moral economy be cherished in the form of 
memory. 
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4.4 The New Moral Order : Rewriting Qadariya 
 
The moral order constructed by the protestors in their poetically-inspired chants 
preserves elements of the cosmic, fate, in the form of a response to a political will for 
life. Through depicting fate as a response to the people’s political will, the poem 
resurrects an age-old doctrine of free will that has historically been resorted to in 
order to resist rulers who justified their rulership as fate-ordained.40 By reviving this 
debate through the poem, the protestors present an imaginary that puts the cosmic in 
negotiation with the social.  
Historically speaking, the revival of the doctrine of free will is claimed by 
Abdulkader Tayob in Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth 
Movement to have played a significant role in overcoming colonial rule throughout 
the Arab World. Tayob mentions how the Egyptian revolt against British colonial rule 
invested in the revival of the ninth-century Mu’atazili belief in free will by such 
thinkers as Muhamad Abdo. 41 The Mu’atazila is a school of Islamic theology that is 
said to have created the ‘first orthodoxy in the Muslim world that extended beyond 
one locality’.42 Its adherents adopted what was known as the heresy of free will, a 
belief affiliated with the earlier philosophical school of Qadariya that argued that 
                                                            
40 Ziad Elmarsafy (in Sufism in the Contemporary Arabic Novel (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2012), 1-22) argues that literature provides a space for the 
'interrogation of the sacred' where the 'transcendent calls forth patterns of questioning 
and interrogation that are recognizably literary'. Literature, for Elmarsafy, 'constantly 
involves questioning limits: between the human and divine, the self and the Other, the 
self and the world, and so on', that are best expressed by the two 'idioms that are 
deeply concerned with limits, namely mysticism and deconstruction' (p.9). By 
literature, Elmarsafy means Arabic novels; however, the same could be argued to hold 
for Al-Shabbi's poem. The poem interrogates the sacred in a romantic fashion that 
evokes the mu'atizilite creed of free will. By responding to this poem in their chants, 
the protestors thus highlight the romantically theological interrogation of the sacred 
that the poem allows. Their chants, in this sense, are extensions and responses to that 
interrogation. 
41 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, p. 23. 
42  Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, p. 6. 
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‘power was worthless as long as one did not prove worthy of it’.43 The Qadariya 
adopted the doctrine to challenge the school of Jabariya or pre-determinism endorsed 
by the political authorities of the time. While the former group advocated the notion 
that free will or irada qualified fate or qadar, the latter held that qadar determined 
choice, irada. The latter position was advocated by the political authority, the 
Ummayad Caliphate, as a justification for their legitimacy to hold rule that was pre-
determined by God. The whole debate was thus a political manipulation of religious 
doctrines whereby the Qadarites resisted the Jabarites’ imposition of sacredness upon 
political authority. In this sense, the qadarite heresy of free will would be the earliest 
manifestation of a recurring motif that would later resurface in different historical 
periods to justify both rebellion and resistance to imposed political rule. 
The particular revival of this debate in which this chapter is interested is that of 
the Egyptian revolution chant. The notion of qadar is rewritten in this chant from a 
deterministic justification for political authority into that of a response to the 
collective free will. Al-Shabbi’s first verse is stated in the conditional form: ‘If, one 
day, the people want to live, then fate will answer their call’ or ‘fate can do nothing 
but give in’. The word that al-Shabbi uses in his poem for fate is qadar, also 
signifying power or predestination, and for choice is arada, a derivation from irada. 
When the protestors chant that they want, yureed, to topple the regime, they thus 
affirm their irada or choice for life, free will, which fate will answer to by helping 
them in breaking the chains of dictatorship. In this revival of the qadarite belief, the 
protestors allow for the political, the toppling of the regime, to mediate the 
relationship between the free will and fate.  
                                                            
43 Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology, pp. 6–135. 
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By rendering fate a response to the collective will, the protestors re-negotiate the 
significance associated with the sacred shield of qadar in political terms. Instead of 
qadar denoting a determinism of necessity that political authority imposes, it assumes 
the guise of a response to the free will as a choice of possibility. They present the will 
as a form of an al-Farabian choice concerned with future possibility. Believed to be 
sympathetic to the qadarite belief in free will, al-Farabi defines choice in terms of 
future possibility.44 In his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, al-Farabi 
redefines the Aristotelian sense of possibility as one dependent on choice, a claim that 
some deny under the effect of ‘legislation and indoctrination’.45 Choice takes two 
forms: choice as a rational development of the will that can only be for the possible, 
and pure will which can be appetitive or imaginary and can desire the ‘possible or 
impossible’, such as the desire ‘not to die’.46 Possibility is thus the criterion for 
distinguishing between the imaginative and the rational will. However, this possibility 
is denied when political indoctrination comes into play. The indoctrination of political 
authority advocates necessity as a form of fate that is antinomic to the possibilities of 
choice. Within the context of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, echoes of this early 
qadarite realization show up in the chant whereby the cosmic notion of fate is no 
longer a deterministic rule of law; instead, it is a divine response that acts in parallel 
and as a response to the people’s rational free choice of political liberation.  
As the people’s chant aligns the rational will with the divine through political 
resistance to dictatorships, it presents a construction of a new moral order that 
integrates elements from the cosmic into the social imaginary of the people. The 
                                                            
44 Alfarabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione, p. p.cxvii–iii. 
45 Ibid., pp. 76–7. 
46 Abu Nasr Alfarabi, ‘A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions’, in Collection of 
Various Treatises, ed. by Muhammad Ismail, Arabic ed. (Cairo, Egypt, 1907), pp. 
p.107–8 ( n.31). 
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protestors develop the awareness that the general free will must be guided by the 
principle of justice marked by political resistance to repression in order for divine fate 
to answer them. In this sense Michael Wahid Hanna writes in ‘Egypt and the Struggle 
for Accountability and Justice’ that there is a ‘newly mobilized political 
consciousness among certain sectors of society no longer amenable to the logic of 
blunt repression’ which has ‘led to fresh calls for justice’ ever since the start of the 
revolution.47 Although Hanna is speaking about transitional justice here and is 
disappointed with its development since the revolution, he draws attention to the fact 
that justice has become the aim for the collective free will. The collective will asks for 
justice in the hope that fate will answer its call. Despite current failures, Hanna 
claims, these calls for justice entertain the ‘possibility for future correction’.48 The 
calls keep alive the possibility that justice will be achieved and fate will answer their 
appeal.  
In their new moral order guided by justice, the protestors render the divine order 
as an addressee that is appealed to in a Derridean form of conjuration. By responding 
to the verse in the conditional voice (if....then), the protestors perceive the poem to 
articulate a wish or promise. The poem has the condition ‘if the people want life’, as a 
prerequisite to a result, which is that ‘Fate will answer their calls’. Implied herewith is 
the assumption that the condition is a prayer or call, a call that the actual chant echoes 
and affirms. In this sense, the chanters could be said to voice what Derrida calls in his 
Specters of Marx (1994), a wish or conjuration. Derrida defines conjuration as ‘the 
appeal that causes to come forth with the voice and thus it makes come, by definition, 
                                                            
47 Michael Wahid Hanna, ‘Egypt and the Struggle for Accountability and Justice’, in 
Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, ed. by Kirsten Fisher and Robert Stewart 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 185. 
48 Hanna, ʻEgypt and the Struggleʼ, p. 185. 
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what is not there at the present moment of the appeal’. 49 The concern, here, is not 
descriptive for the ‘voice does not describe, what it says certifies nothing; its words 
cause something to happen’.50 The chant thus calls forth a future possibility of justice 
whereby fate will work in accordance with the people’s collective will to topple the 
regime. Their prayer activates the poetic sense of the Derridean ‘condition of 
possibility of the event [which] is also its condition of impossibility’.51 Their chant is a 
prayer in the guise of an assertion that opens up the field of possibilities in the 
interaction between choice and fate through justice. 
The prayer for toppling the regime is communicated as a rational choice addressed 
to fate and mediated by justice. Within the context of the poem, justice becomes the 
medium of translation that negotiates the relationship between the secular, rational 
collective will and the divine notion of fate. Recall that in Chapter Two, justice was 
argued to be a practice of reinterpretation and resemblance-making that the weed 
protestors carry out. Their chant for the fall of the regime becomes their interpretation 
of the life that they want. They thus take the notion of life in the first part of the verse 
as an invitation to open interpretation of what the possibilities of choice are. By 
selecting the fall of the regime, they voice an interpretation that ponders questions of 
life, want, and law as preliminary to an answer from fate in proportion to the 
interpretation they offer. The poem is not phrased as ‘If you want fate to answer your 
call, then you must choose life’. Instead, it had the divine answer, qadar, as 
consequent to wanting or choosing. The revolutionaries thus involuntarily draw 
attention to the underlying understanding that divine answer can only be consequent 
                                                            
49 Derrida, Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the 
New International, p. 41. 
50 Ibid., p. 41. 
51 Ibid., p. 65. 
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to the right interpretative address. So, if fate answers their call, then, they must have 
addressed it with the right interpretation within the moral realm of justice. 
By voicing their prayer in a poetic medium, the protestors imbue their 
interpretative justice as a medium between the secular and divine with the poetic 
moral concern with the moderation of excesses. As a medium of interpretative 
regulation, justice moderates the qadarite anarchy of absolute and secularly formed 
free will and the jabarite dictatorship of an absolute sovereign’s will. What justice 
thus seeks to rectify is the excess or state of absoluteness on both sides. The protestors 
chant for a state of qadarite choice in moderation that aligns the rational with the 
divine and defeats political and deterministic jabariyya. In this process, justice 
indicates the moral realm of moderation that mitigates polarization and mediates 
binary oppositions. In this realm of justice, Egyptian political actors, for example, 
found that ‘drafting a permanent constitution’ as a ‘consensus document’ should 
avoid the risk of the ‘polarization of politics along an Islamist–secular divide’.52 Their 
sense of agency is concerned with justice as moderation to avoid the absoluteness of 
both the secular and the Islamic.53 Their modern reformulation of the medieval 
                                                            
52 Laurel E. Miller and others, Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and 
Lessons from Around the Globe (RAND Corporation, 2012), p. 100 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1192rc> [accessed 28 November 2014]. 
53 Sarah Hawas (in ‘Global Translations and Translating the Global: Discursive 
Regimes of Revolt’, in Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir, ed. 
by Samia Mehrez (Cairo, Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 
pp.277-305) claims that the secular is a site of ‘mis- and distranslation’ within the 
Egyptian Revolution (p.290). The categories of ‘Secularism’ and ‘Islamism’, 
according to Hawas, are ‘contingent on very specific narratives’ that create certain 
political imaginaries (p.289). For Hawas, the ‘debates around the secular—or civil—
character of a state as opposed to a religious—specifically Islamic—state are 
mistranslations of a much more complex reality’. This complex reality invests in the 
inimical categories of the secular and Islamic to reflect the antagonism around ‘the 
structural integrity and meaning of a democratic and sovereign state in the twenty-first 
century’. She argues that secularism, ‘in its multiple negotiations, is variously a 
fundamental tool of orientations toward a specific construct of the ‘global’ and 
therefore a highly potent mechanism of depoliticization and ultimately subjugation’ 
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Qadariyya and Jabariyya opposition employs interpretation as a medium guided by a 
wishful attempt at moderation. 
As justice becomes an interpretative address to fate, it introduces a new moral 
order that integrates elements of the cosmic, fate, into the social imaginary of the 
protestors. The revolutionaries now chant and demonstrate with the background 
assumption that the missing link between the free collective will and fate is 
interpretation that regulates the excesses of both sides. The manner of figuring out the 
right interpretation that would align and moderately regulate the secular and the 
divine will thus be my next topic of discussion.     
4.5 The New Moral Order of Justice 
 
So far, we have seen how justice introduces a new moral order for the protestors 
through attempting to align the divine with the secular. In this new moral order, the 
divine promise of qadar is maintained as an answer that is negotiated in secular terms 
of agents rationally choosing means to achieve interpretative and moderating justice. 
Within the political realm, justice assumes the guise of a poetic chant for the fall of 
the regime. However, the chant discussed so far is not the only one indicative of what 
justice as interpretation means for these protestors. Their new moral order of justice 
acquires political significance that this section will further explore. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(p. 290). Hawas’s argument is pertinent here as it draws attention to how the 
categories of the secular and Islamic are being used to depoliticize and redefine the 
notion of a nation’s sovereignty by inserting it into the wider construct of the global. 
Although my argument does not touch on the aspect of globalism, I agree with Hawas 
that the secular and Islamic are created constructs. However, I strive to show that 
protestors, in their chants, negotiate the deterministic aspect associated with these 
constructs (and reinforced by the global script) in order to align them not as 
oppositions but as hues on a continuous spectrum.      
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Another chant that played a significant role in the revolution is one that outlined 
the demands of the protestors for ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice’. In this chant, 
justice acquires a social, economic form: 
 Social justice [is] one of the major frames of the Revolution and it continues to 
motivate protest and collective action, particularly since economic conditions have 
worsened. Revolutionaries, civil society groups, and new political parties 
articulate an agenda around social justice as they demand bread (or more 
abstractly, an adequate standard of living), the equitable and efficient delivery and 
provision of public services and stronger labor rights.54  
Equal social rights is one important demand of the revolution that continues to fuel 
different uprisings. Besides praying for freedom from repression, chanting for equal 
social rights becomes another form of the revolutionaries’ address to fate. Their 
chanted prayer, here, takes the guise of the rational demand for equal rights or social 
justice that has historically been one deciding factor within politics.   
Taken at face value, the protestors’ demand seems to re-enact a cosmic imaginary, 
not very different from that al-Farabi presents in his model of the Virtuous City. In 
The Islamic Conception of Justice, Majid Khadduri claims that al-Farabi’s ‘rational 
justice is ultimately connected with the destiny of man’.55 Justice is founded upon the 
premise that ‘eternal happiness in the hereafter […] where Divine Justice prevails’ is 
the natural consequence to rational employment of noble choice in line with rational 
                                                            
54 Kareem Ibrahim and Diane Singerman, ‘Urban Egypt: On the Road from 
Revolution to the State? Governance, the Built Environment, and Social Justice’, 
Égypte/Monde Arabe, 2014 <http://ema.revues.org/3281> [accessed 29 November 
2014]. 
55 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984), p. 87. 
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justice.56 Within the Virtuous City, rational justice consists of ‘dividing’ goods and 
‘preserving what has been divided’.57 For al-Farabi, the good things that form justice 
include the rights to security, wealth, honor, and dignity. Each individual is entitled to 
a ‘share according to his deserts’ and any ‘decrease or increase is an injustice (jawr)’ 
where ‘the difference must be returned to the party to whom it should belong’.58 
Within the cosmic model of the Virtuous City, justice is a politically procedural role 
of allocating rights and property according to deserts and preventing injustices or the 
abuse of these rights. Rational justice is a political mission where rightness and 
wrongness are defined in terms of the just distribution of rights. Recall that man’s 
power to choose was defined in terms of a rational decision to do what is ‘noble or 
base, and because of it there is reward and punishment’.59 The rational element of 
choice is thus aligned with divine reward or punishment through justice. If a man’s 
power to choose is employed in the service of rational justice, then it will be rewarded 
with a state of happiness that is not only earthly but also eternal. Justice is the political 
medium that negotiates this alignment of the rational to the divine. 
In social terms, chanting for social justice and equal rights voices a promise of 
happiness that could be actualized in a Virtuous City-like structure that is predictive 
of heavenly bliss. Qadar or fate, in this sense, becomes the divine promise of 
happiness in the hereafter if man applies his choice in the political realm in 
accordance with rational justice. By chanting for happiness, the protestors voice a 
messianic hope for an earthly model of justice, the Virtuous City, which is predictive 
of the heavenly one. The latent sense of messianic hope is what both Muhsin Mahdi 
and Leo Strauss claim to feature in al-Farabi’s construction of the Virtuous City. In 
                                                            
56 Khadduri, The Islamic Conception, p. 87. 
57 Alfarabi, The Political Writings, p. 42 (#64). 
58 Khadduri, The Islamic Conception, p. 87. 
59 Alfarabi, The Political Regime, p. 34. 
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Al-Farabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, Muhsin Mahdi claims 
that there is a messianic hope in al-Farabi’s work whereby the Virtuous City becomes 
a wish that the people seek.60 Toppling the regime, in this sense, would be the 
condition for the creative construction of this city’s paradigm of happiness and 
justice. Similarly, Leo Strauss claims that al-Farabi calls the Virtuous City ‘another 
city’, for he seeks to ‘replace the other world or the other life by the other city’ that 
‘stands midway between this world and the other world, since it is an earthly city 
indeed, yet a city existing not “in deed” but “in speech”’.61 The Virtuous City is a 
wished-for state of rational justice for which the revolutionaries chant. This wished 
for state does not necessarily aim for the Virtuous City in itself. As argued in Chapter 
Two, the weeds find their preferred models in other city structures. However, their 
constant striving to achieve that desired city model is still portrayed by al-Farabi as 
guided by a promise of happiness. In this state of promise, the weeds are citizens who 
neither belong nor are excluded from their city. They can only voice their wish and 
constantly contest power. Speech, here, is taken to indicate a Straussian reformulation 
of the Derridean voice that conjures, the prayer. Chanting is a form of speech 
harboring a wish, an arche-writing, where signs are means for mediation and 
différance of this wished-for state.  
Within the context of the Egyptian Revolution, the protestors offer their chant as 
an interpretative medium to voice their wish to create their version of justice. The 
chanters redefine their sense of agency in what sounds like Taylor’s notion of the 
‘collective power and efficacy’ that ushered in secularism in the West. For Taylor, 
this collective efficacy is based on justice, equality, liberty and even solidarity. It has 
                                                            
60 Mahdi Muhsin, Al-Farabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 168. 
61 Leo Strauss, Persecution and The Art of Writing (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 
1952), p. 15. 
Page 198 
 
created modern new spaces which assumed a moral power defined by ‘the people [as] 
sovereign’, instead of subject.62 Although Taylor is speaking here about Western 
secularism, his claims, I argue, echo in the protestors’ chant. For Sander IV and 
Visonà, the revival of al-Shabbi’s words ‘gave agency to the people (al-sha’b), and 
articulated their power as ‘the will of the people’ (iradat al-sha’b)’.63 The protestors 
could be said to re-appropriate sovereignty from the field of cosmic hierarchies run by 
a sovereign king into the sphere of the collective. They seek to topple the regime run 
by a king-like figure who is supposed to ensure rational justice in order to take it upon 
themselves to secure the rights that this sovereign should have provided. An example 
of this gained sense of collective sovereignty is when the protestors and local 
communities formed Ligan Cha’biyya (or neighborhood committees) to guard the 
security of neighborhoods around the country after the security forces failed to do so. 
They enacted a refined sense of agency that seeks to re-appropriate the shield of 
sovereignty based on dictatorial allocation of rights and returns it to the field of the 
collective.  
However, the protestors’ refined sense of agency was continuously defined by 
chants that voiced demands. Hanna, whose work on transitional justice I mentioned 
earlier, argues that Egyptians issued new calls for justice in their newly mobilized 
political consciousness as they found it increasingly and repeatedly difficult to 
achieve that justice. In these calls, the protestors presented a refined moral order 
characterized by a collective attempt to attain the promised justice of the sovereign 
people. However, one important feature of this promise is that it must remain a 
promise, forever to be achieved, forever acting as an impetus for action. In this sense, 
Taylor claims that the acquired agency of the modern sovereign people remains a 
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promise that can be measured in the ‘bitterness of the disappointment when it fails to 
materialize’.64 He gives an example of this promise in the new space of ‘submission 
to God’ or ‘purified Islam’ that the Egyptian controversial scholar and Islamic 
theorist, Syed Qutb, calls for in his Milestones.65 The promise of achieving a purified 
and refined version of the current state defined by a sovereign people is the impetus 
for any revolution. For Taylor, it is the promise’s failure to materialize that actually 
fuels revolutions and defines agency. Taylor’s reading of the development of secular 
agency, I argue, however, is not a totally fitting description for the moral order the 
Egyptian revolutionaries construct. The protestors’ messianic hope entertains the 
possibility of materializing if addressed with the right interpretative act of justice. It 
highlights the role that interpretative justice plays in negotiating the secular and 
divine. The protestors’ sense of agency, then, is not built so much on maintaining a 
dream as on interpreting that dream. They seem to be on the lookout for the right key, 
the right interpretation, which can unlock the opposition set between the secular and 
divine. 
To unlock that opposition, the chanters employ the poetic chants to voice their 
interpretations. By seeking to overturn a ruler, they render their chants instances of 
reverse acclamation, discussed in the previous chapter. In their reverse acclamations, 
the protestors seek to rid the dictator of the sacred shield of jabariyya or determinism. 
The regime takes determinism as a kingly cape that justifies its right for ruler-ship and 
governance. However, when the protestors chant to rid him of that cape, they employ 
a poetic medium with imaginative attributes. Their interpretations create a wedding 
gown that unites the secular with elements from the divine. Divine fate escapes the 
hegemony or cape of jabarite determinism and creates a contract with the qadarite 
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possibilities of choice though the chants. The poetic medium of contractual 
interpretation, however, entertains the question as to the role that language plays in 
this process. This is what I will turn to next. 
4.6 From Inoperativity to Linguistic Qadarism 
 
So far, I have argued that the chants are tools for addressing fate through 
interpretation. Poetic interpretation guided by justice is the attempt to align the secular 
with the divine by ridding each of the cape of sovereign determinism. In their new 
moral order, the protestors introduce signs of what Taylor calls creation. For Taylor, a 
modern moral order is distinguished by a ‘subtraction theory’ whereby elements of 
the cosmic are subtracted from the moral sphere, only to be replaced by an 
‘unprecedented creation’.66 Taylor gives an example of this dynamic through the 
creative development of the ‘new poetic languages’ that marked the Romantic era. 
The creation of a new language, for Taylor, was a necessary development that 
followed a decline in the ‘old order with its established background of meanings’.67 
Decline necessitated that a new language be developed to construct a new paradigm 
for meaning-making, a paradigm that I take to be not very different from which al-
Farabi claims that poetry constructs. This is how I propose that the Egyptian 
Revolution chants could be read. Through their chant, the protestors attempt to 
subtract the jabarite background of meanings by toppling a regime that reinforced a 
cosmic hierarchical order. Politically speaking, the poetic promise that fate will 
answer the people’s qadarite choice is a reading of subtraction that necessitates that 
the people topple the regime in order for the collective will to creatively align with 
divine answer. On the linguistic plane, the dynamic of subtraction and creation takes 
on a unique creative form through the poetic medium in which it enacts itself.  
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As creative agents, the protestors carry out a linguistic mission, first discussed by 
al-Farabi, which is very similar to that performed by Taylor’s creative romantics who 
adopted poetry to experiment with language. The protestors introduce their creative 
linguistic function through repetitive replication of the chant; they formulate their 
commonality upon an act of replication or oral transmission. The oral transmission of 
poems is claimed by al-Farabi to be the mission of the ‘first wise men’ of a nation 
who govern this nation through ‘correct[ing] the language in that nation’.68 These 
wise men come into being after the development of a nation’s language in both 
rhetorical and poetic forms, the artistic forms that ‘are meant for everyone’. 69 The 
poetic is thus a formative component of a linguistic commonality that precedes the 
function of oral transmission. The task to orally transmit the poems that constitute this 
linguistic commonality, for al-Farabi, falls upon the first wise men and first governors 
within a nation. Wisdom characterizes the governing role of these oral transmitters 
who are described as those ‘who govern [the nation], and those to whom recourse is 
had concerning the language of that nation’.70 So, the earliest form of governance of 
‘the multitudes’, or the common people within a nation, is a linguistic one.71 The 
linguistic, in this sense, marks the first shield or cape of sovereignty that the later 
political form will preserve. This is why the first political ruler of a nation, the wise 
imam, is described as carrying out a linguistic function to establish his rule. He 
employs rhetoric and relies upon similitudes, as discussed in Chapter Two, to 
persuade the multitude of his governing authority. He establishes his governing role 
through a shield of linguistic sovereignty. So, when the protestor- sprouts employ 
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poetic chanting, these wise oral transmitters seem to construct a shield of linguistic 
commonality which is as sovereign as that employed by the regime.  
As a nation’s first wise men, the protestors’ linguistic governance is established 
by their fashioning ‘uncommon utterances’ and ‘contriv[ing] names’ for ‘certain 
coincidences’.72 Their linguistic role could be described as one of linguistic creation 
which, when considered within the context of the Egyptian revolution, ushers in what 
Taylor would qualify as a new moral order. By regressing to the early stages of the 
creation of a nation, the protestors challenge an established current moral order by 
attempting to create one with no blueprints except that of poetry. Their linguistic 
creative model constructs a newly established moral order through the qadarite poetic 
chant that they replicate. Just as the jabarite/qadarite debate was translated into the 
modern political field as a justification for overturning the dictatorial regime, this 
debate resurfaces in the modern linguistic plane through linguistic play that 
characterizes this debate. The qadarite/jabarite debate thus becomes a linguistic 
function as much as it is a political one. It is a linguistic mission that characterizes the 
role of the protestors as first creative governors of linguistic play or linguistic 
qadarism.    
The link between the qadarite/jabarite debate and linguistic play is one that I hold 
to find its first traces in the work of al-Farabi. Although he was not a Muslim scholar 
himself, al-Farabi is believed to adopt the qadarite heresy of free will and to reflect it 
in his work. In his Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, 
al-Farabi employs the term qadar to refer to man’s choice, instead of divine 
ordinance, to evoke the connotation that ordinance does not solely take a deterministic 
form. In his translation of al-Farabi’s work, F.W. Zimmerman notes that: 
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Man’s qadar, i.e. his power to choose between alternative courses of action, was 
among the first topics of Islamic dialectics. Anti-predestinarians were therefore 
called qadarites.[…] One of the words [al-Farabi] uses for ‘decide’ is qaddara, 
which, if said of God, means ‘ordain, predestine’, and ‘guess, predict’ if said of 
men.[…]. His argument implies that qaddara in the sense of ‘ordain’ can with 
perfect propriety be said of men: within a limited sphere, man has power over 
events. In the terms of Muslim heresiology this makes him a qadarite. His use of 
qaddara in this passage should certainly be understood as an allusion to this 
label, and possibly as a veiled declaration of solidarity but mildly qualifies his 
general refusal to make common cause with Islamic scholarship. Primarily, 
therefore, his pun would seem designed to annoy the predestinarian majority 
among Islamic scholars.73 
The play on the sense of qadar that al-Farabi carries out highlights the linguistic 
phenomenon of play that characterizes this debate. The language of qadar as 
deterministic fate constitutes a shield to justify political authority. By borrowing the 
term, qadar, from the religious moral field of Jabariyya and displacing it into the 
moral field of Qadariyya or free will, al-Farabi shows how language could be a tool to 
liquidate political hegemony upon terms of religious significance. By displacing the 
term from one field to the other, he draws attention to linguistic play as one practice 
that sheds light on the dynamics of paradigm shifts in meaning making that 
characterize the qadarite/jabarite debate. 
Within the modern Egyptian context, the linguistic role in paradigm-shifting 
shows up in the protestors’ attempt to fashion and experiment with names to denote 
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unprecedented phenomena that distinguished the revolution. The protestors are 
reported to have employed such borrowed names as baltagiya for ‘thugs’, al dawla al 
amiqa or ‘deep state’, and dawla madaniyya or ‘civil state’ to name but a few of these 
phenomena.74 In this process of naqla, the protestors suspend the established 
meanings of these words. They thus enact a subtraction of the cosmic, established 
hegemony of the original meanings of words and a creation of a quasi-new language. 
By re-fashioning these names, the modern oral transmitters echo the role that Taylor 
ascribes to the modern romantic poets who explored words ‘with their ontological 
meanings as it were in suspense’.75 Just as the romantic poets, for Taylor, took art to 
denote not mimesis but creation, the modern protestors handle words with a creative 
artistic streak. They demonstrate a qadarite understanding that established political 
meanings are a jabarite form of determinism of meaning that should be overcome in 
order for words to acquire new denotations. The words’ acquisition of new 
denotations marks a shift in paradigms of meaning making that predict the possible 
construction of a new moral order.  
The qadarite subtractive overcoming and suspension of politically jabarite 
meanings allowed such terms as ‘deep state’, dawla ‘amiqa, and ‘civil state’, dawla 
madaniyya to be put to new use. The former of these terms acquired a new meaning 
during the revolution while the latter lost the dimension of meaning altogether. In 
commenting on the new use of these two terms, Hassan Nafiah claims that the 
expression ‘the deep state’ was a successful linguistic move whereas that of the ‘civil 
state’ was a cause of apprehension on his part:  
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ون موسمية، ويبين أستاذ العلوم السياسية بجامعة القاهرة، الدكتور حسن نافعة، أن هذه المصطلحات تك
لتها تتغير دال ، فهي تظهر ثم تختفي، أو تتوارى قليال لتظهر في ثوب جديد، وقد«الموضة»بما يشبه 
رة من وقت آلخر حسب الوقت والظروف السياسية السائدة عند إطالقها. موضحا أنه منذ قيام الثو
، المصرية ظهرت مصطلحات عدة كانت لها دالالت معينة، بعضها كان موفقا وبعضها غير موفق
 وبعضها أدى إلى عدم فهم وسوء استخدام وبلبلة فكرية
« موفقا»في مصر كان « الدولة العميقة»ة الستخدام مصطلح ويرى دكتور نافعة أن الداللة األساسي
األساسية من  في الوقت الذي كان كثيرون يبحثون عن مصطلح دقيق يصف الحالة المصرية، فالفكرة
األحزاب إطالقه وصفت أماكن التأثير الرئيسية داخل المجتمع، التي هي خارج تأثير قوى الثورة و
عاما، وبالتالي كان استخدامه موفقا  06ام السابق الذي امتد على مدار الجديدة، حيث يسيطر عليها النظ
نقول بدرجة كبيرة، على الرغم من أنه مصطلح غير مصري وليس كاتب مصري من ابتكره ولكنه م
 عن الثقافة الفرنسية
مصطلح  وعلى العكس يرى أستاذ العلوم السياسية أن من أكثر المصطلحات سوءا في االستخدام كان
ت مختلفة، ، الذي شاع كثيرا منذ قيام الثورة، حيث انتشر توظيفه بدالالت وسياقا«لدولة المدنيةا»
لح في أو الدولة أو األمنية أو العسكرية، رغم أن المصط« الدولة الدينية»فهناك من يوظفه في مواجهة 
 األساس غير موجود في األدبيات السياسية الغربية76
Dr. Hassan Nafia, professor of Political Science at Cairo University, explains that 
these terms/expressions are seasonal, or ‘fashionable’; they appear and then 
disappear, or hide for a while only to appear in new attire. Their significance 
changes occasionally according to the time and prevailing political conditions. He 
pointed out that since the start of the Egyptian revolution, several terms with 
certain denotations have emerged, some of which were successful and some 
unfortunate; some of which led to misunderstanding, misuse and confusion […] 
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Dr. Nafia holds that the basic significance of the term ‘deep state’ in Egypt was 
‘successful’ at a time when many people were looking for an accurate or precise 
term to describe the Egyptian condition. The basic reason behind its widespread 
employment was that it described the focal points of influence within the 
community, which transcended the influence of the forces of the revolution and 
the new parties that had been manipulated and controlled by the former regime for 
over 60 years. Its use was thus largely successful, although it is not an Egyptian 
term and is not invented by an Egyptian writer and has, instead, been borrowed 
from French cultural writings.  
On the contrary, the professor of Political Science believes that one of the badly-
used words is that of the ‘civil state’, which was popularly used since the 
revolution. It was employed with different denotations and in different contexts. 
There are some who employed it to challenge the notion of the ‘religious state’ or 
state security or the military, even though the term is basically non-existent in 
Western political literature. 
Employing new terms and contriving new uses for established names was an 
unprecedented linguistic trend that distinguished the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. 
Protestors contrived what seems like a new language through translating the 
significance of such terms as the ‘deep state’ as well as suspending the established 
meanings of terms, such as baltagiya or ‘thugs’. By playing on terms, they enacted 
the mission of oral transmitters and wise governors who fashion a language, a 
political language in this case, for the multitudes. Their creative mission, furthermore, 
acquires the character of linguistic play as evident in the case of the term ‘civil state’. 
The suspension of the meaning of words led to the experimental employment of the 
term to denote different and opposing things. Through word experimentation, the 
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protestors could be said to have ushered in a new political ontology or state of chaos, 
a state that would explain the feeling of apprehension on the part of Dr. Nafia.  
Linguistic play, however, has not always been met with disapproval. A contrasting 
and more optimistic view that focuses on the creativeness of linguistic play is the 
2013 Qamoos al Thawra or the Dictionary of the Revolution. The dictionary 
documents the meanings of terms that the revolution has generated. As a whole, the 
project describes its mission as ‘a free space for everyone to talk’ as it allows for the 
recording of words in aa’miyyah or colloquial Arabic.77 This is to differentiate it from 
fusha or standard Arabic. In an interview with Patrick Kingsley of The Guardian, 
project manager, Amira Hanafi, claims that the dictionary records the changes since 
the 2011 Revolution and is a ‘snapshot of a country undergoing immense flux’. Terms 
document the change in the people’s perception of the events within the revolution. 
More specifically, the documented terms reflect how ‘the factions have competed to 
impose their narratives on highly contested events’.78 Words acquire meanings 
through narratives imposed by political factions thus demonstrating how sovereignty 
is negotiated through fights to establish a jabarite sense of political determinism to 
certain word connotations. Political parties invested in the suspension of word 
meanings in their attempt to allow for political determinism to establish hegemony 
over the people’s creative linguistic play. 
The linguistic negotiation of sovereignty extended past word-play to involve 
language registers. The Dictionary of the Revolution records the meanings of terms in 
colloquial Arabic thus giving credibility to the language of the people. However, 
                                                            
77 Daily News Egypt, ‘New Website Seeks to Define the Vocabulary of the Egyptian 
Revolution’. 
78 Patrick Kingsley, ‘Egypt: After the Revolution Comes the Battle for Language’, 
The Guardian, 18 July 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/egypt-
battle-for-language-dictionary-revolution-amira-hanafi> [accessed 1 December 2014]. 
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colloquialism was not the only unique feature of the street. The slogan ‘al shai’b 
yureed isqat al nizam’ or ‘the people want to topple the regime’ is described as 
‘straddl[ing] colloquial Egyptian and standard media Arabic’.79 By employing 
classical or standard Arabic to voice their demands, the chanters rid the regime of 
another cape of determinism that it employs to justify its sovereignty, the classical use 
of language.80 They redefine sovereignty in terms of its first traces in linguistic 
governance by oral transmitters who roam the streets chanting to topple the regime. 
This play on registers, in turn, imbues other chants with an infusion of classical 
Arabic and informal colloquial expressions. An example of this is ‘eish, hyrriya, 
3adala igtima3iyya’ or ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice’. The first of the three terms is 
the colloquial Egyptian term for bread, ‘eish. However, it is also a case of the standard 
Arabic meaning for the word ‘life’ or ‘survival’. As an expression to indicate bread or 
life, ‘eish stands for the process through which the people negotiate the sovereign 
shield linguistically, not only in terms but also in registers. 
This linguistic play, in the example of the last chant, is accompanied by calls for 
freedom, a notion that is being redefined through a documented term in the Dictionary 
                                                            
79 Colla, ‘The Poetry of Revolt’, p. 50. 
80 Niloofar Haeri (in Sacred Language, Ordinary People: Dilemmas of Culture and 
Politics in Egypt, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)) claims that Classical 
Arabic is the ‘official state language’ in addition to its being ‘the language of 
religion’(p.2). However, Haeri argues that the complexity of the language situation in 
Egypt cannot be ‘reduced to one of “modernists” versus “traditionalists” or 
“Islamists” versus “secularists”’ (p.20).  Fusha cannot be said to play a traditionalist 
or islamist role, just as the vernacular register cannot be claimed to reflect secularism 
or modernism. This is why some modernist Egyptian poets, Haeri shows, have 
employed fusha or Classical Arabic in prose writing. Fusha is perceived by these 
poets as a ‘language that provides space for modern and alternative ways of thinking 
and being’ even if others still held that it is a ‘language that is used by those in power 
for the purposes of political domination’(p.140). The conflicting understanding of the 
role that register, specifically fusha, plays in unsettling the traditionalists vs. 
modernism and the Islamist vs. secularist debate is what I hold the protestors invest in 
to voice their demands and rework the opposition. 
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of the Revolution. The change in word meanings implies a change in the world view 
of the agents giving the meaning as they struggle for language to create a 
linguistically-material world reflective of their changing perspectives. Instead of 
employing language as an instrumental tool to establish ruler-ship, the protestors 
invest in what I take to indicate a qadarite revision of the inoperativity of language. 
Terms constitute a field of building blocks that can be employed to construct a new 
world. The qadarite spirit in redefining terms and re-appropriating registers, a 
linguistic form of qadarism, could thus be said to be the oral transmitters’ discovery 
of the power of words in negotiating an established political ontology. The play on 
words takes place in a double move: the first is a deconstructive move in which words 
become signs whose differed meaning could be invested in to unsettle an established 
system. The second that is my interest here is the creative investment in an unsettled 
system to construct linguistic equations that could unlock a new world. Linguistic 
terms are keys that unlock and blocks that build a world past the politics of 
sovereignty.    
Conclusion 
So, what has our discussion on poetic chanting revealed about the Egyptian 
protestors’ understanding of the role of language in overcoming dictatorships? The 
answer —which I hope has become clear by now— is that the poetic indicates the 
imaginary openness in the closure of ritualistic practice that has allowed for the 
people to imagine and call for a just life through a revolution. By enacting the role of 
oral transmitters of poems, the protestors detach acclamation from sovereignty and re-
direct it to the commonly formed will. However, that qadarite understanding of the 
will is not an assertion of the general will that takes on the guise of commonly held 
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opinion, which marks the Western form of public sovereignty for Agamben. Instead, 
it is a linguistic will that seeks to play on the authority of signification and the 
denotative meanings of words. It involves the creation of a political word-view 
through a revisionist use of words that invests in the inoperativity of language. Terms 
and names are perceived as keys that could unlock a reality and define a whole new 
political ontology. 
As the creative aspect of the revolution, name-giving redefines translation as the 
shift from a divine to a more secular model. Translation is concerned with justice that 
negotiates that shift. To align the divine and the secular, justice moderates and 
regulates the excess status, the determinism, of a jabarite divine that is appropriated 
politically. Justice challenges the political divine that justifies dictatorial power as a 
determined or jabarite political fate. As a medium of regulation, justice also 
moderates the excess of qadarite secularism that seeks to place the political will 
within the sphere of public sovereignty formed in solely rational terms. Instead of 
secular rationalism, the imaginative now evokes a sense of commonality that invests 
in the linguistic to construct a new moral order. Within the context of the Egyptian 
Revolution, linguistic creation marks this new moral order of justice within the 
translation of the divine and secular. So, even if the revolution today does not seem to 
have succeeded on the political level, its linguistic creation could, at least, be said to 
have succeeded in destabilizing frames of reference.  
By destabilizing frames of reference, translational justice, or ‘adl, not only 
moderates excesses through political liberation but also indicates the state of constant 
change inherent in this process. One of the variations of the term ‘adl in the Arabic 
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language is ‘adala which means ‘to change or deviate from an established decision’.81 
Through deviating from the established meanings of terms and names, the Egyptian 
protestors thus practice justice in their attempt to reach political justice within 
translation. One important constituent of the creative process that they initiate is 
change or transformation, experimentation until a commonly formed word could be 
contrived, a word that could unlock a whole new world.  
Within translation, the slogans and political terms are no longer concerned with 
making truth statements about the world. In fact, concern with truth would indicate 
fatalism or a jabariyya within language that limits the possibilities of that linguistic 
tool, the word or slogan. The words acquire what correlates with Derrida’s sense of 
‘performative force’ or the sense of promise within language. To explain this promise, 
Derrida refers to Austin’s sense of the performative force (i.e. a promise, demand, 
request, etc.) that ‘produces or transforms a situation, it effects’.82 Austin 
distinguishes the performative transformational utterance from the ‘classical assertion, 
the constative utterance’ that has its referent ‘outside of itself’.83 Whereas 
performative utterances produce and transform the state of the world, constative 
utterances present what would qualify as a fatalistic view of language, where 
language and word meanings are determined by the referent in the outside world. 
However, Derrida deconstructs the constative/performative dichotomy by claiming 
that all constatives are actually performatives that entail a messianic promise. In every 
constative, there is a silent promise with a messianic motif; it brings about or makes a 
state of affair arrive. In the case of the Egyptian Revolution, each term seems to attach 
                                                            
81 Academy of the Arabic Language, eds., Al-Mu’jam al-Waseet, 4th ed (Cairo, 
Egypt: Maktabat Al Shuruq Al Dawliyya, 2004), s.v. ‘adl. 
82 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, in Limited Inc, trans. by Samuel Weber 
and Mehlman Jeffrey (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 13. 
83 Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’, p. 13. 
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a qadarite sense of the will to this Derridean promise of a future state of affairs. The 
people direct their will towards this state of the unknown; they have chosen to adopt, 
embrace and bring forth the promise inherent in language. In a sense, the 
revolutionaries could be said to offer a reverse witness statement; they have witnessed 
an image of a promised state of affair and are struggling to fit their witness statement 
within a linguistic mold.    
However, this reverse promise that unravels a new unknown world is also one that 
linguistically necessitates that some terms may phase out in order to be replaced with 
others. One particular chant that I have discussed before, the slogan ‘Bread, Freedom, 
Social Justice’, bears witness to this process. The slogan has now become a chant for 
‘Bread, Social Justice’ where the term ‘freedom’ has fallen out of use. Although this 
phasing out is attributed to the ‘preoccupation with [economic] issues [that] distracts 
attention from the expansion of political rights’, it shows how a linguistic 
phenomenon could mark a shift in common political or economic priorities.84 In this 
sense, the phasing out of the term huriyya or freedom marks a necessary and natural 
linguistic development that is part of any act of creative justice. By phasing out, terms 
lose apparent instrumental use but not force; their force redirects itself inwards to join 
other terms that have phased out in order to constitute the origin from which later 
revolutions spark out. Revolutions, I hold, originate from the hidden force of phased 
out linguistic resources that cannot but erupt into chaos when the build-up becomes a 
little too much.  
                                                            
84 Miller and others, Democratization in the Arab World, p. 105. 
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CONCLUSION   
THE POST- REVOLUTION TRANSLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY  
 
This thesis has sought to show the role that a deconstruction of translation can 
play in redefining sovereignty within the context of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. 
Creative justice, I argued, motivates a translation of sovereignty that takes place 
within a linguistic and imaginative medium. In this medium, Agamben’s inoperativity 
and Derrida’s performative promise work within an overall framework of linguistic 
qadarism that renders political theology, the concern with the divine and secular, a 
mission of the poetic. Four years after the start of the revolution, and almost four 
years after beginning this thesis, I now conclude by revisiting this initial research 
question and these subsequent findings that I outlined. The question and answers, I 
find, need to be subjected to the harsh scrutiny of the recent and current post-
revolution proceedings. In their scrutiny, these proceedings challenge my argument by 
posing the following question: where are we today, four years after the revolution, in 
terms of the creative translation of sovereignty that this thesis outlines? Does this 
creative translation of sovereignty persist today post-revolution, and if so, in what 
form?   
Four years after the revolution, the media headlines continue to display 
ambivalence in their assessment of the revolution and its repercussions. While a CNN 
headline announces ‘Mubarak is Cleared: Egypt's Revolution is Dead’,612 The 
Washington Post headlines a response to CNN’s article by the following: ‘The 
                                                            
612Ian Lee, ‘Mubarak Is Cleared: Egypt’s Revolution Is Dead’, CNN 
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/29/world/africa/egypt-mubarak-analysis/index.html> 
[accessed 26 March 2015]. 
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Egyptian Revolution Isn’t Dead Because It Never Happened in the First Place’.613 The 
state of confusion is attributed by Eric Trager, the author of The Washington Post’s 
aforementioned article, to the current military regime’s continued repression of citizen 
dissent. This repression started with the military’s control of the state media 
to discourage further revolutionary activity after Mubarak was ousted.614 The 
persistence of repression within and by state institutions has recently further translated 
itself in the clearing of Mubarak, the epitome of repression that the 2011 revolution 
aimed to curb. As hope for progress seems to fade, Cambanis, a journalist in The 
Atlantic, headlines his article by asking: ‘Is Egypt on the Verge of Another Uprising?’ 
He describes how upon the eve of the fourth anniversary of the January 25th uprisings, 
‘things are anything but quiet, despite the best efforts of Sisi’s state’.615 A very similar 
position is taken by Vltcheck who describes in ‘The Arab Spring is Dead: Egypt’s 
Failed Revolution’ (2013) this unsettled aspect of the Egyptian scene post-revolution 
as follows: 
There is no logic in all this. The military wants to retain its hold on power. The 
Brotherhood wants to come back and rule. It is not about social justice, or 
education, or alleviation of poverty. It is not about jobs or even about in which 
                                                            
613 Eric Trager, ‘The Egyptian Revolution Isn’t Dead Because It Never Happened in 
the First Place’, The Washington Post, 4 December 2014 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/04/the-egyptian-
revolution-isnt-dead-because-it-never-happened-in-the-first-place/> [accessed 26 
March 2015]. 
614 Trager, ‘The Egyptian Revolution Isn’t Dead’. 
615 Thanassis Cambanis, ‘Is Egypt on the Verge of Another Uprising?’, The Atlantic, 
2015<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/the-egyptian-
revolution-four-years-later/384593/> [accessed 26 March 2015]. 
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direction Egypt will go, politically or ideologically. It is not really even about 
Egypt, anymore!616  
By mourning ‘that beautiful dream and that compassionate Revolution, that Arab 
Spring [that] are all dead!’, Vltcheck best depicts the pessimistic media outlook on the 
Egyptian political scene after the revolution. 
The general mood of ambivalence that characterizes the international media’s 
assessment of the revolution is nothing but a reflection of the confusion of local 
Egyptian analysts in evaluating this revolution. Analysts seem to be divided in their 
characterization of the revolution as being a case either of complete failure or of a 
promising resistance to power. The former position is taken by Samuel Tadros in 
‘Egypt’s Failed Revolution’ (2014). Tadros argues that the protestors have failed to 
think of sovereignty beyond the struggle of black and white or ‘between good and 
evil, between a corrupt regime and forces for change’. The protestors have sought to 
overturn a regime and enact the forces of change without getting ‘involved in the 
details of the society’. Involvement includes the ‘traditional method which requires 
[one] to visit villages, campaign, mobilize the vote, and make compromises with 
[one’s] opponents’.617 For Tadors, the protestors have not mastered the principles of 
secular sovereignty that would involve compromise and public engagement with all 
sectors of society.  
In a similar sense, Abeer Radwan, in ‘How the Egyptian Revolution Emphasized 
the Sovereignty of the People’ (2011), relates the challenges that the revolution poses 
to the question of sovereignty. She argues that there has been ‘excessive confidence in 
                                                            
616 Vltchek, ‘The Arab Spring Is Dead: Egypt’s Failed Revolution’ <http://rt.com/op-
edge/egypt-revolution-failed-arab-spring-849/> [accessed 3 March 2015]. 
617Michael J. Totten, ‘Egypt’s Failed Revolution’, Dispatches [online blog], 
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/egypts-failed-revolution> 
[accessed 25 February 2015]. 
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the people’s role [that] has inclined the Egyptian people to believe in only their own 
sovereignty’.618 That rudimentary form of sovereignty has met its first obstacle in 
formulating consensus on the procedures to select representatives for the people. This 
obstacle, Radwan holds, could only be overcome through national dialogue. 
Despite the general mood of pessimism that characterizes these assessments of the 
revolution, other studies have chosen to underscore the innovative attempts in the 
protestors’ resistance to imposed authority. The protestors, these other studies show, 
have displayed creativity through the artistic and literary media that they have 
employed in their resistance. For example, in ‘Stripping the Boss: The Powerful Role 
of Humor in the Egyptian Revolution 2011’, Mohamad M. Helmy and Sabine 
Frerichs argue that the protestors have resorted to humor and ridiculing power in their 
‘renewed belief in self-efficacy’. The protestors have enacted a ‘festival of resistance, 
with people dancing, chanting and laughing in a marvelous spirit of community and 
political determination’.619 In this festival of resistance, their innovative sense of self-
efficacy has successfully challenged the regime’s imposed sense of authority that 
builds itself on dynamics of fear.  
In a similar focus on the role that popular artistic expression plays in rethinking 
sovereignty, Luca Mavelli, in ‘Postsecular Resistance, the Body, and the 2011 
Egyptian Revolution’ (2013), argues that resistance has taken on a Habermasian 
‘postsecular’ form. This postsecular form centers around the image of the tortured 
                                                            
618 Abeer Bassiouny Arafa Ali Radwan, ‘How the Egyptian Revolution Emphasized 
the Sovereignty of the People’, ed. by Csaba T. Chikes, Amercian Diplomacy, 2011 
<http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2011/0912/oped/radwan_egyptianrev.html
> [accessed 20 February 2015]. 
619 Mohamed M. Helmy and Sabine Frerichs, ‘Stripping the Boss: The Powerful Role 
of Humor in the Egyptian Revolution 2011’, Integrative Psychological and 
Behavioral Science, 47 (2013), 450–81 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12124-013-9239-
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body. For Mavelli, the protestors’ ‘politics of resistance’ escapes the polarization of 
religion and the secular as it centers itself on the image of the tortured body, the 
imagination.620 Mavelli adopts Maha Abdelrahman’s definition of the secular as the 
‘power to define the space and meanings that religion may occupy in society’ and that 
the state had controlled for a long while.621 By investing in the image of the tortured 
body, the protestors thus display an indifference to that version of the secular. The 
imagination becomes a Foucaultian site of resistance to the polarization of the 
alternative ‘regimes of power and knowledge’.622 By relying on the imagination as a 
site of resistance, the protestors thus rethink politics past the polarization of the 
religious and the secular regimes of power that the older regime maintained. 
Despite the apparently diverse, positive and negative, outlooks within these 
readings of the revolution, I take them to actually highlight the creative translation of 
sovereignty that I argue for in this thesis. The translation of sovereignty within the 
context of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution has been an on-going struggle and shift from 
a politically imposed divine model towards a more collective and aesthetically secular 
one. I read Radwan’s and Tadros’s commentaries to underscore this struggle in the 
protestors’ rudimentary sense of popular sovereignty that could not think of itself in 
secular acts of negotiation and compromise with others. For Radwan and Tadros, the 
protestors seem to sink back into a divine model of sovereignty that the regime 
imposed; they remove the regime, only to replace themselves as sovereigns. However, 
Radwan’s and Tadros’s readings seem to miss the point that collective sovereignty 
does not necessarily build itself in the political arena. It can form in imaginative, 
                                                            
620 Luca Mavelli, ‘Postsecular Resistance, the Body, and the 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution’, Review of International Studies, 38 (2012), 1057–78 (p. 1074) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000472>. 
621 Maha M. Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt 
(London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p. 108. 
622 Mavelli, ‘Postsecular Resistanceʼ, p. 1078. 
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emotional and poetic terms. For example, the people’s collective model of 
sovereignty breaks the fetters of instrumental or political logic in such media as 
political cartoons and poetry, as we have seen in this thesis. Cartoons and poetic 
chanting profane or play with the sacred elements of imposed sovereign power. Here, 
such studies as Helmy, Freirichs’s and Mavelli’s serve to underscore the protestors’ 
politics of profanation that destabilizes the politics of power and sovereignty. Their 
studies show that collective sovereignty is redefined through the emotional and 
aesthetic aspects associated with it. Political sovereignty established on fear, for 
Helmy and Freirchs, is replaced by sovereignty based on collective humor, sarcasm 
and word play. While sovereign-induced-fear is employed to affirm the continued 
control of the regime upon the people, sovereign-embodied-laughter can only evoke 
collective madness. Madness is a dynamic that is clearly not associated with power 
and one that could only forecast the emptiness of the throne of power in the far future. 
Similarly, Mavelli argues that the protestors employ imaginative indifference to the 
secular and religious regimes of power. Although the notion of the religious and 
secular, here, differ with the ones I adopt for this thesis, Mavelli’s postsecular 
maintains the promise of the empty throne of power through imaginative indifference. 
Indifference qualifies an emotional sense of collectivity that is reflected in the 
people’s response to an image. This is why I hold that imaginative indifference and 
laughter are not simple strategies of resistance that emphasize self-efficacy and 
disregard for the religious and secular. Instead, they are emotional responses that 
rewrite the dynamics inherent to power and that render power an empty throne that 
can only be expressed in imaginative terms. 
In their politics of profanation, the people creatively translate sovereignty beyond 
the political sense. They display the emptiness of the throne of power – an emptiness 
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that becomes their incentive for more creative output. Their imaginative creativity 
shows in their experimentation within language, for example. Language no longer 
fulfills its officially set role of communicating meaning. Political expressions, such as 
‘civil state’, assume too many opposed meanings to bear any meaning at all. By 
displaying the emptiness and futility of the instrumental role ascribed to language, the 
protestors lay bare a Derridean deconstructive ‘play’ within language. In this sense, 
Ahmad ElShiekh writes in ‘Between the Signifier and the Signified Falls the 
Signification: Reflections on the Use of Political Terms in the Egyptian 2011 Events’ 
that signification within the revolution loses its path between the signifier and 
signified. Terms, like justice, have political meanings that fail to realize themselves in 
reality and could be mistaken for injustice, and vice versa.623 Although ElShiekh sees 
in play a proper description for the state of confusion in which all Egyptians are, I 
hold that this confusion is but a form of linguistic potentiality that announces the 
release of language from its fatalistic mission or its socially and politically dictated 
instrumental use. In this release, the empty throne of power becomes the impetus for 
the artistic and creative translation of sovereignty. 
In order to make this argument, I started by exploring the translation of 
sovereignty within a comparative framework whereby I employed Western 
postmodern thought to reread early Islamic medieval philosophy. Derrida’s writings 
allowed me to investigate the translation of sovereignty as a deconstructive tendency 
within logical rational thought. The insignia of power, such as the cape and throne, 
are employed by the regime to signify a divine-like sovereignty. However, by 
overthrowing that regime, the protestors render the cape a wedding gown as they 
                                                            
623 Ahmed Abdel Azim ElShiekh, ‘Between the Signifier and the Signified Falls the 
Signification: Reflections on the Use of Political Terms in the Egyptian 2011 Events’, 
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enact a secular form of popular sovereignty. In this attempt, the protestors shed light 
on what Derrida calls the king’s absent body, a body that is forever absent and forever 
ready to be shrouded. However, in that absence of the body and the emptiness of what 
Agamben calls the throne of power, the protestors find a promise or the ‘gateways to a 
new happiness’.624 Their promise lies in contemplating the state of the emptiness upon 
the throne and the absence of the body whereby whatever is deemed sacred and 
worthy of power within the political sphere is returned to common use and subjected 
to play.  
This deconstructive translation of sovereignty informs my reading for similar 
traces within al-Farabi’s medieval thought. Divine sovereignty in the guise of the 
imam invests in political jabarite determinism of rhetorically creating similitudes for 
divine truths. However, the weeds of the Virtuous City, the medieval version of 
modern protestors, employ qadarite free will to poetically contest the imam’s images 
and resist his sacred shield of similitudes. Instead of a king or imam-centered 
sovereignty, the weeds introduce a collective sense of the will that is aesthetically 
creative.625 Sovereignty is translated within an imaginative and affective context. In 
that translation, the Derridean cape and wedding gown become the sacred set of 
images dictated by the imam as a reference for power. Just as power cannot translate 
itself except through sovereignty in both the divine cape form and the secular 
                                                            
624 Agamben, Profanations, p. 76. 
625 Al-Farabi’s contribution to the question of the Muslim notion of sovereignty, as 
imam or caliph (the two terms are used interchangeably), lies in his philosophical 
reformulation of this political concern. For Marcia L. Colish (in Medieval 
Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition, 400-1400 (New Haven/London: 
Yale University Press, 1997), p.141), al-Farabi ‘recast[s] the caliph as philosopher-
king of Plato’s Republic’ and ‘correlates the hierarchy of offices in the caliph’s 
bureaucracy with the Neoplatonic chain of being’. However, for Colish, al-Farabi’s 
philosophy ‘had no influence on later Muslim philosophy or statecraft’. In this sense, 
it can be argued that the Islamic framework for sovereignty differs according to each 
philosopher and the period of concern to the researcher. 
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wedding-gown one, it cannot translate itself except through the images and the affects 
on which each form of sovereignty relies. In the weeds’ redefinition of sovereignty, 
language functions not as an instrumental tool to communicate signification but rather 
as a set of keys to creatively unlock new realities wholly based within the 
imagination.  
By investigating the translation of sovereignty within this comparatively 
dialogical framework, this thesis sheds light on the role that justice plays in orienting 
that translation. In the first chapter, I argued that the translation of sovereignty, from a 
Western Derridean perspective, marks a shift from a divine paradigm to a more 
secular understanding of semiotics. The divine paradigm of sovereignty is depicted by 
a cape as the insignia of divine power. Derrida translates this cape into a wedding 
gown as an insignia of collective and contractual secular power. Sovereignty, for 
Derrida, can only be communicated in translation between these two paradigms of 
insignia: cape and wedding gown. The former conceals the absent body of the king 
while the second encloses the absent body of the people. In semiotic terms, the 
insignia of power translate as signs that have lost the dimension of the divine 
signified. In order to conceal its inherent loss, the sign contracts with the aesthetic 
image as an expressive symptom of that loss. Contract indicates the condition for 
supplementation; signs cannot self-fulfill and thus constantly need the 
supplementation of other signs or images. Contract is guided by the messianic hope of 
achieving justice, a justice that cannot be uttered except as a prayer for forgiveness for 
this constant need for supplementation. In this state of the wedding-gown-contract, 
mediation becomes the key concern of translating sovereignty that aims for justice.   
In the second chapter, I explored traces of this Western postmodern framework of 
translating sovereignty within al-Farabi’s medieval thought. By taking the imam to 
Page 222 
 
indicate a divine figure of the king, I showed how this imam employs mimesis to 
mediate theoretical truths through rhetoric. Being a philosopher-king, the imam’s 
intellect is also in contact with the divine mind through emanation. The truths that he 
communicates to the citizens of the Virtuous City via mimetic mediation preserve 
traces of illumination from the Active Intellect. Mimetic mediation that distinguishes 
politically divine sovereignty, however, is the same tool that the protestors employ to 
deconstruct that notion of sovereignty. Whereas the imam employs mimesis by 
imitating truths through images, the weeds reformulate mimesis to indicate the 
multiplication of images in relation to the emotional and imaginary construction of 
other city models that are yet-to-come. The translation of sovereignty takes the form 
of redefining emanation as man-made mimetic creation of images. Justice, for the 
weeds, is an appetitive moral of the soul that correlates with the very act of 
multiplying images in relation to constructed value.  
Adopting this comparative framework of translating sovereignty, I moved on in 
Chapter Three to investigate collective mimetic creation within the context of the 
2011 Egyptian Revolution. Political cartoons were investigated as the media for the 
mimetic play of images and signs integral to the affective translation of sovereignty. 
Depicting the people’s attempt at toppling the regime, the cartoons display how the 
people introduce secular sovereignty as they collectively face the divine-like model 
imposed by the regime in an affective display of unified sarcasm. The cartoon 
depictions highlight Agamben’s notion of glory or praise fundamental for the 
establishment of sovereignty. However, the protestors are depicted to employ the 
dynamics of glory to profane, instead of praise, the regime’s divine model of 
sovereignty. Instead of acclaiming the sovereign, the protestors praise the media that 
deliver that glory. By displaying glory as a medium for both praise of mediation and 
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profanation of a sovereign, the cartoons show how glory assumes a reverse form 
whereby glory rests within itself and discloses the empty throne of power that 
sovereignty, in both divine and secular forms, relies on and shields. In reverse 
acclamation, the emptiness of the throne promises justice through withdrawal from 
sovereignty. Justice is the promise that it is possible to bring back to common use all 
that was deemed to be sacred by sovereignty. One tool that the protestors attempt to 
withdraw from sovereignty and that the cartoons shed light on is that of language that 
is used in praise and profanation. Language ceases to instrumentally communicate 
analytic logical meaning and is, instead, characterized by play. Linguistic play utters 
the hope for justice where the throne of sovereignty is left empty within translation. 
In the last chapter, I embarked on investigating the de-instrumentalization of 
language through the poetry of the revolution. Poetry negotiates the translation of 
cape-wedding gown, or the divine-secular models of sovereignty, through reflecting a 
shift in the social imaginary, taken to mean the common paradigm of meaning-
making, of the protestors. One common paradigm is that of the free will/ pre-
determinism or qadariya/jabariya debate that resurfaces in the people’s modern 
imaginary concerning sovereignty. Poetic language articulates a secular free will 
impetus that breaks with the sacred paradigm of already-established meaning-making. 
However, it still aligns itself with the divine notion of fate as an affirmative 
emanation of created meaning. The protestors come up with such terms as ‘civil state’ 
or dawla madaniya in order to bring about, name or shed light on a political 
construction that does not exist yet. This political construction at the moment seems to 
have no meaning at all because of the many contradictory meanings it already entails. 
By negotiating a world vision through poetry, the protestors enact the role of oral 
transmitters of poetry who are responsible for making up names and fashioning terms. 
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They become the builders of a nation that is yet to come, the nation within justice 
marked by freedom from the fatalism of language, or the fatalism of the already-
established meanings within language. The aesthetic translation of sovereignty 
between the divine and secular thus is a form of articulating a creative impetus guided 
by justice that seeks to unlock a certain freedom within the fatalism of language. This 
linguistic freedom, or what I call linguistic qadarism, lays bare the empty throne of 
power that maintains the promise without the prospect that it will be filled. The 
protestors are left with the mission of offering a reverse witness statement, a linguistic 
mold for a promised state that they can only do through the imagination. 
Let me close, here, with some more evidence, besides language, that the creative 
translation of sovereignty in Egypt is still ongoing today. Despite the general 
pessimistic and ambivalent readings that the media, which I referred to earlier, 
present, there are hints that the promise within translation survives. As already 
mentioned, strife in the name of justice is ongoing and shifting in the current forms it 
takes. The most important of its forms is that of popular artistic creation, whether in 
drawing, political cartoons, or music. After the military government has taken over, 
political cartoons, for example, continue to emphasize the divine model of 
sovereignty that the government embodies and against which protestors continue to 
struggle. One sample cartoon below focuses on depicting the artistic aspect of this 
struggle. The following cartoon is created by the Egyptian cartoonist Andeel who 
posted this cartoon on his Facebook page in October 2013 after his cartoon was 
rejected by Al-Masri Al-Youm, the newspaper for which he was working:626   
                                                            
626 Carol Hills, ‘Two Cartoonists in Egypt Push the Boundaries of What’s Acceptable 
and Find a Ready Audience’, Public Radio International 
<http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-05-15/its-back-mubarak-era-egypt-political-
cartoonists-find-portraying-sisi-limits> [accessed 25 March 2015]. 
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 Figure 1. ‘The Craftsman’.627  
The ‘new pharaoh’ that is being sculpted has the face of General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, 
the current Egyptian president. The caption reads: ‘For shame, sir! I’m really doing a 
proper job on this one - it’ll work like a charm for 30 or 40 years at least! God 
willing’.628 Al-Sisi is the new face for the pharaoh as the divine model of sovereignty 
that the cartoonist, the representative of the people, satirizes. Andeel presents the 
cartoon as a popular form of art that protests against sculpture, an engrained and 
durable artistic form. The political cartoon thus depicts the people’s persistent 
struggle against the divine model of sovereignty. This struggle takes the form of the 
cartoon’s double reading of sovereignty through focusing on artistic expression, 
popular drawing vs. sculpting. This growing awareness of the role of popular artistic 
expression as witness statements prompts Ganzeer, an artist who participated in a 
global graffiti campaign against al-Sisi, to write that ‘critical artists should be seen as 
a source of information to the State. By paying attention to what we do, perhaps the 
State can better understand popular grievances and adjust its policies and governance 
                                                            
627 Andeel, ‘The Craftsman’ [Facebook post], 23 October 
2013<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10153381591275224&set=a.13866
5530223.232104.777560223&type=3&theater˃ [Accessed 10 April 2015]. 
628Hills. 
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accordingly, rather than invest so many resources into trying to shut us up’.629 
Ganzeer’s message outlines the critical role that art can play not only in political 
decision making but also in the translation of sovereignty from a divine to a popular 
model. 
The role that popular art plays in rewriting the translation of sovereignty 
resurfaces also in musical expression. Electro shaabi, also known as mahragan or 
festive music, is one form of musical expression that has been growing in popularity 
since the 2011 revolution. This style ‘reflects the reality, values and ideologies of 
Egyptian youth, referencing the language, fashion, and dialects of the working classes 
left behind by the political process’.630 Popular festive music gives space for the social 
sector that has been marginalized by political struggle. The people rewrite the struggle 
against the divine and imposed model of sovereignty not through a political struggle 
for a collective model of sovereignty but through collective artistic expression. 
Through this collective artistic expression, the youth insist that the ‘talk about the 
streets, this is politics’, as one electro shaabi star states. The youth redefine the 
political concern with power and authority into that with the ‘talk about the young 
people and how they feel’.631 In their redefinition, they present their ongoing attempt 
at fashioning an Agambenian inspired politics of profanation. Their profanation is 
evident in the messy and ‘insanely annoying’ aspect of the music, the ‘volume, the 
                                                            
629 Jonathan Guyer, ‘Picturing Egypt’s Next President’, The New Yorker 
<http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/picturing-egypts-next-president> 
[accessed 29 March 2015]. 
630Pete Kowalczyk, ‘Cairo’s Underground Producers Defy Military Rule’, Dazed 
<http://www.dazeddigital.com/music/article/20043/1/egypts-underground-producers-
stand-against-military-rule> [accessed 25 March 2015]. 
631 Kowalczyk, ʻCairo’s Underground Producersʼ. 
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intensity’, that they make.632 Songs are not written to deliver a message; instead, 
songs rewrite power in volume and intensity. In artistic expression, the youth strive 
for justice through de-instrumentalizing language. Language seems to be restored to 
its status as pure means when it matters only in terms of the volume of the music in 
which it is delivered and the emotional response it causes in the audience. By 
focusing on rhythm and emotional response, the people rewrite the translation of 
sovereignty past the models of divine sovereignty and collective secularism. Their 
translation lays bare the empty throne of power through artistic creative expression. 
Instead of rendering power a collective dynamic within sovereignty, the Egyptian 
youth increasingly resort to popular artistic techniques to rewrite the dynamics and 
definition of power itself. They thus display and embellish what Claude Lefort calls 
the ‘empty space’ of power. According to Lefort, power ‘cannot  be  occupied - it  is 
such  that  no individual  and  no group can  be  consubstantial  with  it - and  it  
cannot  be  represented’. 633 As an empty space, power cannot be said to ‘reside in 
society’ nor can it be appropriated by governments. This only shows that power is a 
constant state of contestation or ‘controlled contest with permanent rules’.634  
However, what this thesis has hopefully made clear by now is that the Egyptian youth 
are rewriting this power dynamic. In their struggle, the youth highlight Lefort’s 
emptiness of the space of power, Agamben’s void and Derrida’s absent body, only to 
show how it translates itself through popular artistic contestation. Popular art, for the 
Egyptian youth, does not take authority necessarily as its aim; it might invest in power 
only so that justice can be persistently pursued. Musical noise and popular cartoons 
                                                            
632Andeel, ‘You Just Got Mahraganed’, Mada Masr 
<http://www.madamasr.com/sections/culture/you-just-got-mahraganed> [accessed 26 
March 2015]. 
633 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Thought, trans. by David Macey 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1988), p. 17. 
634 Lefort, Democracy and Political Thought, p. 17. 
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are the people’s newly constructed field of justice to which law will have to answer. 
Law’s mission cannot be limited to a simple rational act of curbing or even protecting 
these artistic forms of expression; law’s task, it now seems, is to provide these fields 
with material that will promote their creative potentials as witness statements.  
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